

















West Africa  
 
 
Independent Evaluation of UNIDO Regional 














  UNITED NATIONS 
  INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION  
            U N I D O   E V A L U A T I O N   G R O U P      




















Independent Evaluation of UNIDO Regional Programmes  





















UNITED NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION 


































The views and opinions expressed in this Evaluation Report are those of the authors based on 
their professional assessment of the evaluation subject. Those views and opinions do not 
necessarily reflect the views of UNIDO. 
 
The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this document do not imply 
the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations 
Industrial Development Organization concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city 
or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. 
 
Mention of company names and commercial products does not imply the endorsement of 
UNIDO. 
 









Original: English/French Table of Contents 
 




Annex 1: Terms of Reference  1 
Annex 2: Synthesis of PRMN findings  17 
Annex 3: Synthesis of WAQP findings  27 
Annex 4: Overall assessment of WAQP using recommendations from            
                the Thematic Evaluation of SMTQ as Benchmarks  
 
45 
Annex 5: Country reports   49 
Annex 6: List of persons met  113 
Annex 7: Key Reference documents        124 
 
    
 
  
  1 
Annex 1: Terms of Reference 
 
Independent internal evaluation  
of UNIDO 
Trade Capacity Building Programmes 
in West Africa 
 
I. GENERAL BACKGROUND 
 
The UNIDO Executive Board has mandated the UNIDO Evaluation Group to conduct 
this independent thematic evaluation of two UNIDO Trade Capacity Building (TCB) 
Programmes in West Africa. The evaluation covers the following large scale regional 
programmes: 
 
-  “Restructuring and upgrading of industries in UEMOA countries” - abbreviated 
“Upgrading Programme”; (10.9 million euro UEMOA funding, 0.8 million euro 
UNIDO funding). 
-  “Competitiveness support and harmonization of TBT and SPS measures”, - 
abbreviated “West Africa Quality Programme” (WAQP); (16.9 million euro EU 
funding). 
 
Both  programmes  are  among UNIDO’s  most  strategic,  longstanding  and  wide 
ranging  initiatives.  Both  come  under  the  thematic  priority  of  TCB.  And  both 
programmes implement UNIDOs so called "Three C Approach" (Competitiveness, 
Conformity  and  Connectivity)  with  Industrial  Upgrading  being  at  the  core  of 
“Competitiveness”  and  Standards,  Metrology,  Testing  and  Quality  (SMTQ) 
programmes  addressing  “Conformity”.  The  combined  evaluation  of  the  two 
programmes offers therefore the unique opportunity to assess UNIDO’s competitive 
edge  in  implementing  two  complementary  regional  programmes  that  are  coming 
under two different technical areas while serving the same development objective. 
 
Both programmes are under implementation since 2007. The Upgrading Programme 
has come to an end in 2011; the WAQP is currently in a one year “bridging phase”. 
They are subject to mandatory evaluations under the responsibility of the respective 
donors but, for various reasons, the donors did not yet conduct these evaluations.  
 
This independent internal evaluation will complement the two donor-led evaluations 
by  focusing  on  evaluation  questions  that  are  of  specific  strategic  importance  for 
UNIDO (see chapter V). The evaluation report should become available by the end of 
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II. PROGRAMME INFORMATION 
 
Structure, objectives and budget of the Upgrading Programme 
  
The pilot programme for Industrial Upgrading is funded by the UEMOA and covers all 
eight UEMOA member states (Benin; Burkina Faso; Côte d’Ivoire; Guinea - Bissau; 
Mali; Niger; Senegal; Togo). It is managed by the Business, Industry and Technology 
(BIT) branch at UNIDO HQ through a Technical Coordination Unit (TCU)1 based at 
the  UEMOA  Commission  in  Ouagadougou.  The  regional  counterpart  of  the 
programme  is  the  Directorate  of  Industry  at  the  UEMOA  Commission.  National 
counterparts are the respective Ministries of Industry with National upgrading offices 
(BRMN) in all eight countries. In Senegal the programme is implemented in parallel 
with another upgrading programme at national level. 
 
The programme document defined the following five components: 
 
  Component 1: Strengthening of regional and national institutional 
restructuring and upgrading capacities. 
  Component 2: Support for the design and implementation of financing 
mechanisms for restructuring and upgrading at the regional and national 
level. 
  Component 3: Creation or strengthening of capacities in the field of 
upgrading. 
  Component 4: Pilot support programme for the restructuring of agribusiness 
companies. 
  Component 5: Pilot support programme for upgrading and improving the 
competitiveness of agribusiness companies. 
 
The  Logframe  of  the  Upgrading  Programme  defines  17  outputs  under  the  five 
components. It mentions indicators at output level (although mostly qualitative) but 
no indicators are provided for the development objective and the three outcomes 
(stated as “specific objectives”) shown in Table below: 
 
Table 1: Upgrading Programme - Development Objective and Outcomes 
General objective  
Boosting industrial production, investment and employment 
promotion and improvement of the economies’ competitiveness at 
regional and international levels. 
Specific objective 1:  Enable the emergence of support services that will provide the 
necessary skills and qualifications needed by firms. 
Specific objective 2   Enable firms to become competitive. 
Specific objective 3  
Strengthen the capacities of firms to enable them to track and 
master technological change and to adapt to the demands of 
regional integration and international competition. 
 
 
                                                 
1 Cellule Technique Régionale de Mise à Niveau (CTRMN)  
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As  shown  in  Table  2,  the  project  document  sets  targets  of  60  companies  for 
upgrading (component 4)  and 60 for restructuring (component  5). The cumulated 
target of 120 companies is equivalent to 10% of the estimated population of 1200 
companies in all eight UEMOA countries (not differentiated by country), put forward 
in the project document.  
 
Table 2: Upgrading Programme – Targets at Enterprise Level 
Component 4 : Pilot support programme for the restructuring of agribusiness 
companies 
Output: Redress companies that have the capacity to rehabilitate 
Indicator: Restructuring diagnostics developed for 60 agribusiness companies 
Indicator: 60 agribusiness companies assisted in restructuring 
Component 5 : Pilot support programme for upgrading and improving the 
competitiveness of agribusiness companies 
Output: Improve the competitiveness of agribusiness companies 
Indicator: Upgrading diagnostics developed for 60 agribusiness companies 
Indicator: 60 agribusiness companies selected and assisted in upgrading 
 
The programme document sets the total funding at 14, 7 million euro (without support 
cost). This overall amount was split into a UNIDO budget of 10.9 million euro and an 
amount  of  3.8  million  euro  to  be  implemented  directly  by  UEMOA,  primarily  for 
subsidizing material investments of the beneficiary companies. The programme was 
financed by UEMOA with a contribution of 800,000 euro from UNIDO. Table 3 shows 
the financial structure of the programme spread over several budgetary entities. 
 
Table 3: Upgrading Programme Planned Budget (Euros) 




TERAF07001  UEMOA  
10,076,190 
6,655,251 
TERAF07A01  UEMOA   400,500 
TERAF07B01  UEMOA   321,975 
TERAF07C01  UEMOA   38,071 
TERAF07D01  UEMOA   2,160,000 
UEMOA COMMISSION  10,076,190  9,575,797 
XPRAF06023  UNIDO 
800,000 
36,438 
YARAF07036  UNIDO  161,334 
YARAF09012  UNIDO  211,142 
YARAF10009  UNIDO  388,000 
UNIDO  800,000  796,914 
TOTAL  10,876,190  10,372,711  
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The programme has been completed. The latest progress report of December 2011 
reports on a financial implementation rate of 99.88%. Table 4 shows the breakdown 
by  components  from  the  programme  document  (including  activities  directly 
implemented by the UEMOA).  
 
Table 4: Planned Upgrading Programme Budget by Component  
(in Million Euro) 
  TOTAL  YEAR 1  YEAR 2 
Joint administration structures  1,940  1,115  825 
Component 1  648  648  - 
Component 2  193  193  - 
Component 3  439  439  - 
Component 4  5,723  1,390  4,333 
Component 5  5,723  1,390  4,333 
Sub-total  14,666  5,175  9,491 
Support cost  1,907  673  1,234 
Total  16,573  5,848  10,725 
 
The programme document envisaged that beneficiary companies might be able to 
achieve  annual  growth  rates  of  10%  for  production,  exports  and  employment.  A 
programme report on the financial support mechanisms revealed in 2011 that most 
target countries had difficulties to recruit the number of 15 companies envisaged for 
support. The assessment mentions three major reasons: 
 
  Too restrictive selection criteria; 
  Agro-industry focus inappropriate for certain countries; 
  In certain countries inadequate government support for country offices. 
 
The initially planned duration of two years was extended several times leading up to 
an actual duration of more than five years (02/07 – 06/12). However, as shown in 
Table 7, the programme managed to reach 99 companies. 
 
Structure, objectives and budget of the WAQP Programme 
 
The  programme  “Competitiveness  support  and  harmonization  of  TBT  and  SPS 
measures” (WAQP) relates to SMTQ and hence to “Conformity”. It started in 2007 
and follows-up on an earlier UNIDO programme in UEMOA countries implemented 
between 2001 and 2005 under EU funding. Under this predecessor programme four 
regional SMTQ institutions (SOAC; NORMCERQ; SOAMET; CRECQ) were created, 
which continue to exist, although they do not cover ECOWAS but only UEMOA. 
 
The  WAQP  is  managed  by  the  UNIDO  TCB  branch.  Initially,  it  was  split  into  a 
UEMOA  component  and  into  a  component  covering  Gambia,  Ghana,  Liberia, 
Nigeria,  Sierra  Leone,  Guinea  and  Cape  Verde  (ECOWAS  but  not  UEMOA 
members),  as  well  Mauretania,  which  is  not  an  ECOWAS  member.  The  two 
components were managed by two different project managers at HQ and from two  
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different PMUs, one at the UEMOA Commission in Ouagadougou and another one 
initially located in Accra and then transferred to the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja. 
Since  August  2011,  these  two  sub-programmes  are  managed  by  one  single 
programme  manager  at  HQ.  Since  January  2012  the  overall  implementation 
responsibility  became  concentrated  at  the  PMU  in  Abuja  with  the  PMU  in 
Ouagadougou becoming a sub-office. Table 5 shows the objectives and indicators of 
the WAQP. Most of them are of a qualitative nature. 
 
Table 5: WAQP – Development Objective and Outcomes 
Overall objective 
Contribute to the gradual integration of 
the West African region in the global 
economy. 
Indicators 
Harmonized policies for quality are adopted 
at national and regional levels. 
Specific objective 
Strengthen the competitiveness of 
enterprises and ensure compliance 
with international trade rules and 
technical regulations. 
 
Quality, standardization, conformity 
assessment and upgrading infrastructures 
are functioning according to international 
operative practices. 
Result 1 
National and regional quality 
infrastructure are able to provide 
services to enterprises. 
 At least 25% of the companies are 
certified. 
 Regional and national standards are 
developed for 25% of the priority products. 
Result 2 
The standardization, conformity 
assessment and accreditation 
activities are operational. 
 On average, 2 laboratories accredited per 
country. 
 4 national product certification bodies are 
operational and comply with ISO Guide 
65. 
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Table 6 shows the planned budget from the programme document and the actual 
final budget after revisions: 
 
Table 6: WAQP Project Structure, Planned and Actual Budget (Euro) 




UEMOA countries  Non-UEMOA countries  Total 
Budget  Components  Budget  Components  Budget 
Program 
coordination 
1,276,820  Program 
coordination 
 Economic 
analysis of trade 
2,034,075  3,310,895  6,443,840 






953,082  Conformity 
assessment 
 Certification of  
enterprises and 
products 
   Metrology/ 
calibration 




685,045  Standardization  948,176  1,633,221  938,992 
Inspection  473,362  Inspection  646,774  1,120,136  328,073 
Quality 
promotion 
511,213  Quality promotion  938,829  1,450,042  1,989,850 
Restructuring/ 
upgrading 
932,723  x  x  932,723  754,468 






5,607,477  Total (excluding 
administration 
fees) 




392,523  UNIDO 
administration 
fees 
523,365  915,888  1,107,674 
Total  6,000,000    8,000,000  14,000,000  16,931,600  
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Table 7: Programme Coverage 









Firms  Nat. 
 Progr 

















1  Benin    4  1  15    46  14    2010 
2  Burkina Faso    4  1  16    50  18  x  2010 
2012 
3  Côte d’Ivoire    4  1  12    65  14     
4  Guinea Bissau    __  1  14    27  13     
5  Mali    2  1  10    37  15  x  2010 
6  Niger    1  1  10    25  10  x   
7  Senegal    8  1  21  X  58  15  x  2012 




























x   
10  Gambia    2  2  2    2010 
11  Ghana  X  4  1  3  x  2010 
12  Guinea    2  1       
13  Liberia    2  1  4    2012 
14  Mauritania    3  1  5***    2012 
15  Nigeria    4  2  7  x  2010 
16  Sierra Leone    2  1  3    2012 
 
* Data from the UNIDO investor survey available for this country 
** Years in which EU conducted Results Oriented Monitoring (ROM) mission 
*** Five enterprises selected in 2012 are currently supported 
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Technically,  the  WAQP  was  split  into  two  Components:  EE/RAF/07/A17  covering 
UEMOA countries with a budget of US$7,707,655 and EE/RAF/07/017 with a budget 
of US$11,367,092 covering the other eight countries. In total, the initial budget of the 
WAQP amounted therefore to US$19,074,747 (14,000,000 euro).  
 
The initial budget has been revised three times
1 and increased to a final amount of 
16,931,600  euro.  The  latest  progress  report  dated  February  2012  mentions  a 
financial implementation rate of 84%. The initially planned duration of three years 
(09/07 – 09/10) was extended twice. It has been agreed that 2012 should become a 
“bridging year” leading to the next phase. 
 
A number of companies were supported by both programmes. As shown in Table 6, 
the UEMOA component of the WAQP included company support activities under the 
conformity  assessment  component  and  under  a  special  component  “restructuring 
and upgrading” (UEMOA countries only). The extent of overlaps and/or synergies 
between the company supports of both programmes is to be reviewed under the 
evaluation. 
 
Table  7  shows  the  country  coverage  of  the  two  programmes;  the  numbers  of 
laboratories, firms and consultants supported in each country; in which years the 
countries were visited by a “Results Oriented Monitoring” (ROM) mission of the EU 
(covering the WASQ only) and whether this country has been covered by the “Africa 
Investor Survey 2011” conducted by UNIDO. 
 
III.   RELATED ONGOING AND PAST EVALUATIONS 
 
This evaluation is part of to the ongoing thematic evaluation of UNIDO interventions 
in the area of Industrial Upgrading (IU). This process oriented evaluation started in 
2011 and will be finalized by the end of 2012. It assesses a representative sample of 
UNIDO projects and programmes dealing with different aspects of IU.  
 
The  thematic  evaluation  pays  attention,  among  other  aspects,  to  the  interaction 
between  industrial  upgrading  and  the  availability  of  a  national  quality  (SMTQ) 
infrastructure. This interaction is also at the core of the present evaluation, which is 
therefore expected to provide additional input to the thematic evaluation.  
 
The evaluation will also take into account the findings and recommendations from 
another thematic evaluation covering UNIDO projects in the area of SMTQ, which 
was delivered in 2010.  
 
The evaluation will also build on the comprehensive and thorough self-evaluation of 
the upgrading programme, which was commissioned by the former UNIDO manager 




                                                 
1One  for  the  extension  of  programme  duration  from  August  2010  to  December  2011,  one  for  the 
transition phase and one (Amendment 5) for the use of the accrued interest. 
2 Auto Evaluation - Programme sous-r￩gional pilote de restructuration et de mise ￠ niveau de l’industrie 
des pays de l’UEMOA (TE/RAF/07/001) ; rapport préparé par Alexandra Capello ; 19 janvier 2011.  
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Last  but  not  least  the  evaluation  will  build  on  the  “Results  Oriented  Monitoring” 
(ROM) exercises of the WAQP conducted by the EU Commission (see Table 7).  
 
IV.   EVALUATION PURPOSE  
 
UNIDO has a long-term and a short-term interest in this evaluation. The short-term 
interest comes from the fact that follow-up phases are currently under discussion for 
both programmes. Therefore, the recommendations from this evaluation should be 
available in a timely fashion to feed into the planning of these possible next phases.  
The  long-term  UNIDO  interest  comes  from  the  strategic  importance  of  the  two 
regional programmes for the TCB line of actions for the Organization. In that sense, 
the  evaluation  is  expected  to  produce  lessons  learned  on  UNIDO’s  management 
modalities  of  large  regional  programmes  and  on  the  optimization  of  UNIDO’s 
multidimensional “3 C” approach.  
 
Furthermore,  the  evaluation  is  relevant  to  two  major  organizational  challenges 
identified as critical by the UNIDO management: 
 
  Improve the cooperation between the different branches of the Organization 
in order to increase synergies (“Delivering as One UNIDO”);  
  Optimize the use of field offices for the implementation of UNIDO Technical 
Assistance. 
 
These issues are being addressed through an organizational change programme to 
which the evaluation is expected to provide inputs. 
 
The purpose of the evaluation is to produce: 
 
  Short-term recommendations to UNIDO in view of the planned extensions of 
the two programmes; 
  Recommendations to UNIDO for the management of large regional 
programmes; 
  Strategic recommendations to UNIDO for further optimization of the “3 C” 
approach to TCB; 
  Input for the pending external evaluations to be conducted by donors. 
 
As mentioned above, external donor evaluations are pending for both programmes. 
This  independent  internal  UNIDO  evaluation  has  been  designed  in  a  way  to 
complement the donor evaluations and to avoid duplication and potential overlap. 
Cooperation with donors and counterparts will be sought throughout the evaluation. 
The draft evaluation report will be shared for comments. 
 
V.   EVALUATION METHODOLOGY  
 
The evaluation will build on the findings and recommendations of the two thematic 
evaluations, the self-evaluation and the ROM exercises of the EU mentioned above. 
It will be carried out through analyses of various sources of information, including 
desk analysis, field visits, surveys and interviews  with counterparts, beneficiaries,  
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donor  representatives,  programme  managers  and  through  the  cross-validation  of 
data.  
 
It  will  apply  the  standard  DAC  evaluation  criteria  of  relevance,  effectiveness, 
efficiency, impact and sustainability to assess the achievements of the programmes 
against  the  objectives  and  indicators  set  out  in  the  logical  frameworks  in  the 
respective project documents and, if applicable, in the revised Logframe documented 
in the inception reports or any other agreed document. 
 
Methodologically, the evaluation faces a number of challenges.  
 
  As mentioned above, the combined evaluation of the two programmes offers 
the unique opportunity to assess UNIDO’s competitive edge in implementing 
two complementary regional programmes that are coming under two different 
technical areas while serving the same development objective.  
  However, the two programmes have different histories, different funding 
structures, different management structures and different geographical 
coverage. This requires thorough analysis and balanced judgements of the 
individual programmes before making comparisons or generalizations. 
  The available budget is rather small, compared to the size of the programmes 
(50,000 euro, which is less than 0.2% of the combined financial volume of 
27.8 million euro of the two programmes) and the ambitious learning 
objectives. 
  The evaluation needs to be conducted in a relatively short period of time; the 
draft report should be ready by the end of 2012. 
  The evaluation covers 16 countries using three different languages: French, 
English and Portuguese. 
 
Against  the background  of these challenges it would be unrealistic to  expect the 
evaluation to follow a comprehensive approach. Instead, it will focus on a limited 
number of evaluation questions that are of strategic importance for UNIDO (see next 
chapter). It will also not be possible to conduct field work in all 16 countries but only 
on a limited sample of countries to be selected (see below). However, this focused 
approach is justified not only by UNIDO’s specific learning needs but also by the 
more comprehensive donor evaluations that are expected to come, as mentioned 
above. 
 
The evaluation will be carried out in keeping with the principles laid down in the “UN 
Norms and Standards for Evaluation” and the Evaluation Policy of UNIDO.
3 While 
maintaining  independence, the  evaluation  will  adopt  a participatory  approach  and 
seek the views and assessments of all parties.  
 





                                                 
3 All documents available from the websites of the UN Evaluation Group: http://www.uneval.org/  
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  Background analysis for all 16 countries and for the region as a whole. This 
analysis will be based on the collection of statistical data (trade statistics; 
rejection rates; etc) and information on relevant government policies and 
measures of other donors, and on the state of national quality systems and 
the industrial fabric. This analysis should allow assessing the relevance and 
shedding light on the possible impact of the programmes. It should also allow 
identifying the sample of countries to be covered by field visits as well as 
questions and issues to be analyzed in greater depth during these visits. 
  Interviews with UNIDO HQ staff. 
  Surveys among the beneficiary laboratories (46 testing laboratories and 19 
calibration laboratories). 
  Surveys among the beneficiary companies of the WAQP and the upgrading 
programme. 
  Self-evaluation surveys among the 16 National Programme Coordinators of 
the WAQP and the 8 national upgrading offices (BRMN). 
  Interviews with counterparts at the ECOWAS and UEMOA commissions and 
UNIDO staff at the three regional coordination offices in Ouagadougou and 
Abuja. 
  Field visits in Nigeria and Burkina Faso and in other countries (to be selected 
under the background analysis (see above). These filed visits will include 
interviews with UNIDO staff, laboratory staff, government counterparts, 
private sector representatives, beneficiary companies and relevant donors. 
  Evaluation analysis and report writing. 
 
VI.   EVALUATION QUESTIONS  
 
The evaluation will address issues and evaluation questions of strategic interest for 
UNIDO. Some of the questions are of a technical  nature and apply either to the 
Upgrading Programme or to the WAQP. Other questions are more crosscutting and 
will be applied for  both programmes with programme specific data collection and 
analysis.  
 
1.  Strategic guidance 
To  what  extent  has  the  UNIDO  strategic  guidance  on  TCB,  the  “Three  C” 
approach,  industrial  upgrading  and  building  National  Quality  Systems  been 
consistent, clear and up-to-date and to what extent do the programme designs 
reflect this guidance? 
 
2.  Programme formulation 
Were the programmes formulated in a participative manner? How did  UNIDO 
moderate  the  political  consensus  building  process  between  the  UEMOA  and 
ECOWAS Commissions, the EU as a donor, the individual countries and other 
stakeholders? Does the design of the two programmes represent a good balance 
between  (regional/national)  political  constraints,  programme  objectives  and 
implementation needs? Did UNIDO make good use of its competitive advantage 
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3.  Relevance and synergies at design stage 
Was a systemic approach applied during programme design? Were regional and 
national policies and initiatives considered? Were the most relevant entry points 
identified and potential impact channels properly explored? Were contacts with 
other  relevant  programmes  and  institutions  sought  and  adequate  linkages 
foreseen? 
 
4.  Ownership and programme governance 
Are government and Commission counterparts satisfied with: the design of the 
programmes; the substantial reporting (reports; on-line information; databases; 
etc); the financial reporting; the governance structures at regional and national 
levels? Do partners, including the private sector, feel empowered to adequately 
steer the programmes? Did partners provide the agreed contributions fully and 
timely? 
 
5.  Management and implementation structure 
Does the implementation structure represent a good balance between political 
constraints, programme objectives and implementation needs? Has the UNIDO 
field  structure  of  Regional  Offices,  Country  Offices  and  Desk  Offices  been 
adequate and was it properly used? Did the three level management structures 
(HQ, regional PMU, national offices) prove to be efficient? What are the strengths 
and weaknesses of a large scale regional programme as compared to a series of 
smaller projects at national level? Were UNIDO management and reporting lines 
clearly  defined  and  adhered  to?  Is  regional  and  national  staff  adequately 
empowered?  What  were  the  reasons  for  the  considerable  delays  in  both 
programmes and how could these have been avoided? 
 
6.  RBM compliance 
To what extent are the intervention theories, Logframe and planning documents, 
the  budget  structure,  the  monitoring  mechanisms  and  the  (substantial  and 
financial) progress reports RBM compliant?  
 
7.  UNIDO expertise 
Did UNIDO provide expertise of adequate quality and in a timely manner? Have 
international,  regional  and  national  expertise  been  properly  used  for  effective 
capacity building? Does national staff feel their capacity has been adequately 
used  and  developed?  How  efficiently  did  UNIDO  manage  its  own  staff  and 
ensure proper continuity? How efficiently did UNIDO manage the international 
experts and the national experts? 
 
8.  Procurement 
Did UNIDO manage the procurement of laboratory equipment in an efficient and 
timely  fashion  (identification  of  equipment  needs;  priority  setting;  drafting  of 
technical specifications; efficient handling of calls for tenders and selection of the 
appropriate equipment; efficient handling of delivery in target countries; adequate 
phasing  of  delivery  dates  depending  on  the  availability  of  proper  laboratory 
premises;  availability  of  the  necessary  chemicals  and  reagents  at  the 
laboratories; appropriate training of laboratory staff and ensuring the availability 
of spare parts and the necessary maintenance)? 
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9.  Specific questions on the performance of the upgrading programme 
Did the programme design incorporate recommendations from past evaluations 
and/or other innovative features? To what extent did the programme address the 
different aspects of upgrading (process, product, functional, channel and cluster) 
and  encompass  interventions  at  micro,  meson  and  macro-levels?  Did  the 
programme create sufficient awareness among the business community at large? 
Did  it  apply  a  focused approach  (sector  or  other)  and,  if  yes,  was  this  focus 
setting justified? Were companies interested to participate and was the company 
selection  process  open  and  transparent?  Was  the  selection  process  pitched 
towards  identifying the neediest  companies  or towards  those  with  the highest 
potential  for  growth  (“picking  the  winners”)?  To  what  extent  are  beneficiary 
companies  satisfied  with  the  support  they  received?  Did  the  programme 
engender market distortions? What are the prospects to achieve attributable and 
measurable impact at company level? Will the capacity building at national level 
(e.g.  national upgrading offices and programmes; access to finance and BDS 
services)  be  sustainable?  Will  the  capacity  building  at  regional  level  be 
sustainable? 
 
10. Specific questions on WAQP performance 
Did UNIDO analyze the national and regional quality systems in a holistic and 
systemic manner (accreditation, testing, certification, metrology, standardization, 
quality  promotion,  and  inspection  and  consumer  protection)?  Were  the  most 
relevant  and  appropriate  partner  institutions  selected?  Were  good  linkages 
established  with  the  private  sector?  To  what  extent  do  enterprises  use  the 
laboratory and certification services supported by the WAQP? To what extent are 
the standardization,  inspection and consumer protection targets of the  WAQP 
being  met?  To  what  extent  did  the  programme  contribute  to  tangible 
improvements of exports and/or production for national markets? To what extent 
did it contribute to regional integration? Has the capacity building been effective 
and will the improvements at the national and regional levels be sustainable? 
 
11. Linkages between WAQP, upgrading and other programmes 
How  effectively  did  UNIDO  ensure  linkages  and  synergies  between  the  two 
programmes  during  design  and  implementation  (e.g.  by  identifying  “priority 
products”, by introducing a restructuring/upgrading component into the UEMOA 
part  of  the  WAQP  and  by  using  capacities  built  under  the  WAQP  for  the 
“immaterial  upgrading”  and  certification  component  of  the  upgrading 
programme)? What about synergies and linkages with other UNIDO projects at 
country and international level? What about synergies and linkages with other 
donor initiatives at country and regional level? 
 
12. Programme impact  
What are the prospects for attributable and measurable impact on competitive 
production;  regional  and  international  trade  performances;  food  security  and 
consumer  protection;  and  environmental  protection?  Did  the  “priority  product” 
approach  contribute  to  better  impact?  Did  the  programmes  make  plausible 
contributions  to  poverty  reduction  and  gender  equality  and  what  are  future 
prospects in this respect? 
 
13. Overall assessment and perspectives 
What are UNIDO’s strong and weak points as an implementer of large scale TCB 
programmes, as perceived by government partners, beneficiaries and donors?  
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To what extent does the design of the follow-up programmes include lessons 
learned from the first phase and incorporate innovative features? To what extent 
are the design and the envisaged implementation arrangements flexible enough 
to allow for continuous improvement?  
 
VII.   TENTATIVE SCHEDULE  
The main evaluation tasks and the tentative schedule will be as follows: 
 
Tasks  Tentative schedule 
General desk studies  August 
WAQP: self-evaluation among national coordinators;   
 
1/10 to 7/11 
 
Upgrading: self-evaluation among national upgrading offices; 
WAQP: web / telephone survey among laboratories; 
Upgrading & WAQP: web / telephone survey among companies; 
Background analysis;  September 
Interviews at UNIDO HQ;  End of September 
Interviews with counterparts at the ECOWAS and UEMOA 
Commissions and UNIDO staff at the regional coordination units in 
Abuja and Ouagadougou; 
October 
Field visits in selected countries (to be determined);  October/November 
Drafting and validation of evaluation report.  November/December 
 
 
VIII.  EVALUATION TEAM 
 
The evaluation team will be composed of the Senior Evaluation Officer of UNIDO 
(team  leader);  a  senior  international  evaluator  for  Industrial  Upgrading;  a  senior 
international  evaluator  for  Quality;  an  evaluation  analyst  and  a  junior  evaluation 
consultant. The distribution of tasks among the members of the evaluation team will 
be as follows: 
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Tasks  Responsible team member 
Information collection;  Evaluation consultant 
WAQP: self-evaluation among national coordinators;   
Evaluation consultant under 
supervision of the team leader 
 
Upgrading: self-evaluation among national upgrading offices; 
WAQP: web / telephone survey among laboratories; 
Upgrading & WAQP: web / telephone survey among companies; 
Background analysis  Evaluation analyst 
Interviews at UNIDO HQ;  Team leader and senior international 
evaluators 
Interviews with counterparts at the ECOWAS and UEMOA 
Commissions and UNIDO staff at the regional coordination units 
in Abuja and Ouagadougou; 
 
Team leader and senior international 
evaluators 
  Field visits in selected countries (to be determined); 
Drafting and validation of evaluation report. 
 
The evaluation team will maintain close links with the UNIDO offices and other UN 
agencies as well as with the ECOWAS and UEMOA Commissions, the concerned 
national agencies and governments as well as with national and international project 
staff.  
 
The  evaluation  team  is  free  to  discuss  with  the  authorities  concerned  anything 
relevant to its assignment. However, it is not authorized to make any commitments 
on behalf of the Government, the donor or UNIDO. 
 
IX.   LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS 
 
Depending on the country and the counterpart institution, the evaluation will be 
conducted in English and French and the input papers for the final report will be 
drafted respectively in these two languages. 
 
X.  REPORTING 
 
The  evaluation  team  will  submit  a  first  draft  of  its  findings  for  initial  review  and 
consultation  to  the  responsible  UNIDO  managers.  The  evaluators  will  take  these 
comments  into  consideration  for  the  preparation  of  the  final  draft,  which  will  be 
circulated for comments among counterparts and stakeholders. 
 
The final report will follow the structure laid out in Annex 1 of these TORs. Whenever 
appropriate  it  will  present  findings  and  conclusions  on  the  two  programmes  in 
separate sections. It will be translated in French and English and published in line 
with the UNIDO Evaluation Policy.  
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Template of the evaluation report 
 
The evaluation report should not exceed 35 pages 
(Excluding annexes) 
 
I.  Executive summary 
  Must be self-explanatory. 
  Not more than three pages focusing on the most important findings and 
recommendations. 
 
II.   Introduction 
  Information on the evaluation: why, when, by whom, etc. 
  Information sources and availability of information. 
  Methodological remarks and validity of the findings. 
 
II.   Programme information 
  Summary  information  on  the  two  programmes  under  evaluation 
(programme structure, objectives, donors, counterparts, timing, cost, etc). 
 
III.  Assessment of UNIDO performance 
  This chapter will assess the performances of the WAQP, the upgrading 
programme and of relevant wider UNIDO issues. 
  The  chapter  will  be  structured  by  sub-chapters  along  the  lines  of  the 
evaluation questions. 
  Each  sub-chapter  will  provide  thorough  analysis  and  balanced 
judgements of the individual programmes before making comparisons or 
generalizations. 
 
IV.  Recommendations 
  Recommendations must be based on evaluation findings. 
  The implementation of the recommendations must be verifiable (indicate 
means of verification). 
  Recommendations  must  be  actionable;  addressed  to  a  specific  officer, 
group  or  entity  who  can  act  on  it;  have  a  proposed  timeline  for 
implementation. 
  Recommendations should be structured by addressees: 
o  UNIDO. 
o  Government and/or Counterpart Organisations. 
o  Donor. 
 
Annex 
  Country assessments 
  16 concise country assessments in a standardized format (in English or 
French language depending on the country). 
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Annex 2: Synthesis of PRMN findings 
Key milestones and timeline  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Cooperation Agreement - October 2006  ←                                         
Official start – February 2007                                           
Formal launching ceremony - June 2007                                           
First Regional SC meeting                                           
First National SC meetings                                           
Awareness building &training                                           
Analysis of priority sectors and packaging                                           
Prep. & approval of procedures & amendments                                           
Upgrading Offices operational in all 8 countries                                           
Approval of eligibility criteria/enterprises                                           
Electronic M &E system start/date on line                                           
Pilot test (Senegal and Mali)                                           
Call for expression of interest/companies                                           
Pre-diagnostics                                            
List of eligible enterprises finalized                                           
Diagnostics: Call for tenders -contracts                                           
Diagnostics                                           
Approval of upgrading plans                                           
“Soft” upgrading: tender                                           
“Soft” upgrading: implementation                                           
Approval on investment eligible for “prime”?                                           
Start of formulation of national programmes                    →                       
Drafting of deployment phase project document                                           
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POINTS FORTS  POINTS FAIBLES  POURSUITE / CAPITALISATION 
pour éventuelle prochaine phase 
CONCEPTION  
  La «mise à niveau » (MAN) est un produit 
reconnu de l’ONUDI ; méthode bien structurée 
et documentée ; innovations développées 
dans d’autres pays. 
  PRMN soutient la mise en œuvre de la 
Politique Industrielle Commune de l’UEMOA. 
  Conception du programme basé sur une étude 
de faisabilité. 
  Conception en concertation avec des 
organisations nationales publiques et privées 
clefs au niveau régional et national. 
  Un programme « pilote ﾻ qui s’autorise une 
période de test avant déploiement ultérieur. 
  Une innovation majeure : le programme est 
non seulement déployé à une échelle 
régionale (8 pays) mais il est financé et géré 
par une institution politique régionale: 
l’UEMOA. 
  Faiblesses de la MAN (identifiées lors des 
évaluations antérieures et mise en exergue 
par certains donateurs): approche 
interventionniste et orientée vers la distribution 
de subventions ; manque de flexibilité ; délais 
importants. 
  Programme conçue pour une période de deux 
ans (planning trop ambitieux). 
  Faiblesses de l’￩tude de faisabilit￩ et du 
document de programme ; base 
analytique pas claire ; différences importantes 
entre les pays peu analysées, ni les difficultés 
d’appliquer une m￩thode et un r￨glement 
standardisés dans un espace très hétérogène. 
  Distinction « MAN » et « restructuration » peu 
pertinente ; dimension « restructuration » du 
PRMN semble aléatoire. 
  Manque de souplesse pour expérimenter avec 
des innovations telles que la mise à niveau 
« verte » au Sénégal ; programme combiné 
MAN/Qualité au Cameroun ; consortia 
d’exportation Côte d’Ivoire). 
  Articulation peu réfléchie entre niveaux 
nationales et régionales et cohérence avec 
programmes nationales.  
  M￩canisme de suivi et d’extraction des 
enseignements peu développé (notamment 
pour un programme « pilote »). 
  Analyser les enseignements et les refléter de 
manière rigoureuse dans la conception dans 
la phase de déploiement et dans la conception 
de nouveaux programmes ailleurs. 
  Renforcer le rôle du secteur privé dès la 
conception (exemple AAFEX qui met en 
œuvre un programme de mise ￠ niveau et 
qualité pour ses membres). 
  Des la conception de la phase de 
déploiement, préparer des collaborations avec 
les autres programmes ONUDI (dont la phase 
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BUREAUX DE MISE A NIVEAU ET COMITÉS DE PILOTAGE (COPIL) 
  Sensibilisation des gouvernements nationaux 
à la MAN. 
  Création de 6 bureaux de mise à niveau 
(Sénégal et Mali étaient déjà créés) avec un 
appui de 68 000 euros du programme. 
  Recherche d’un ancrage solide au niveau 
national à travers les COPIL avec 
représentation du secteur privé. 
  COPILs nationaux du PRMN identiques au 
COPILs des programmes nationaux (pas de 
duplication de COPILs). 
  Recherche d’une appropriation des BRMN par 
les gouvernements; décrets et mobilisation de 
budgets (pour assurer la continuité après la fin 
de la contribution du programme – voir ci-
après). 
  Mise en réseau des 8 BRMN nationales. 
  Renforcement des capacités et formations des 
BRMN ; missions d’￩tude auprès des BRMN 
Sénégal et Tunisie ; des formations régionales 
et in situ. 
  Peu de tentatives de coordonner avec d’autres 
initiatives de support au secteur privé déjà 
existantes (par exemple “maison de 
l’entreprise” au Burkina Faso). 
  Viabilité et pérennité variables des BRMN 
selon pays: Certains BRMN manquent de 
moyens (experts juniors, turnover staff / 
direction, pas de véhicule pour déplacement 
vers les entreprises). 
  Peu d’implication des BRMN dans les 
investissements immatériels mises en œuvre 
par les bureaux conseils internationaux et 
dans le suivi par consultants ONUDI en 
dehors des BRMN. 
  Supporter les états membres dans la mise en 
œuvre de leurs programmes nationaux 
respectifs au lieu de dédoubler ces 
programmes par des actions régionales. 
  N￩cessit￩ de coordonner avec d’autres 
programmes en cours ou en voie d’￪tre cr￩￩s 
(par exemple programmes de développement 
du secteur privé au Burkina (financement UE) 
ou future programme régional de soutien aux 
PMEs. 
  Pour d’autres programmes dans l’avenir, les 
problèmes de pérennité des BRMN devraient 
amener à une réflexion sur la nécessité de 
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FORMATION / UTILISATION DES CABINETS DE CONSULTANTS 
  Le document de programme du PRMN vise à 
promouvoir « l’￩mergence des services de 
support aux entreprises ». 
  Vaste effort de sensibilisation à la 
méthodologie MAN (584 participants dans les 
8 pays ; dont 174 employés de Ministères et 
d’organisations de support au secteur et 410 
consultants nationaux). 
  341 consultants nationaux form￩s ￠ l’outil 
diagnostique.  
  Un effort fourni pour renforcer les capacités 
des services conseil des 8 pays par la 
sélection de 17 cabinets conseil de la région 
pour effectuer les diagnostiques des 
entreprises. 
  Accompagnement des consultants nationaux 
par des consultants internationaux 
expérimentés lors de la phase de diagnostique 
(coaching des consultants).  
 
  Cours de formation de 5 jours pour les 
consultants trop courts et trop généralistes. 
  Délais importants entre les formations (2007) 
et la mise en œuvre des diagnostics 
(2009/10). 
  Le programme n’a pas analys￩ l’existence et 
les performances des cabinets conseils dans 
chacun des pays mais s’est focalis￩ sur la 
formation des individus. 
  Questionnement sur la capacité des cabinets 
de maîtriser l’approche multidisciplinaire. 
  Changement de m￩thode pour l’assistance 
immatérielle: les entreprises ne pouvaient pas 
avoir recours aux bureaux d’￩tude de leur 
choix. 
  Ecarts importants entre les taux de 
rémunération prévus par le PNUD et les taux 
du marché ; tensions entre attentes des 
consultants et offres ONUDI. 
  R￩alisation pas document￩ de l’objectif majeur 
de promouvoir « l’￩mergence des services de 
support aux entreprises » (satisfaction des 
consultants ; nombre des consultants ; qualité 
et coût des services ; etc.). 
  Manque d’une v￩ritable dimension r￩gionale 
(base de donnée de consultants; codification 
et échange de bonnes pratiques ; mobilité des 
consultants ; etc.). 
  Adopter une véritable approche de 
“d￩veloppement du march￩ des services 
d’assistance aux entreprises” bas￩e sur une 
analyse de la performance de ces marchés 
aux niveaux national et régional et une 
formulation d’objectifs de développement 
réalistes pour ces marchés. 
  Créer un lien entre ces cabinets et les 
structures privées/publiques chargées de 
l’appui aux entreprises.  
  Développer et appliquer des méthodes de 
suivi performantes pour analyser l’impact des 
interventions sur « l’￩mergence des services 
de support aux entreprises » et le 
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 ETUDE FILIÈRE ; APPEL A MANIFESTATION D’INTÉRÊT ; SÉLECTION DES ENTREPRISES  
  Application de l’approche ﾫ filière » : étude 
des filières prioritaires initiée en octobre 
2007 et ￩tude sur l’emballage en 2008. 
  268 entreprises r￩pondent ￠ l’appel ￠ 
manifestation d’int￩r￪t en avril 2008 / 135 
participent au pré-diagnostic / 99 
entreprises sont diagnostiquées.  
  Les critères de sélection des entreprises 
sont définis en concertation avec les pays 
et la Commission de l’UEMOA (largement 
débattu). 
  L’analyse des fili￨res et l’identification des 
“produits prioritaires” par pays a dur￩ 
longtemps (2007-2009) et n’￩tait pas 
harmonis￩ avec l’exercice identique du 
PQ2. 
  Par rapport aux études pays du PQ2 les 
analyses du PRMN sont assez générale ; 
pas d’identification des obstacles de 
développement.  
  Ciblage trop large du secteur de l’agro-
industrie et nombre élevé des produits 
prioritaires - étude pas été utilisée comme 
outil de décision par le programme. 
  « Philosophie » de sélection pas claire. Si 
le programme a visé les effets de 
d￩monstration, pourquoi pas d’actions de 
diffusion des expériences prévues avec 
les entreprises bénéficiaires ? 
  Les crit￨res de s￩lection n’ont pas ￩t￩ 
adaptés aux conditions du pays (par 
exemple la m￪me taille d’entreprise 
partout).  
  Mieux op￩rationnaliser l’approche 
« filière ». 
  Clarifier la « philosophie ﾻ d’intervention et 
de sélection.  
  Choisir les grandes entreprises sous 
condition qu’elles ont un effet de levier ou 
d’essaimage, si leur mise ￠ niveau peut 
induire des mises à niveau ou des 
créations de PME. 
  Rendre plus flexible le processus, laisser 
des possibilit￩s d’adaptation des crit￨res 
de sélection au niveau national. 
 
 
DIAGNOSTIC ET PLAN DE MISE A NIVEAU  
  99 entreprises diagnostiquées (8 à 16 cas par 
pays ; 60 petites, 26 moyennes et 13 
grandes).  
  Diagnostic apprécié par la grande majorité des 
entreprises. 
  Des conseils rapides et pratiques 
  Processus de sélection compliqué avec forte 
implication du niveau régional dans les 
activités nationales : d￩lais d’un an entre la 
manifestation d’int￩r￪t et le pr￩-diagnostic.  
  Manque de MoU avec les entreprises qui 
clarifierait les responsabilités et engagement 
  Raccourcir le circuit de décision : la 
Commission de l’UEMOA doit-elle émettre un 
avis sur la sélection des PME au niveau 
National ?  
  Etablir des conventions /MoU avec les 
entreprises qui définissent clairement  
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délivrés « sur le tas » pendant le processus de 
diagnostic (y compris par des experts 
additionnels recrutés par le programme). 
  « Coaching » des consultants et contrôle de 
qualité rigoureux effectué des plans de MAN. 
 
des deux parties PRMN / entreprise. 
  A cause de la sélection des 17 cabinets par 
l’ONUDI, les entreprises ne peuvent pas 
choisir les cabinets. 
  Diagnostics délivrés gratuitement : en porte-à-
faux par rapport aux règlements des 
programmes nationaux ; distorsion du 
marché ; affaiblit ownership des entreprises. 
  Rigidité des plans de mise à niveau 
concernant les coûts des interventions 
(nombres de hommes / jours ; taux de 
rémunérations ; coûts des équipements). 
  La procédure standard pour la MAN 
immatérielle (choix des consultants par les 
entreprises ; remboursement à titre de 80%) 
telle que par exemple appliquée au Sénégal 
n’a pas ￩t￩ suivi. 
  Richesse d’information incluse dans les 99 
diagnostics peu exploit￩e par l’ONUDI pour 
orienter la « phase de déploiement » 
 
l’approche, les rôles et obligations de chacun.  
  Introduire plus de flexibilité dans le processus 
de la mise à niveau car il est possible que 
l’entreprise soit bloqu￩e par des facteurs 
externes. Certaines enterprises pourraient 
aussi brûler des étapes. 
  Eviter les différences de règlement entre 
programme nationale et régionale intervenants 
auprès du m￪me bassin d’entreprises. 
  Utiliser les diagnostics réalisés dans la phase 
pilote pour effectuer une analyse approfondie 




MISE À NIVEAU “IMMATERIELLE” ET “SPÉCIFIQUE” 
  L’approche d’utiliser deux bureaux d’￩tudes 
internationaux a permis de mobiliser un très 
grand nombre d’experts en peu de temps: 49 
experts internationaux et 244 experts 
nationaux (ceci n’aurait pas ￩t￩ possible par 
contrats directs ONUDI). 
  L’expertise dans les diff￩rents domaines 
(technique (25%); qualité (18%); comptabilité 
(17%); management (14%); marketing (14%); 
  L’approche d’utiliser des bureaux d’￩tudes 
internationaux est différent par rapport aux 
programmes nationaux de MAN; ceci n’a pas 
été bien communiqué créant des confusions / 
frustrations de la part des entreprises et des 
BRMN; il a entraîné un manque de continuité 
entre diagnostic et MAN immatérielle. 
  Fourniture de l’expertise ﾫ en nature » et 
gratuite contraire aux bonnes pratiques 
  Eviter les interventions en parallèle des 
programmes nationaux et régionaux.  
  Maintenir l’approche standard avec 
responsabilité des entreprises pour le choix et 
le payement des consultants.  
  Appliquer une approche plus durable et long 
terme : éviter les interventions « de choc » par 
cabinets internationaux, décentraliser le 
pilotage des actions vers les BRMN, quitte à  
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software (10%) généralement appréciée mais 
pas unanimement. 
  Recherche d’une compl￩mentarit￩ avec le 
WAQP en « sous-traitant » les actions qualité  
  Reconnaissance des formations et des 
accompagnements techniques, en particulier 
sur les aspects qualité.  
  Des certifications ISO 22000 acquises (2?) 
Faut-il « sortir » ISO 22000 ; a-t-on le chiffre : 
2 sur combien ?  
  Appréciation des formations et des conseils 
sur mesures donnés en temps utiles relatives 
à l'amélioration de la qualité (les formations 
HACCP et préparations ISO 22000 hautement 
appréciées). 
 
  Les experts/cabinet conseils effectuant la MAN 
« immatérielle ﾻ n’ont pas eu acc￨s aux 
diagnostics. 
  Certains entreprises ont v￩cu l’assistance 
immat￩rielle comme une assistance “de choc”: 
beaucoup de moyens en trop peu de temps.  
  Diff￩rentiel entre les dur￩es d’assistance 
prévues dans les plans de MAN et la réalité – 
perçu comme un manque de transparence par 
les entreprises. 
  Actions dans le domaine de la Qualité: délais 
de mise en œuvre trop longs, perte de 
motivation des entreprises. 
  WAQP et PRMN ont mis un an pour s’accorder 
sur les modalités de coopération ; 
mécontentements graves de la part de 
certaines entreprises concernant ce délai.  
  La MAN « spécifique » (achat de logiciels; 
formations ciblées) a créé des problèmes 
sérieux (investissements non remboursées) – 
différences de vues concernant les causes de 
ce probl￨me entre l’ONUDI; l’UEMOA et 
bureaux d’￩tudes internationaux. 
  Pilotage « autonome » des cabinets conseil par 
l’ONUDI; les BRMN ont per￧u leur rôle comme 
￩tant r￩duit ￠ un “guichet des plaintes”. 
  Peu d’information sur les résultats au niveau 
entreprises - rapport des deux cabinets 




leur fournir une assistance adéquate à cet 
effet. 
  Extraire les succès stories et des études de 
cas pour le Kit de mise à niveau). 
  Renforcer les liens entre les programmes de 
MAN et de Qualité en clarifiant les 
responsabilités pour éviter les doubles 
emplois, voire les frictions. 
  De nouvelles passerelles entre les 
programmes sont possibles (ex. laboratoires 
accrédités sont candidats possibles pour une 
mise à niveau dans le cas du Benin).  
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INVESTISSEMENT MATERIEL ET “PRIME” 
  Malgré son taux limité à 20%, la « prime » 
peut faciliter les investissements, notamment 
pour les entreprises les plus démunies. 
  L’accompagnement par le PRMN a ouvert les 
portes de banques à certaines petites 
entreprises. 
  Certains BRMN ont appuyé les dossiers 
d’entreprise aupr￨s des banques ou autres 
partenaires financiers (Cote D’Ivoire). 
 
  L’instrument de la ﾫ prime » trop mis en avant 
alors que le véritable problème se situe au 
niveau de l’acc￨s des entreprises au 
financement. 
  Pas de liens avec des instruments financiers/ 
d’accompagnement dans l’ingénierie 
financière au niveau national, ni régional  
  Gestion de la prime en direct par la 
Commission de l’UEMOA semble ￪tre 
dysfonctionnelle (d￩lais d’environ un an, 
manque de communication, demande 
excessive de justificatifs, tournées de visite) – 
seulement 23 demandes de primes sur 41 ont 
été payées – frustrations au niveau des 
entreprises – Commission de l’UEMOA 
envisage d’abandonner ce type de gestion 
centralisée. 
  Inclure un accompagnement ￠ l’ing￩nierie 
financi￨re dans l’approche de MAN ; le 
financement des PME n’est pas forcement du 
crédit bancaire ; d’autres outils de financement 
sont présents dans les pays ; accompagner 
les PME vers ces outils au moment du 
développement du plan de MAN. 
  Eviter la gestion d‘activit￩s de niveau national 
à travers une chaine d’interventions r￩gionales 
(principe de subsidiarité) 
  Extraire des r￩ussites et des cas d’￩cole pour 
illustrer le kit MAN. 
 
ACCES AU FINANCEMENT  
  Etude sur l’acc￨s au financement (d￩marr￩e 
en 2009 ?) avance des idées / alternatives à la 
prime : avances remboursables, prêts à taux 
bonifiés. 
  Un atelier régional en juin 2010 suivi de 
différents ateliers dans les pays (Novembre 
2010) pr￩sente les r￩sultats de l’￩tude et 
recherche la validation des recommandations.  
  Un travail d’￩tude pr￩paratoire ￠ la cr￩ation d’un 
fonds de mise à niveau a été lancé en 2008, mais 
reste ￠ finaliser selon l’UEMOA (r￩clamation en 
Octobre 2012). 
  La référence au fonds de restructuration et au 
fonds de mise ￠ niveau n’est pas pertinente 
face au manqué de distinction faite dans la 
phase pilote entre l’assistance ￠ la 
restructuration et à la mise à niveau.  
  Le statut, le mandat et les compétences de la 
Commission UEMOA ne sont pas adaptés à la 
gestion d’un fonds de mise ￠ niveau ciblant 
des appuis au niveau national (lourdeur, 
manque de proximité). 
  
  Considérer des alternatives au système de 
subventions (prime) pour la mise à niveau 
matérielle, directement reliées au schéma 
national d’appui aux PME des diff￩rents pays. 
  Car nombreux fonds d’investissements 
existent et se déploient en Afrique, la mise en 
place de collaboration (à travers des comités 
d’investissements) entre le programme et ces 
fonds d’investissements peut faciliter l’acc￨s 
au financement.  
  Etablir des conventions avec des fonds 
d’investissement, des banques et fonds de 
garantie pour analyser spécifiquement les 
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ARTICULATION ENTRE LE PROGRAMME REGIONAL ET LES PROGRAMMES NATIONAUX  
  Organisation de rencontres ministérielles sur 
le PRMN (avril 2008 et juin 2010) pour 
renforcer l’appropriation par les 
gouvernements et la pérennisation de la 
démarche. 
  Approche harmonisée de la mise à niveau 
dans les 8 pays de l’UEMOA. 
  Effet de démonstration réussit dans tous les 
pays qui n’avaient pas de mise ￠ niveau (les 8 
pays ont arrêté le décret nécessaire à 
l’￩tablissement des bureaux de mise ￠ niveau 
et les comités de pilotage, création des 
bureaux de mise à niveau.  
  Support à la création des programmes 
nationaux au B￩nin; Côte d’Ivoire et Guin￩e 
Bissau. 
  Flexibilité dans les modalités des nouveaux 
programmes (Bénin et Côte d’Ivoire). 
  Incompatibilités entre PRMN et programmes 
nationaux là où ils existent (Sénégal; Burkina 
Faso).  
  Difficult￩ d’appliquer le “principe d’￩galit￩” et 
les règlements uniformes à travers les différent 
pays étant donné leur état d’avancement 
différents. 
  Application d’une approche standard pour tous 
les pays s’est av￩r￩e impraticable ; « manuel 
de procédures » pas terminé. 
  La dimension réellement régionale de la mise à 
niveau n’a pas été clairement définie. 
  Pas de véritable articulation / synergie entre le 
niveau régional et le national prévues. 
 
 
  Ne pas confondre le mandat du régional et du 
national (principe de subsidiarité). 
  Le niveau microéconomique « support 
individualisé aux entreprises » doit être géré 
au niveau national.  
  Mieux cerner la dimension régionale de la 
mise à niveau (réseautage; échange de 
bonnes pratiques; fonds de garantie 
régionaux; etc). 
  Des analyses des différentes chaines de 
valeur au niveau régional (problématique 
matière première ; transports ; chaine du froid) 
peuvent être réalisées par le régional. 
 
  ENJEUX DE GESTION / MISE EN OEUVRE 
  Règlement administratif du programme a été 
établi par un dispositif complet de « notes 
techniques »  
  Effort de r￩daction d’un guide m￩thodologique 
pour les BRMN. 
  Implication des BRMN dans le développement 
d’outils (procédures / manuels/ boite à outil).  
  Auto évaluation approfondie conduite en 2010 
par un consultant externe. 
  Planning irréaliste (durée de 5 ans au lieu des 
2 ans prévus) ; problème remarqué mais non 
pas corrigé lors de la formulation. 
  Tentatives de réviser le document de projet se 
heurtent aux rigidités des procédures de 
l’UEMOA. 
  Extension de la durée sans financement 
supplémentaire résulte en une réduction de la 
part du financement allant vers les entreprises 
  Le mode d’intervention centralis￩ depuis le. 
niveau régional augmente les rigidités de 
l’approche MAN et s’av￨re inefficace. 
  Changements fréquents du responsable au 
Siège (3 managers en 5 ans) ainsi que sur le 
terrain (2 CTAs). 
  Absence de « imprest account ﾻ de l’ONUDI au 
  Poursuivre la mise à jour du guide 
méthodologique de la mise à niveau. 
  Saisir les opportunités offertes par d’autres 
outils, de l’ONUDI (benchmarking, investment 
promotion, cleaner production). 
  Améliorer la coordination et les synergies 
entre le programme qualité et le programme 
mise à niveau et identifier les passerelles.  
  Prendre des décisions sur les études 
inachev￩es demand￩es par l’UEMOA. 
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Burkina alourdit la gestion et augmente les 
coûts. 
  Problèmes habituels liés au mode de mise en 
œuvre centralis￩e de l’ONUDI (position du 
CTP par rapport ￠ l’administrateur au Si￨ge et 
au client (UEMOA) pas claire). 
  Communication parfois inefficace entre 
UEMOA et UNIDO HQ. 
  Délais dans les prises de décisions : circuit de 
décisions long (Comité de Pilotage régional, 
Comités de Pilotage nationaux, Bureaux de 
mise ￠ niveau,) qui concerne ￠ la fois l’ONUDI 
et la Commission régionale, résultant sur des 
d￩lais de mise en œuvre trop longs pour les 
entreprises. 
  Système de suivi-évaluation focalisé sur les 
activit￩s; r￩sultats de l’appui sur la 
productivité, la qualité et les couts pas 
enregistr￩s; le syst￨me d’information sur 
internet donne seulement des informations 
limitées.  
  Incompatibilit￩s des proc￩dures d’audit de 
l’ONUDI et de l’UEMOA donnent une 
mauvaise image du programme vis à vis de 
tiers (AFD). 
  Evaluations prévues à mis parcours et à la fin 
du projet n’ont pas ￩t￩ r￩alis￩es. 
  Formulation de la phase de déploiement sans 
capitalisation des expériences passées . 
  Pas de date pour la tenue du comité de 
pilotage régional final. 
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Annex 3:  Synthesis of WAQP findings 
  2007  2008  2009  2010  2011  2012 
Cooperation Agreement                                                 
Official start                                                 
Planned duration                                                 
Actual duration                                                  
Launching ceremonies                                                 
Reg. Steering Committees, QP2                                                 
Reg. Steering Committees, EMQP                                                 
Central Steering Committee                                                 
Unification of QP2 and EMQP                                                 
Core Coordination Committee                                                 
EMPQ coordination unit          Accra  Abuja 
Turnover of CTAs of EMPQ          1        2  3             
CTA of QP2 became CTA of WAQP                                                 
Recruitment of NTCs of QP2                                                 
Recruitment of NTCs of EMQP                                                  
Regional experts QP2 recruited                                                 
Regional experts EMQP recruited                                                 
Creation of reg. SMTQ bodies QP1  ←                                               
NORMCERQ coordinator recruited                                                  
SOAMET coordinator recruited                                                 
SOAC coordinator recruited                                                 
Preparation of next programme                                              → 
Planned EU evaluations                                                 
ROM missions, EU                                                 
External evaluation, EU                                                → 
Internal UNIDO evaluation                                                 
Note: References to recommendations of the “Thematic Evaluation of SMTQ Activities” are in brackets (e.g. Rec. 31/TE)   
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STRONG POINTS  WEAK POINTS  WAY FORWARD:  
LESSONS FOR NEXT PHASE 
TESTING LABORATORY SUPPORT 
National dimensions 
 
  Intention to focus on food testing labs in 
line with priority products (cf. Rec. 1.3/TE). 
  Comprehensive step by step approach, 
particularly in QP2: lab identification, 
scoring and selection, coaching, mock 
audit, accreditation (cf. Rec. 1.7/TE), 
including attempt to avoid overlaps. 
  Involvement of some 100 labs in the initial 
needs assessment missions, which also 
raised staff awareness on quality issues. 
  Flexibility shown with respect to capacity 
levels of labs (ranking for accreditation; for 
QMS introduction; for training). 
  Flexibility shown in scope by including 
private labs, medical labs and civil 
engineering labs (contributing to increased 
demand for services of auditors trained by 
the project and, in general, to the building 
up of the accreditation system and its 
sustainability) – see Rec. 3.1/TE. 
  “Coaching” missions of lab experts to the 
selected labs: monitor progress; hands-on 
advice; training of quality managers and of 
technical staff. 
  Emphasis of study tours on exposure to 
labs in a comparable context. 
  Awareness raised on the importance of 
metrology issues in testing labs. 
  Programme investment in equipment 
(€800,000 in total) provided to 48 labs 
(compared to €1.5 million under QP1). 
  Programme triggered counterpart 
investments into physical infrastructure of 
National dimensions 
 
  Often too many priority products selected; 
no systematic connection between priority 
products and support interventions; gaps 
in lab infrastructure are important but not 
the only factors hampering development of 
priority sectors (cf. Rec. 1.4 and 1.5/TE). 
  More emphasis on capacity of individual 
labs in lab selection process than on their 
“systemic” importance.  
  Certain labs were not retained for support, 
despite “systemic” importance (ex. 
fisheries labs in Guinea; Nigeria). 
  No systematic information collection and 
reporting on trends in the demand for 
services of the labs (cf. Rec. 7.4/TE). 
  Underestimation of time needed to 
upgrade the physical infrastructure (as 
one of the necessary steps in work 
towards accreditation). 
  Differences in the formalization of 
cooperation (no systematic MoU between 
the project and the labs in EMQP; exists 
for PQ2). 
  Inadequacies in communication: last 
minute information on expert visits and 
labs not systematically informed of the list 
of equipment retained for their lab, prior to 
purchase by UNIDO and shipment. 
  Delays in implementation: major time gap 
between initial needs assessment and 
staff training versus the delivery and 




  Use the NQS mapping methodology (to be 
developed at regional level – see below) 
to conduct detailed mapping of NQS and 
demand for lab analyses as a basis for 
selection of labs to be supported (cf. 
Rec.1.1/TE). 
  Use the selection and scoring tool (to be 
developed at regional level - see below) 
as a basis to select labs, develop a tailor 
made “support menu” depending on their 
role, their needs and their status/ scoring; 
and monitor progress. 
  Preparation of business plans should be 
part of the “support menu” at an early 
stage, with support of specialized 
expertise. These business plans could 
take the form of more comprehensive 
“upgrading plans” similar to the ones used 
under the PRMN for enterprise upgrading. 
  Each laboratory to sign MoU that defines 
and specifies “who is to do and pay for 
what and by when” as well as milestones 
depending on the “support menu”. 
  If equipment is purchased, keep the 
beneficiary labs informed of the decision 
making process prior to purchase and 
allow for review and adjustment, 
especially if the delays between needs 
assessment and actual purchase are 
major. 
  Give due attention to information sharing 
on equipment sales conditions (warrantee, 
maintenance contracts). 
  Support labs with conducting results  
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STRONG POINTS  WEAK POINTS  WAY FORWARD:  
LESSONS FOR NEXT PHASE 
the retained labs. 
  Programme triggered complementary 
donor support to labs (e.g. Liberia; Sierra 
Leone). 
  Practical advice and training before the 
mock audits and guidance thereafter 
(including use of expertise from country 
with more advanced quality infrastructure 
(use of expertise from the region: Ghana, 
Senegal, Nigeria). 
  7 labs accredited so far: ISO 17025 (six) 
and ISO 15189 -bio medical (one); more 
mock audits undertaken and foreseen and 
some 13 additional lab accreditations 
envisaged by end 2012. 
  Positive appreciation particularly by those 
labs that succeeded accreditation (positive 
effects reported on image, visibility, quality 
of services and increase in turnover 
(Benin; Côte d’Ivoire). 
  Recognition that the achievements of the 
labs on the road to ISO accreditation (with 
support of the project) relate to voluntary 




  Very systematic and transparent selection 
and ranking process under PQ2. 
  Cooperation fostered among labs as 
regards the harmonization of testing 
methods (among non-UEMOA countries) 
based on methods used by GSA/Ghana. 
  As regards UEMOA: guide developed 
under PQ1 on harmonization of testing 
methods continues to be used. 
  Inter-lab exchange opportunities through 
  Study tours qualified as interesting but not 
always practical enough (call made by 
several labs for more hands-on training). 
  Some lab equipment not properly 
installed, not functioning or parts missing, 
yet no indication of reporting on such 
problems or search for solutions prior to 
project closure. 
  Labs not aware of warrantee conditions of 
equipment/after sales maintenance 
contracts (cf. Rec. 8.6/TE). 
  Sustainability issue as regards purchase 
of reagents supplied by project. 
  Poor focus on business plans, which are 
crucial for labs to sustainably fulfil their 
“systemic” role; the project is now 
supporting 5 labs in this respect, yet this is 
(i) only focused on 4 accredited labs and 
CIRDES, (ii) organized in the tail end of 
the transition phase (consultancy in the 
period August – December 2012); (iii) 
approach adopted in document seen by 
evaluation team is too generic (not 
sufficiently tailored for the specific 
situation of laboratories). (cf. Rec. 4.1/TE) 
  Risk of losing accreditation if not able to 
keep up the requirements (inter alia 
number of tests performed) (cf. Rec. 
4.4/TE). 
  Many enterprises reported to use other 
labs than the ones supported by the 
programme because these provide 
cheaper and/or more diligent services. 
 
Regional dimensions 
  Differences in the approach followed: 
structured assessment and ranking 
based self-monitoring of lab services. 
  Foster cooperation between private and 
public labs for certain analyses (cf. Rec. 
2.3/TE). 
  Refer accredited labs interested in the 
expansion of their business/market 
expansion to seek support of the 
Upgrading Bureaus and facilitate also 




  Develop and formally approve a set of 
common UNIDO tools and guidelines 
covering. 
*NQS mapping method. 
*Holistic selection and scoring tool for 
selection of labs (taking into account not 
only their level of technical competence 
but also their “systemic” importance, 
organizational status, management and 
HR systems in place, etc. ). 
  Recognizing that UNIDO does not have 
the same normative mandate as WHO, 
the existing WHO tool could be used as a 
model for a staged approach (cf. Rec. 4.3 
and 4.4/TE). 
  While recognizing that UNIDO - unlike 
WHO - is involved in voluntary and not 
mandatory standards, encourage UNIDO 
management to develop and position the 
normative role of UNIDO in assessing and 
upgrading NQIs, using the above-
mentioned common tools and guidelines. 
  Conduct an annual “state of progress” 
survey covering all labs supported in the 
region and publicise progress made as a  
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LESSONS FOR NEXT PHASE 
study tours, participation in regional 
technical meetings, and participation in 
inter-lab proficiency tests (cf. Rec. 4.2 and 
5.2/TE). 
  Attention to sustainability concerns in 
initial assessment missions and in regional 
technical meetings (Conakry, Accra), 
drawing attention to the importance of lab 
business plans aligned to the 17025 
standard for labs; as regards UEMOA, 
building on prior training on lab 
management under PQ1.  
  Recognition of constraints faced by public 
testing labs (lack of autonomy, complexity 
of procedures to purchase inputs and to 
determine price level of services) and 
advice on improvements in legal 
framework/statutes of public labs 
(organizational study). 
  Awareness of crucial importance of 
maintenance of lab equipment (prior 
support from Hungary; study conducted to 
create a regional centre; discussions, also 
with PTB) (cf. Rec. 8.6/TE). 
  Active collaboration with a private sector 
provider of laboratory equipment in 
Senegal that has scope for further 
development towards a regional 
dimension (cf. Rec. 8.6/TE). 
 
Positive perception by other regional 
programmes (e.g., SFP, including efforts in 
some countries to avoid overlap in investment 
in equipment); cooperation with 
EDES/COLEACP regarding inter-lab 
comparisons. 
approach developed under PQ2 but not 
applied under EMQP (different 
methodology by different staff in the same 
implementing branch of UNIDO). 
  Inter-lab proficiency tests perceived as a 
very welcome regional activity but 
launched at late stage. 
  Work undertaken (studies; consultations 
bringing together UEMOA, UNIDO and 
PTB), yet limited progress in addressing 
the crucial challenges of regional capacity 
building for lab equipment maintenance 
  Organizational study related to the 
statutes of public testing labs came only 
late. Unless solved organizational 
constraints may undermine the 
achievements of the project (resources for 
maintaining accreditation; capacity to 


















  Give particular emphasis to developing a 
“good practice guide” for national policy 
makers on the organizational status and 
management principles to be adopted by 
public laboratories. 
  Foster information of and further 
networking among the labs of the region 
(considering and complementing related 
activities in this field in the region, taking 
into consideration challenges to sustain 
certain analyses at the country level, (ex.: 
histamine). 
  Pursue the discussions as regards 
possible models for addressing the 
maintenance problems; give a prominent 
role to private sector players (equipment 
manufacturers; distribution agents; 
technical service providers). 
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STRONG POINTS  WEAK POINTS  WAY FORWARD:  




  Policy advice in certain countries resulting 
in the adoption of metrology related laws 
and regulations (ex.: Guinea 
Bissau/Decree, 2012; Mali/construction of 
a new national metrology lab; Gambia/Act 
2012; Mauritania/Law 2010-030; Sierra 
Leone/construction of metrology lab). 
  15 National Metrology bodies/labs 
received metrology equipment (mass, 
volume, temperature and pressure) 
  Indication of flexibility: in case of Ghana, 
major part of its WAQP related funding 
went into the purchase of metrology 
equipment. 
  Celebration of World Metrology Day at 
country level (sometimes with the support 
of the programme to cover communication 
costs). 
  Countries became/paid up membership of 





  At level of UEMOA: (i) WAQP support to 
the operationalisation of SOAMET (see 
below); (ii) support to the elaboration of 
regional legislation pertaining to metrology 
(harmonization effort under review by 
UEMOA) and (iii) reflection on the creation 
of regional reference labs. 
  Training and networking opportunities for 
metrology experts in the region through 
National dimensions 
 
  Late arrival of metrology equipment for 
EMQP countries (around September 
2012) given delivery delays (few 
manufacturers; specialized equipment not 
in stock); no indication whether this 
equipment is operational. 
  Delays (Burkina Faso; Sierra Leone) as 
new buildings were required. 
  Limited information on the actual utilisation 
of the metrology and calibration services 
strengthened (enterprises; labs; other) (cf. 
Rec. 7.4/TE). 
  Sustainability concerns as regards the 
WAQP paying IOLM membership fees for 
countries. 
  Limited emphasis in project design (that 
was more export focused) on legal 





  Notwithstanding efforts, cooperation with 
PTB (that has its own cooperation 
agreement with UEMOA) remained limited 
and division of labour (regional/country 
level) not always clear; also, several 
metrology bodies received earlier on 
equipment from PTB, but not clear from 
the reports if and how the equipment 
provided under the WAQP has 




  Ensure that all equipment purchased is 
operational at the end of the current 
project. 
  Introduce a system to monitor the use of 
metrology lab services as indication of 
demand and quality of service delivery. 
  Include awareness raising on metrology 
issues in work with consumer 
organizations (matter to be strengthened 
in next stage). 
  Phase out payment of membership 
fees/subscriptions to organizations and 
encourage countries to budget 
subscriptions/membership of international 
bodies (reported to be the case now in 




  Pursue the harmonization of regional 
standards in the field of legal metrology. 
  Search to deepen the coordination with 
PTB (who is leading the support to the 
regional reference centres), based on 
UNIDO’s assessment that much more can 
be done together (provided this is also the 
view of PTB, as cooperation is a two-way 
street). 
  Clarify cost/benefit and viability of the 
regional metrology reference labs by a 
thorough feasibility study before 
expanding UNIDO support to this 
operation.  
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participation in regional technical meetings 
and in inter-lab comparisons. 
  Effort by UNIDO to improve cooperation 
with PTB; Cooperation agreement with 
PTB has led to e.g., joint workshop; PTB 
support to regional metrology reference 
labs; recognition of PTB expertise. 
  Centralized purchasing of equipment 
contributing to standardization and also 
facilitating maintenance. 
  Concept of regional metrology reference 
labs subject to questions (expected cost 
advantage, likelihood of their use by other 
countries, language barriers, readiness of 
the labs in terms of service offerings, other 
preconditions to operationalizing such a 
network of regional reference labs). 
  Deepen linkages with AFRIMETS, building 
on the work done under the WAQP. 
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LESSONS FOR NEXT PHASE 
MARKET SURVEILLANCE FUNCTIONS AND INSPECTION BODY SUPPORT 
National dimensions 
 
  Inclusion of an action line on inspection 
bodies into the WAQP (not exclusively 
related to export matters). 
  Training of inspectors from 16 inspection 
services (typically phyto-sanitary and 
veterinary inspection services). 
  Support to first steps towards introduction 
of quality related documentation 
according to ISO 17020 in 16 inspection 
services. 
  Equipment purchase in some cases 
(Togo). 
  Awareness creation among Governments 
and positive impact on national 





  In the case of UEMOA the programme 
could build on the mapping/needs 
assessment of Inspection Bodies 
undertaken by the Commission’s 
Department in charge of food safety. 
  Regional training of inspectors and 
networking opportunities during the 




  No indication of mapping of national 
inspection bodies in EMQP (including 
private inspection bodies) to identify 
overlapping mandates and 
dysfunctionalities. 
  Dialogue between inspection services and 
labs not always easy (observations on lack 
of speed and on gaps in transparency). 
  No “hard information” available at the time 
of the evaluation on the results of training 
and introduction of quality system 




  Upgrading of national inspection services 
could only focus on the implementation of 
documentary system (not ready for support 
towards accreditation), although , implying 
that work is remained to be done as 
regards this highly relevant issue in cross-
border trade (given the WAQP’s goal to 
contribute inter alia to the growth of intra-
regional trade) ; market for inspection 
remains dominated by private international 
groups (accredited or with means to 
support accreditation costs). 
  Overlapping roles on the side of the UN 
(WHO, FAO) and complexity to implement 
UNIDO role in inspection body support 




  Foster dialogue among stakeholders 
(also keeping in mind the need for inter-
ministerial cooperation, as different 





  Put emphasis on the regional 
harmonization of inspection procedures 
and documents used by phyto-sanitary 
and veterinary services (vital to 
streamline processes at border control 
posts). 
  Foster a clear institutional distinction of 
enforcement agencies, conformity 
assessment and standardization bodies, 
a pattern increasingly adopted all over 
the world. 
  Intensify exchanges among inspection 
services within the region. 
  While recognizing that UNIDO - unlike 
WHO and FAO - is involved in voluntary 
and not mandatory standards, 
encourage UNIDO management to 
emphasize the UNIDO mandate as 
“voice of industry” when it comes to 
highlighting dysfunctional ties of the 
inspection system and upgrading 
inspection bodies that are critical for 
industrial development.  




  Good intention to include an action line for 
enterprise support into the WAQP in view 
of a more needs driven approach (cf. Rec. 
3.1/TE). 
  Good intention to collaborate closely with 
PRMN. 
  Public announcement of the certification 
support offered by the programme 
(advertisement) complemented by 
communication on the programme by 
standards bodies, business membership 
organizations (all stimulating enterprises 
to embark on a “quality route”), showing 
interest and involvement. 
  Flexible approach: focus on the 
introduction of basic quality system 
principles if ISO certification too ambitious 
within the project time span. 
  Hands-on advice (QMS, food safety): 
UEMOA: 106 companies (going beyond 
demonstration; EMQP: 29 companies; 
some 60 companies involved in 
cooperation between PRMN and WAQP. 
  Joint meetings of enterprises (ISO 9001 
cases) under QP2. 
  13 certifications to date: ISO9001 (9); 
ISO22000 (2); Organic Agriculture (2). 
  Programme made good use of national 
quality experts and provided training and 
service opportunities for them. 
  Some evidence that the training for 
process certification consultants and 
auditors (4 ISO 9001 auditors and 1 
HACCP trainer) has led to stimulating the 
market for process certifications (in the 
case of Senegal, cost for ISO certification 
National dimensions 
 
  Enterprise support primarily focused on 
ISO process certification but not on 
stimulating the use by enterprises of 
laboratory testing; no action to increase 
enterprise demand for such services or to 
promote linkages with testing laboratories.  
  Rationale of promoting ISO certification 
was not entirely clear (Demonstration 
cases for other companies? Providing 
opportunities for auditors? Interventions 
critical to priority products?  
  Private standards (BRC and GLOBALGAP 
included in the call for interest but limited 
focus in the actual support offered (only in 
one country –Burkina- a case of GLOBAL 
GAP and two Organic reported in context 
of cooperation with AAFEX). 
  No systematic use of MoUs in EMQP to 
formalize the cooperation between 
enterprise and programme. 
  A significant number of beneficiary firms 
did not achieve the envisaged ISO 
certifications. 
  The limitations of the UNDP scale of 
salaries led UNIDO to apply very low fee 
levels for consultants often not in line with 
market fee levels; thus highly qualified 
consultants declined participation (rf. Rec. 
8.8/TE). 
  Limited degree of joint meetings under 
EMQP bringing together the different “pilot 
enterprises” (missed opportunities of 
exchanges and joint learning). 
  Enterprises, once certified, may have 
difficulty to sustain recurrent costs related 
to certification, especially if not in position 
National dimensions 
 
  Cover enterprise support under national 
enterprise upgrading rather than regional 
quality infrastructure programmes, 
notwithstanding the evident need for 
effective linkages between regional and 
national programmes. 
  Ensure effective cooperation with related 
country level programmes. 
  Clarify the rationale for interventions at 
enterprise level: 
  optimize selected value-chains ; see also 
rec. 1.3/TE; 
  use larger companies as “quality 
ambassadors” for demonstration;  
  stimulate national market for quality 
related business development services. 
  If 1: Make sure that all necessary 
conditions are in place to achieve 
outcomes and impact (holistic 
approach). 
  If 2: Make sure that “demonstration” 
effect works if support goes to large 
enterprises that have the technical and 
financial resources to introduce quality 
systems and prepare for certification on 
their own. 
  If 3: Stimulate national markets network 
of certified auditors connected to 
national institutions involve in the 
promotion of quality rather than training 
and using such experts on individual 
basis as project consultants. 
  Ensure the MoU defines the conditions 
of the cooperation between the retained 
enterprise and the project.   






has come down significantly) (rf. Rec. 
3.2/TE). 
  Cases where programme managed to 
convince large international enterprises to 
open their doors and play a demonstration 
role (e.g. brewery in Togo). 
  Quality awards (see also below) 
supported efforts of enterprises to 
improve their image and contributed to 





  Quality awards competition (UEMOA) 
created good synergy between regional 
and national levels (Cf. Rec. 2.5/TE). 
  Good collaboration with AAFEX thanks to 
excellent inputs of international expert. 
  Consultations with two EU funded. 
  Programmes (COLEACP – PIP and 
EDES) – focused on private standards – 
with a view to avoiding overlaps. 
to reflect improved quality in their pricing. 
  No explicit plans how the programme 
intended using the certified beneficiaries as 




  Criteria for selection elaborated, yet 
rationale of enterprise support not clear: 
  Search for demonstrations effects? 
  Provision of opportunities/demand 
for consultancy services (market 
development for consultants 
engaged in quality related BDS)?  
  Direct support to enterprises that 
are likely “winners”?  
  Combination of the above? 
  Multi-layered regional decision making 
causing significant delays and hence 
frustrations at enterprise level. 
  Delays were particularly severe for 
companies participating in BRMN who 
were supposed to receive quality related 
support from WAQP (list of enterprises 
communicated by PRMN end 2010 rather 
than in 2008 as planned); BRMN and 
WAQP needed more than a year to define 
cooperation modalities; in many cases 
quality support to BRMN companies 
started only in 2. 
 
 
  Seek collective efficiencies (group based 
advice and training followed by in situ 
monitoring).  
  UNIDO management should encourage 
flexibility in determining salary levels in 
line with market rates, otherwise UNIDO 
projects will have difficulties to work with 
national experts of adequate 




  Facilitate the exchange of good practice 
and lessons within the region. 
  Adapt and adopt the UEMOA quality 
award for ECOWAS as envisaged. 
  Ensure effective cooperation with related 
regional programmes. 
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REGIONAL TECHNICAL CENTRES 
National dimensions 
  Targeted national centres received significant 
equipment under QP1 followed by an 
assessment under the WAQP (see below). 
 
Regional dimensions 
  Combined WAQP and PRMN effort in the 
UEMOA region (funded through WAQP – 
UEMOA component); 4 centres identified and 
supported under QP1, complemented by 
CERFITEX and the remaining 2 identified by 
PRMN (ITA and Songhaï). 
  Introduction of concept to strengthen the 
enterprise support infrastructure (advice, 
coaching, training) covering both upgrading and 
quality issues, giving regional function to the 
selected 7 national centres focused in particular 
on meat, milk and products, fruits and 
vegetables, and cotton: DTA/Burkina Faso; 
LTA, IER and CERFITEX/Mali; 
LANSPEX/Niger; I2T/Côte d’Ivoire; Centre 
Songhaï/Benin; ITA/Senegal. 
  Assessment of the envisaged regional technical 
centres (except CERFITEX) in period January – 
October 2011. 
  Support to CIRDES (regional research institute) 
covering different aspects, among which: staff 
training on quality; preparation on genetics 
testing lab towards ISO 17025 accreditation for 
which mock audit took place; mock 
audit/CIRDES’ ISO 9001 certification; 
equipment, internet access, and documentation, 
research stipends). 
National dimensions 
  Expectations created at the level of 7 (for now 
national) centres, with limited follow-up, with 
the exception of supply of equipment.  
  No credible and sustainable business model 
for national technical centres available. 
  Risk that equipment provided remains idle, is 
not utilized for training/demonstration purpose 
for the targeted sector at large, not even at 
the country level; and risk of unfair 
competition with private investors if project 
equipment is used by the recipient public 
entities for productive activities.  
 
Regional dimensions 
  Decision on regional centres was taken at the 
start of programme (part of Contribution 
agreement; QP1, UEMOA), yet support 
essentially covered supply of equipment, with 
major delays in their installation. 
  Case of gaps in intended cooperation with 
PRMN (theme more linked to concept than 
WAQP): weak analysis of concept of regional 
technical centres ex ante (under QP1); 
concept more theoretical than practical; 
regional coverage potential overestimated; no 
clear understanding of legal foundation and 
functioning of regional and national centres. 
  Major time gap between the selection of 
regional centres (QP1) and needs 
assessment of the centres as service 
providers in the field of upgrading and quality 
(2011). 
  Preconditions not in place and need for 
support in many fields ( as shown in 2011 
National dimensions 
  Identify and rank the existing national 
centres in the ECOWAS member 
countries (see below). 
  Develop a credible and sustainable 




  Follow-up on the expectations created to 
avoid frustrations and obsolescence of 
the significant equipment delivered.  
  Clarify whether the regional technical 
centres will be followed up under the next 
phase of the WAQP or the next phase of 
the PRMN; avoid any overlaps and 
doubts (support to the regional centres 
seems to be foreseen under deployment 
phase of PRMN). 
  Clarify the statute of “regional technical 
centres” and what the concept entails in 
terms of shared national and regional 
responsibilities: 
1.  National centres with proven 
reputation in their respective fields 
supported for regional outreach (while 
remaining national centres).  
2.  Genuine regional centres run under 
ECOWAS/UEMOA responsibility. 
  Inform the 7 centres selected earlier one 
of the outcomes of the discussion and 
take decision as regards the equipment 
provided to 4 of these 7 centres (used in 
the context of activities foreseen in the 
next phase of PRMN/WAQP; sold in  
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assessments). 
  No indication if and how assessments have 
been used by the project/by the selected 
centres. 
  Challenges involved in performing regional 
functions not addressed in these 
assessments. 
  No information on the impact of the support to 
CIRDES on its services at the regional level. 
transparent bidding process – if not yet 
transferred to the recipients; other options 
to fructify the investment made). 
  Report on results of support to CIRDES in 
terms of its regional service delivery. 
 
STANDARDS BODIES AND GENERAL QUALITY AWARENESS RAISING 
National dimensions 
Standards 
  Standards Bodies received different types of 
support: office equipment, documentation, 
membership payment/subscription to 
international data bases, training and 
networking opportunities through regional 
seminars, study tours and other training in 
countries with more advanced standards 
bodies. 
Product certification 
  Audit of 3 certifying bodies (Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, 
Senegal) and preparation for their accreditation. 
Process certification 
  Consultants and auditors trained; several 
certified (4 quality auditors ISO 9001; 1 
HACCP); see Rec. 3.2/TE. 
  Growing number of private certification 
organizations/certified auditors having reduced 
the cost of certification (case of Senegal, 
Ghana); see Rec. 3.1 and 3.2/TE. 
Awareness raising 
  Many countries launched quality award system, 




  No indication of reporting on the performance 
of standards bodies supported (trend in 
demand for services). 
  No indication of attention to training services 
on how to apply standards (a source of 
income for many standards bodies). 
Product certification 
  Product certification and quality labelling 
operational in few countries. 
  Certification costs remain high in many 
countries. 
Process certification 
  Number of certified enterprises and 
consultants rather limited, consider regional 
coverage. 
  No search for support to “upgrading” national 
certification system, where in place (implying 
at times “double certification” and generating 
some confusion). 
  Certification costs remain high in many 
countries.  
Awareness raising 
  Quality awards system not operational in 
National dimensions 
Standards 
  Report on the performance of supported 
standards bodies in terms of service 
delivery/trends. 
Product certification 
  Support gradual introduction of product 
certification and labelling aspects in 
national programmes. 
  Identify and learn from lessons aimed at 
reducing certification costs. 
Process certification 
  Identify opportunities to support the 
accreditation of national certification 
systems where in place. 
  Identify and learn from lessons aimed at 
reducing certification costs. 
Awareness raising 
  Reinforce sensitization efforts (work with 




  Identify obstacles in 
adoption/implementation of regional  
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  Support to the development of a system of 
regional norms at level of UEMOA (see 
NORMCERQ below). 
  System aimed at harmonisation of standards at 
the level of ECOWAS developed and adopted. 
  ECOWAS membership of ISO allowing the 
region to adopt international (ISO) standards, 
i.e. member countries adopting international 
standards through a regional rather than 
country specific scheme. 
Product certification 
  Regional conformity mark developed and 
deposited with AOIP. 
Awareness raising 
  Awareness building of journalists from the 
region. 
  Work started to expand quality award 
competition (consultant recruited by WAQP to 
propose criteria for all 16 countries).  
EMPQ countries of the region.  
  Gaps in periodicity of organizing quality 
awards in several countries. 
  Limited and late attention to work with 
consumer protection associations as avenue 
for awareness raising (regional training 
involving experts of Consumers International 
in Nov. 2012). 





  Low speed of adoption/implementation of 
regional standards. 
Product certification 
  No indication of promotional efforts as 
regards production certification and labelling 
in the region. 
  
 
standards and support the harmonisation 
process of standards and technical 
regulations through networking among 
standards bodies (NORMCERQ). 
  Recognize the ‘natural processes towards 
harmonization among member states, as 
most national and regional standards are 
adopted from international standards 
(mainly ISO and CODEX). 
Product certification 
  Facilitate exchange of good practices. 
Process certification 
  Facilitate exchange of good practices.  
Awareness raising 
  Raise awareness on importance of quality 
award systems where nor in place. 
  Pursue link between regional and national 
quality award (UEMOA). 
  Support the introduction of a regional 
quality award system (ECOWAS). 
REGIONAL SMTQ INSTITUTIONS 
  Possibility to build on regional bodies (UEMOA) 
created under QP1: SOAMET, NORMCERQ 
and SOAC. 
  NORMCERQ: operational; 40 standards 
developed and technically adopted. 
  SOAMET: operational; draft regional law on 
metrology elaborated; approval by UEMOA 
awaited; non-UEOMA member country 
participated in meetings of SOAMET (Guinea). 
  SOAC: awareness building; legal advice on 
  Establishment of the regional bodies under 
QP1 would have benefited from deeper ex 
ante analysis of resource requirements and 
modus operandi. 
  Delays at UEMOA Commission level with 
making SOAC operational: legal status of 
SOAC still under discussion; manager of 
SOAC was not recruited by UEMOA, project 
recruited interim expert end 2008.  
  Regional standards not yet legally adopted 
  Engage discussion on progress to date 
as regards the regional infrastructure 
bodies and implications for further 
support. 
  Draw lessons from functioning of UEMOA 
regional bodies for decisions on wider 
coverage (ECOWAS region). 
  Support the intensification of efforts to 
develop and adopt regional standards, to 
harmonize inspection and testing 
methods and other quality related  
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questions pertaining to statutes; establishment 
of two accreditation committees; training of 
assessors. 
  Partnership with TUNAC and COFRAC to 
support the operationalisation of SOAC: training 
of interim expert, accreditation committees’ 
members, and of pool of technical and quality 
assessors. 
  Start of discussions to define ECOWAS wide 
regional infrastructure. 
  Support to preparation of ECOWAS Standards 
Harmonization Model. 
and hence not used (NORMCERQ). 
  Decision making on next steps as regards 
regional quality infrastructure (ECOWAS) and 
expected contribution of the WAQP pending. 
  No indication of a road map for the 
development of the three organizations 
including the expansion of their outreach 
(ECOWAS wide). 
 
initiatives based on harmonization 
principle. 
  Strengthen linkages with harmonization 
initiatives undertaken elsewhere in Africa 
(including other Regional Economic 
Commissions). 
POLICY ISSUES AND POLICY SUPPORT 
National dimensions 
  Alignment  of  the  project  support  to  the 
countries’ priorities. 
  In several countries the programme supported 
the elaboration of a road map and legal 
framework for a national quality system (ex. 
Sierra Leone – under the complementary 
national project; Cape Verde; Mauritania; 
Burkina Faso; Togo); see Rec. 2.6/TE. 
 
Regional dimensions 
  Recognition that regional integration in West 
Africa is in transition and that overlapping 
mandates between UEMOA and ECOWAS are 
gradually being solved. 
  Programme funded sensitization seminars on 
new ECOWAS Quality Policy at level of 
member countries.  
  Regional Policy adopted in October 2012 as 
major breakthrough (based on widespread 
stakeholder debate in all countries; commitment 
of national and regional policy makers; 
visibility). 
National dimensions 
  No evidence that the national frameworks, 
road maps and Quality Policies were 
operationalised into the formulation of 
national SMTQ programmes and proactively 
used for funds mobilization. 
 
Regional dimensions 
  Seemingly overlapping mandates between 
UEMOA and ECOWAS (legislative 
competence vis-à-vis each other and vis-à-vis 
the national level not fully clear).  
  Gaps in communication between UEMOA and 
ECOWAS as regards the ECOWAS Quality 
Policy (no clear indication that ECOWAS 
wanted to learn from UEMOA’s experience). 
  Gaps in communication between ECOWAS 
and UNIDO as regards the ECOWAS Quality 
Policy (limited technical involvement of 
UNIDO experts by ECOWAS; contribution 
mainly limited to funding of expertise). 
  No reference in ECOWAS Regional Policy to 
WAQP and its donor, nor to UNIDO. 
National dimensions  
  A regional programme should encourage 
national governments to recognize and 
execute their legislative and 
administrative duties and provide 




  Discuss support priorities in the light of 
recent ECOWAS Regional Quality Policy, 
with clear distinction between regional 
efforts and national efforts. 
  Strictly adhere to subsidiary principle 
when conducting national activities under 
a regional programme; thus: regional 
level should focus on contributions to the 
design and monitoring of country level 
activities (funds mobilisation, facilitating 
the exchange on good practice, 
benchmarking of quality infrastructures 
among Member States, and ensuring 
regional harmonisation and coherence), 
but not in implementation of country level  
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  WAQP support to fine tune some technical 
issues (at request of ECOWAS Commissioner) 




activities (cf. Rec. 5.3/TE). 
  Pursue support to operationalisation of 
regional quality infrastructure including 
eventual expansion of outreach to cover 
ECOWAS (functioning of regional bodies; 
harmonization of standards, inspection 
procedures, testing methods; regional 
quality awards also at level of ECOWAS). 
  Consider the creation of a regional 
Observatory to stimulate systemic 
collection of performance information 
regarding market surveillance activities, 
keep track of national initiatives, extract 
and diffuse experiences and lessons. 
STATUS OF NATIONAL QUALITY PROGRAMMES 
National dimensions 
  The synergies created between the national 
Quality programme in Ghana and the WAQP 
can be considered a model for other countries 
in the future. 
  The programme facilitated the formulation of 
national Quality programmes in Sierra Leone, 
Liberia and Guinea. 
  Formulation of new national quality programmes 
under preparation (Nigeria, Benin) or (even 
better) programmes that integrate quality and 
upgrading (Cameroon; Côte d’Ivoire). 
 
Regional dimension 
  Countries seeking to adapt the approach to 






National and regional dimensions 
  There are many national and regional 
programmes with a direct relationship to NQS 
development. The EU is one of the most 
active donors in this field. However, donor 
coordination is sub-optimal and overlaps 
between national projects and regional 
programmes are rather frequent. 
National dimensions 
  National governments should fully 
subscribe to their responsibility of 
strengthening the National Quality 
Infrastructure.  
  Key national stakeholders should be 
actively involved in the development of 
the national Quality programmes. 
 
Regional dimension 
  The future regional programme should 
apply the subsidiary principle more 
strictly. While ensuring convergence of 
national policies and initiatives, the 
regional programme should set up an 
“observatory” for national initiatives in the 
region and provide guidance and good 
practices support to national governments 
with developing national programmes and 
offer good practices such as NQS 
mapping and ensuring participation of key 
national stakeholders in programme  
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design (rf. Rec. 2.1 & 5.3/TE). 
  The focus on selected value chains 
(“priority products”) should be pursued 
but it requires close coordination with 
sectoral programmes (rf. the case of the 
Sustainable Fisheries Programme). 
MANAGEMENT ISSUES 
  Strong motivation and commitment at all levels 
(regional coordination; national coordination; 
Regional Economic Commissions; donor; 
UNIDO HQ). 
  Regional Steering mechanism operational in, 
each, QP2 and EMQP, including Central 
Committee composed of the two RECs, donor 
and UNIDO that met back to back to the 
regional committee meetings; since transition 
phase: meetings of Core Committee - RECs, 
Donor and UNIDO –not limited to wider 
Regional SC. 
  Overall good appropriation at country level with 
some variations in functioning of local steering 
mechanism (cf. Rec 1.2, TE). 
  South-south cooperation facilitated throughout 
in both QP1 and EMQP (cf. Rec. 5.1/TE). 
  Intention to focus interventions by identifying 
priority products for each country (cf. REC. 1.3). 
  Search for sustainability: regional technical 
experts expected to be absorbed by ECOWAS 
– already budget for; 2 staff already integrated 
by UEMOA. 
  Visibility through communication efforts – based 
on lesson learned from QP1 (staff in charge of 
communication at country and regional level, 
press coverage, film under preparation). 
  Search for synergies with Restructuring and 
Upgrading Programme. 
  Time allocated for implementation too short 
(even the duration of transition phase – latter 
was limited for administrative reasons).  
  Complexity to cover countries with vast 
differences (size; state of quality 
infrastructure) known at the start of the 
programme yet underestimation to what 
extent specific national activities (especially if 
similar in nature and intensity) can minimize 
the differences. 
  Split of WAQP into 2 parts (UEMOA and 
EMQP) with limited synergies in the 
implementation phase among the two parts 
up to August 2011; (cf. Rec. 8.1/TE). 
  Gap of 21 months between QP1 and QP 2, 
implying  loss  in  HR  and  time  needed  to 
rebuild the team. 
  Conflicting views between ECOWAS Director 
of Industry and UNIDO, resulting in objections 
to activities that were later authorized, yet 
implied delays. 
  The initial decision to locate the coordination 
unit of the EMQP in Ghana affected 
ECOWAS ownership. 
  Concentration of decision making at HQ - up 
to changes in decision making after the 
unification of management in August 2011. 
  Important turn-over of CTAs of the EMQP 
component (3 CTAs; 4
th CTA is former CTA of 
  Avoid gap between current transition 
phase and new programme under 
preparation; if needed, extend the 
transition phase.  
  Decide which sets of activities are best 
handled at regional level and which ones 
are best dealt with at national level 
(subsidiary principle). 
  Actively involve the key stakeholders at 
the regional and national levels; 
involvement of business associations at 
the regional level could be strengthened 
(cf. East Africa Programme). 
  Seek solution to communication problems 
between different stakeholders for new 
programme to start on solid and smooth 
co-operation ground, based on clear 
definition of respective responsibilities. 
  List and find solution to questions of 
administrative nature, such as: staffing 
needs and contractual arrangements of 
l.t. project staff of coordination office; 
contractual arrangements of s.t. 
consultants; salary grid of 
national/regional expertise (cf. Rec. 
8.8/TE); speed in authorizations; gaps in 
logistics; gaps in procurement – speed 
and inclusion of maintenance issues into 
technical specifications) – see Rec. 8.6 
/TE).  
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  Cooperation with other interventions at country 
level (Mali - WB; Cape Verde and the Gambia - 
FAO, Liberia - EU and WTO; also with SFP and 
AAFEX). 
  Identification (2011) of a wide range of lessons 
(technical  and  administrative)  learned  in 
implementation  (two  exercises),  which  was 
presented to stakeholders. 
  UNIDO  top  management  intervention  to  re-
orient the programme (cf. DG’s decision to unify 
HQ management). 
  Decision  taken  in  August  2011  to  unite  the 
UEMOA  and  EMQP  component  under  same 
management (HQ and field, with former CTA of 
QP2  becoming  the  CTA  of  the  entire 
programme)  and  decentralization  effort  to 
delegate  authorities  where  possible  to  the 
regional  coordination  unit  (taking  the  lead  in 
implementation). 
  Pre-financing  by  UNIDO  of  activities,  pending 
receipt  of  budget  tranches,  to  ensure  the 
continuity of project operations 
 
 
UEMOA component).  
  Severe coordination problems with PRMN; 
lengthy agreement process between the two 
programs affected the effectiveness of the 
PRMN in the Quality field and also planned 
work as regards the regional technical centres 
(some enterprises dropped out or went ahead 
on their own because of delays). 
  Understaffing of regional coordination unit 
(Ouaga) due to gaps in foreseen provision of 
experts (UEMOA) and delays by ECOWAS in 
acceptance of recruitment of regional 
technical experts.  
  Current freeze of recruitment by ECOWAS 
affecting chances for absorption by technical 
experts now covered by programme. 
  Shortage of support staff of core regional 
team in Abuja and antenna in Ouagadougou 
considering workload. 
  Sub-optimal communication between UEMOA 
and ECOWAS technical staff. 
  Sub-optimal communication between some 
ECOWAS staff, the regional coordination 
team and UNIDO HQ. 
  Room for better integration between 
coordination team and ECOWAS Secretariat 
(not in same location / building earlier on but 
now based in ECOWAS office); in the case of 
UEMOA project staff better integrated in 
Commission’s team. 
  RECs assess UNIDO procedures as “heavy 
and long”; but RECs decision making 
processes are also lengthy. 
  Role of Regional UNIDO Office in Nigeria 
limited to in particular administrative issues. 
  Major origin of delays is reported to be related 
to processing via UNDP (which is source of 
  Adopt “implementation from the field” 
principle where possible. 
  Consider delegation of some 
implementation responsibilities to project 
partners. 
  Find a solution to reconcile UNIDO 
administrative requirements with the good 
practice of anchoring national 
coordinators in national institutions 
(possibly through sub-contracts). 
  Seek opportunities to cooperate with new 
programmes (e.g., new 
programme/AAFEX). 
  Share findings of UNIDO evaluation with 
EU evaluation team that has started field 
work shortly after UNIDO evaluation 
completed the field missions. 
  Ensure full rigour in evaluation of next 
phase (both midterm and final; cf. Rec. 
7.4 and 7.5/TE)) and secure adequate 
budget allocation within the project 
budget; conduct such evaluations in truly 
joint manner, involving donor, Regional 
Economic Commissions and UNIDO. 
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sizeable administrative costs); not clear how 
imprested account has generated 
administrative gain in case of Nigeria.  
  Decentralization efforts came only late with 
unified management; lost opportunities for 
more “implementation from the field” (issue 
raised in particular as regards EMQP). 
  Differences in anchorage of national 
coordinators: in case of EMPQ recruited as 
independent national experts (affecting 
sustainability); better anchorage in case of 
UEMOA where coordinator is integral part of 
key national partner institution.  
  Difficulties for UNIDO administrative 
procedures to accept that from a sustainability 
point of view, recruiting individual consultants 
as coordinators has weaknesses. 
  No systematic MoUs with partners under 
EMQP defining and specifying respective 
roles and contributions, including who pays 
for what. 
  National experts complain on low 
remuneration level (UNDP scale). 
  Limited reporting on outcomes, such as 
increased/improved delivery of SMTQ 
services (call for results-based monitoring). 
  No systematic effort by the RECs to link 
WAQP to other donor support they receive in 
the field of trade capacity building and private 
sector development. 
  Gaps between planning and implementation 
of evaluations (no mid-term evaluation - 
postponed due to first ROM/2010 &then 
skipped; second ROM/2012 followed by final 
evaluation at very end of transition phase; no 
attempt to coordinate ex ante with UNIDO 
evaluation.   
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Annex 4: Overall assessment of WAQP using 
recommendations from the Thematic 




1. Needs driven and long-term project preparation    
UNIDO should develop and adopt a structured and in-depth approach for SMTQ 
project preparation. Processes for project preparation should be clearly defined and 
consistently applied by all members of the TCB branch across the entire SMTQ 
portfolio. 
 
1.1  Conduct NQS mapping and gap analysis (SMTQ service users and providers 
both private and public and also across TBT/SPS - funding of such analysis to 
be provided either from UNIDO preparatory assistance funds or by donors – 
see also recommendation 9.). 
1 
1.2  Active  involvement  of  key  stakeholders  (in  particular  industry  associations, 
private SMTQ service providers and consumers). 
2 
1.3  Identify  “lead  sectors  /  lead  value  chains”  and  designing  projects  from  the 
demand side (including service sectors where appropriate). 
3 
1.4  Include domestic SMTQ benefits (e.g. better protection against sub-standard 
imports) systematically  into  project  design  (see  also  recommendation 10.  to 
donors). 
3 
1.5  Assess  expected  contribution  to  poverty  reduction  and  identify  impact 
pathways in sub-sectors with close trade/poverty linkage. 
1 
1.6  Integrate gender issues into all aspects of the project cycle, particularly project 
preparation and develop suitable gender indicators. 
1 
1.7  Define  country  specific  counterpart  structures  taking  into  account  the 
respective  institutional  landscape  in  the  country  and  potential  institutional 
rivalries  and  avoid  pre-definition  of  counterparts  and  technical  areas  of 
intervention on “political” grounds. 
3 
2. Contribute to improved governance of National Quality Systems  
Building on its comparative advantage as a “neutral broker”, its thematic leadership 
and political weight, UNIDO should assist governments with reducing systemic failures 
of National Quality Systems (unclear responsibilities; duplications; frictions) by 
introducing more effective governance/steering structures and developing long-term 
“Master Plans” for NQS development. 
 
2.1.  Support  governments  in  applying  good  governance  principles  within  the 
National Quality System. Governments should take care of: proper dialogue 
and  involvement  of  the  private  sector,  consumers  and  other  key 
stakeholders; reduce or avoid conflict of interests and promote a systemic 
approach to NQS development. 
2 
2.2.  Promote National Quality Fora involving Government, industry associations, 
public  and  private  SMTQ  service  providers  and  consumers  as  an 
institutionalized governance structure and a platform for policy dialogue with 
Government accompanying lawmaking processes. 
1 
2.3.  Consider  expanding  the  approach  of  private  public  partnerships  already 
adapted in Sri Lanka (e.g. semi-private certification bodies, joint-venture etc.) 
also to other countries. 
1 
                                                 
5 Assessments made on a scale from 1 (low) to 3 (high)  
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  Assessment
5 
2.4.  Continue strengthening the demand side for quality services by capitalizing 
on  the  positive  experience  in  countries  where  this  has  been  successfully 
done. 
3 
2.5.  Promote the national “quality culture” e.g. by systematic public awareness-
raising; quality awards, introducing quality training into technical university 
curricula, strengthening consumer organizations. 
3 
2.6.  Develop long-term “Master Plans” for NQS development as a new UNIDO 
service package, possibly involving other UNIDO branches mentioned under 
recommendation 8). 
1 
3. Private sector involvement    
UNIDO should further develop its recent move towards a stronger involvement of the 
private sector in SMTQ projects. 
 
3.1.  Watch the balance between the “public goods” dimension of SMTQ services 
(e.g. rule of law; assuring access to SMTQ services) and stimulating markets 
for  those  SMTQ  services  that  can  be  provided  by  the  private  sector  (e.g. 
testing;  certification)  and  avoid  exclusive  partnerships  (lock-in)  with 
Government and public SMTQ providers. 
3 
3.2.  Stimulate  markets  for  SMTQ  services,  e.g.  by  counterbalancing  possible 
cases of oligopolies of private SMTQ service providers. 
3 
3.3.  Watch  the  risk  of  crowding  out  private  labs  and  SMTQ  consultants  and 
include them into support programs (not individually but through associations 
of private laboratories; associations of quality consultants; etc). 
3 
4. More comprehensive approach to capacity building and change management 
at partner organizations 
 
UNIDO should adopt a more comprehensive and long-term approach to institutional 
strengthening that takes into account organizational development and change 
management principles and goes much beyond technical training. 
 
4.1.  Conduct thorough and structured analyses of the organizational structure and 
capacities of counterpart organizations (using in-depth assessment methods 
such as organizational assessment, “report cards” or “health check”). 
1 
4.2.  Apply the same organizational assessment tool consistently and objectively 
across countries to allow for cross-national benchmarking. 
2 
4.3.  Develop a set of benchmarks (e.g. “sustainability assumptions”) against which 
counterpart organizations should be checked. 
1 
4.4.  Set  minimum  sustainability  criteria  that  should  be  mandatory  before 
embarking on a project (e.g. minimal level of institutional autonomy). 
1 
4.5.  Agree on a “change management compact” with periodic checks of progress 
against jointly pre-defined benchmarks. 
1 
5  Regional and South-South cooperation   
UNIDO should further develop its leadership in stimulating regional and South-to-South 
cooperation. 
 
5.1.  Encourage  South-South  cooperation  between  SMTQ  organizations,  e.g. 
through  facilitating  partnerships  of  organizations,  internships,  trainings  and 
exchange  of  experts;  benchmarking  and  developing  regional  “centers  of 
excellence”. 
3 
5.2.  Build  on  the  success  of  international  platforms  such  as  “labnet”  and 
encourage  international  benchmarking  of  good  practices  among  SMTQ 
organizations as part of UNIDO technical assistance projects. 
2 
5.3.  Regional  approaches  (strengthening  regional  structures)  should  be  used 
where  a  project  can  link  into  already  existing  regional  institutions  and 
cooperation  frameworks.  When  applying  regional  approaches,  take  into 
account different development stages of countries, allow for “multiple track” 
implementation and strengthen national and regional structures in parallel. 
2  
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  Assessment
5 
6  Enhance national ownership and decentralize project implementation   
UNIDO should further develop its implementation mechanism, strengthen project 
governance and project management structures and coordinate with other UN 
Agencies. 
 
6.1.  imprested  Empower  Project  Steering  Committees  and  provide  them  with 
result-oriented, accurate and regular information for decision making. 
2 
6.2  Where appropriate,  consider establishing a  unified steering  committee  and 
project management structure for several UNIDO SMTQ projects in the same 
country  or  region  (seek  donor  agreement,  where  necessary  –  see 
recommendation 10). 
3 
6.3.  Delegate project implementation as much as possible to the field.  1 
6.4.  Avoid setting up independent project management units (PMUs) but rather 
integrate PMUs into national administration bodies. 
2 
6.5.  Provide partners with full transparency on management decisions and project 
expenditures. 
2 
7  Good project management practice (RBM)   
UNIDO as a whole should further improve its internal quality control framework and the 
TCB should develop its own internal mechanisms and responsibilities to ensure the 
consistent application of good project management practices across the entire branch. 
 
7.1.  Systematic  application  and  updating  of  Logframe  analysis  and  planning 
including identification and monitoring of external factors (risk management). 
1 
7.2.  Adopt results based budgeting and financial reporting.  ? 
7.3.  Make  inception  phases  mandatory  to  update  project  planning  to  changing 
conditions. 
? 
7.4.  Define  monitoring  mechanisms,  responsibilities  and  allocate  the  necessary 
funds for monitoring with a specific focus on outcome and impact monitoring 
(also ex-post) and consider cooperating with local partners for this. 
1 
7.5.  Adopt regular and accurate reporting on progress and self-evaluation.  2 
7.6.  Develop a scoring system for evaluations that would allow for comparisons 
and benchmarking between projects. 
n/a 
8  Act as “One UNIDO” in TCB projects   
Clarify and streamline roles and functions of “substantive branches” and overcome 
operational challenges between UNIDO “substantive branches” and “service branches” 
through better integration of service branches into the project cycle at an earlier stage. 
 
8.1   Implement the “3C” approach through better coordination in-house and with 
other UN Agencies and development actors. 
2 
8.2   TCB branch should be leading “comply” related activities (also food safety 
and SPS). 
3 
8.3   PSD branch should be leading “compete” related activities (including 
“industrial upgrading”). 
1 
8.4   Agro-industry branch should be leading agro-value chain activities.  3 
8.5   Energy and Environment branch: Responsibility for environmental and energy 
standards should be clarified. 
2 
8.6   Involve the UNIDO procurement branch at an early stage of procurement and 
include local conditions such as maintenance issues into technical specifications of 
equipment. 
? 
8.7   Involve HRM in the selection of Chief Technical Advisors and other long-term 
consultants and apply standard selection criteria including management aspects and 
soft skills, such as management skills. 
? 
8.8   Apply appropriate fee rates for hiring national consultants that are in line with 
the respective market rates. 
1  
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  Assessment
5 
9.   Recommendations to donors   
9.1   The donor should accept long-term commitments because SMTQ requires a 
comprehensive approach and long-term efforts; investing into multi-annual “master 
plans” and multi-layered governance and coordination structured is good value for 
money and prerequisite for sustainability. 
 
9.2  The donor should align their funding policies with country needs (e.g. include 
welfare benefits of domestic SMTQ as appropriate – see recommendation 1.5) and 
coordinate with other donors to enhance aid effectiveness. 
 
9.3   The donor should be aware that too much pressure for timely implementation 
and expenditure without taking into account (unexpected) absorption problems may be 
counterproductive. 
 
9.4   The donor should avoid elements of “tied aid”, as these may blur project 
objectives and strategies. 
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Annex 5: Country reports 
 




Le Bénin a connu, dans les années 90, une période de croissance et de développement 
industriel ￠ la faveur de l’ouverture de son ￩conomie.  Malgr￩ l’￩troitesse du march￩ 
interne,  le  co￻t  des  facteurs  (co￻t  de  l’￩lectricit￩,  faiblesse  des  infrastructures),  la 
position du Bénin est stratégique pour atteindre des marchés tels que celui du Niger et 
surtout celui du Nigeria. La performance de l’￩conomie b￩ninoise a ￩t￩ relativement forte 
entre 2005 et 2008 avec une croissance du PIB d’environ 4,1%, en tout cas au dessus 
de la moyenne régionale.  
 
Toutefois, le pays est resté un pays à faible revenu avec 680 USD / par tête et par an 
car  sa  croissance  ￩conomique  bien  que  positive  n’a  pas  ￩t￩  suffisante  vis-à-vis  de 
l’accroissement de la population b￩ninoise.  
 
De  plus,  2009  et  2010  la  croissance  s’est  r￩duite  ￠  environ  2,6  %  par  an  (facteurs 
externes, inondations de 2010). Aussi, le développement du secteur privé, en particulier 
celle de l’industrie qui est encore faible (repr￩sente seulement 7,8% du PIB), reste ￠ 
consolider. C’est pourquoi l’un des piliers des diff￩rents Documents de Strat￩gie pour la 
Réduction  de  la  Pauvreté  du  Bénin  (DSRP-B￩nin)  est  le  maintien  d’une  croissance 
économique  durable  et  équilibrée  à  travers  le  développement  du  secteur  privé,  la 
compétitivité  des  entreprises  et  de  l’industrie.  Le  gouvernement  dans  le  DSRP 
2011/2015, continuit￩ des pr￩c￩dents, pr￩voit d’intervenir en faveur de l’acc￩l￩ration de 
la  croissance  par  la  diversification  de  l’￩conomie,  la  promotion  de  l’industrie  et  le 
renforcement de la compétitivité des PME (renforcement de capacité des institutions de 
support). 
 
Les programmes r￩gionaux de l’ONUDI Qualit￩ et PRMN r￩pondent donc ￠ un besoin 
clairement identifi￩ du gouvernement et on comprend qu’ils aient ￩t￩ particuli￨rement 
attendus et suivis.  
 
Ainsi, le programme de mise à niveau correspond bien aux objectifs du pays mais les 
parties -prenantes, principalement le secteur privé, ont bien compris que le programme 
régional était « pilote ﾻ et ne permettrait pas d’atteindre l’envergure nationale. Aussi, le 
Comité  National  de  Pilotage  (qui  est  désormais  ancré  au  plus  haut  niveau  avec  le 
Ministre de l’Industrie lui-même) et le Bureau National de Mise à Niveau ont travaillé 
avec force les deux premières années à sensibiliser les autorités, mettre en place un 
budget de fonctionnement pour le BRMN, préparer un programme national.  
 
L’actuel directeur (un premier responsable a d￩missionn￩ en 2009) a consolid￩ avec le 
soutien du Comité de Pilotage, du BRMN en mobilisant un budget de fonctionnement 
substantiel : une équipe avec 3 cadres, des locaux en centre ville, des véhicules pour se  
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d￩placer, un budget communication (￩dition d’un magazine trimestriel). Le BRMN a tr￨s 
vite recherché des partenaires pour la formulation d’un Programme National de Mise à 
Niveau et avec le Conseil National du Patronat du Bénin a mobilisé le CDE pour financer 
une mission d’expertise de formulation. 
 
Le 31 mai 2012, le programme national a été validé par toutes les parties-prenantes: le 
Ministre  de  l’Industrie,  du  Commerce,  des  Petites  et  Moyennes  Entreprises,  les 
différentes administrations béninoises, le secteur privé, les banques et les partenaires 
techniques et financiers.  
 
Un  des  acquis  important  du  Programme  Régional  de  Mise  à  Niveau  est  donc  la 
naissance  de  ce  programme  national  dont  la  gestion  est  confiée  au  BRMN.  Le 
programme  national  reprend  les  éléments  de  méthodes  du  programme  régional  de 
l’ONUDI. Cependant capitalisant sur les difficult￩s rencontr￩es par la mise en œuvre du 
programmes  régional,  certains  éléments  (en  particulier  les  crit￨res  d’￩ligibilit￩,  les 
modalités de financement des primes) ont évolué:  
 
1.  Le  programme  national  embrassera  tous  les  secteurs  de  l’￩conomie  (inclus  les 
services,  le  secteur  BTP,  centre  de  formation,  centres  techniques)  et  ne  sera  pas 
exclusivement concentr￩ sur l’industrie r￩pondant aux sp￩cificit￩s du B￩nin. 
 
2. Afin de faciliter l’adh￩sion des entreprises, les crit￨res d’￩ligibilit￩ sont assouplis, les 
micros  entreprises  et  les  entreprises  semi-publiques  (20%  de  participation  de  l’Etat) 
peuvent y participer. 
 
3. La participation des entreprises au financement de 10% du diagnostic stratégique 
initial (sauf micro entreprise), le montant de plafonds des primes est relevée: 
 
- Investissement immatériel: 80% pour toutes les entreprises, plafonné à 50 
millions de CFA. 
- Investissement matériel: 20% pour toutes les entreprises, plafonné à 100 
millions de CFA. 
 
Le programme vise la mise à niveau ou restructuration en 5 ans de 89 entreprises 
dont  42  entreprises  du  secteur  industriel  –  Le  budget  prévisionnel  est  de  28 
milliards de CFA. 
 
Le BRMN solide et visible a donc permis d’avoir un effet de d￩monstration m￪me si 
certaines difficultés inhérentes au programme régional demeurent: 
 
-  Lors de la mise en place du programme, les consultants locaux ont trouvé 
l’outil de diagnostic pertinent mais g￩n￩raliste, ils auraient appr￩ci￩ des outils 
« métiers », adaptés au secteur des entreprises.  
-  Le manque de collaboration/partage d’exp￩riences entre les diff￩rents 
Bureaux nationaux. 
-  Les délais trop longs entre chaque étape (démotivant les participants, les 
consultants): certaines entreprises ont entrepris seules les actions  
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immatérielles prévues dans le plan de mise ￠ niveau qu’elles jugeai en 
urgentes. 
-  La difficulté de sélection des entreprises, les critères n’￩tant pas adapt￩s ￠ 
l’￩conomie faiblement industrielle du B￩nin. 
-  Le manque d’implication des BRMN dans l’organisation des diagnostics; au 
Bénin deux cabinets conseil ont été recrutés pour les diagnostiques, l’un a 
g￩r￩ cinq entreprises, l’autre neuf. La surcharge de travail d’un des cabinets 
a eu un impact sur la qualité du travail avec les entreprises. 
-  Le manque d’implication du BRMN dans le recrutement des consultants 
internationaux ce qui a empêché le BRMN de jouer son rôle de supervision et 
d’interm￩diaire en cas de conflit. 
-  Le m￩contentement de certaines entreprises. Certaines jugent qu’elles n’ont 
pas reçu le nombre de jour prévu dans le cas d’actions immat￩rielles pr￩vues 
dans leur plan de mise à niveau. Dans le cas de la société ETE, entreprise 
produisant de l’eau min￩rale, le litige sur le nombre de jour pass￩s et pr￩vus 
est important (20H/jour dans le plan, 5H/jour comptabilis￩ par l’entreprise). 
-  Pour les entreprises qui devaient recevoir une assistance en comptabilité 
analytique, les informations contradictoires re￧ues quant ￠ pour l’achat ou 
non du logiciel de comptabilit￩, a finalement r￩sult￩ ￠ l’annulation des 
formations qui ne pouvaient se faire sans le logiciel. 
 
Le  programme  qualité  a  été  mis  en  place  sans  difficulté,  le  Bénin  ayant  déjà  une 
structure « qualité ﾻ avec l’agence ABENOR, Agence Béninoise de Normalisation et de 
gestion de la qualité (ex CEBENOR) en charge de la normalisation depuis 2010.  
 
En effet, le décret du 5 novembre 2010 du gouvernement du Bénin a mis en place cet 
établissement public à caractère scientifique et social doté de la personnalité morale et 
de l’autonomie financi￨re; placée sous la tutelle du Minist￨re de l’Industrie, elle h￩berge 
le  Coordinateur  Technique  National  (CTN).  La  collaboration  avec  l’agence  a  ￩t￩ 
naturelle, le programme a appuyé les équipes responsables de la certification personnel 
(formations et accompagnement pratique) de l’agence ￠ mettre en place la certification 
de produits (des demandes sont en cours sur les savons médicinaux, la viande de lapin, 
le jus d’ananas) et finalement de se pr￩parer aux Guide ISO 65 et la norme ISO 17021 
« organisme de certification de produits et des systèmes de management qualité ». Un 
plan d’action certification et la revue de l’organigramme de l’agence est actuellement en 
cours pour préparer ABENOR dans une d￩marche d’accr￩ditation. 
  
La promotion de la qualité à travers la pérennisation du Prix de la qualité est d’ailleurs 
une activit￩ phare de l’ABENOR. En 2012, ETE, une des entreprises accompagnées à 
la certification ISO 9001 version 2008 par le Programme a été primée lors de l'édition 
2012 du Prix UEMOA de la Qualité. Elle a reçu le prix « Leadership » qui est le 2ème 
Prix dans sa Catégorie (catégorie B: entreprise de moins de cent agents).  
 
Les  entreprise  ont  largement  adhéré  aux  programmes  et  sont  satisfaites  de 
l’accompagnement re￧u pour  la certification m￪me si elles ont jug￩ les d￩lais assez 
longs. 
 
En effet, le démarrage a été lent même si le comité de pilotage a travaillé sans problème 
majeur et régulièrement. Il comprend 22 membres et ceci explique peut-être la difficulté 
de maintenir la motivation de tous les membres. Le comité a surtout permis de diffuser la  
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culture « qualité » au Bénin. Le comit￩ a ￩t￩ positivement surpris par l’adh￩sion des 
entreprises au programme et par les importants résultats en termes de certification et de 
démarche qualité.  
 
A l’inverse, une frustration demeure devant les r￩sultats du programme qualit￩ phase 2, 
en  particulier  de  la  part  des  représentants  du  secteur  privé  qui  observe  la  « non » 
accr￩ditation  des  laboratoires  d’analyses  des  produits  agroalimentaires 
(microbiologiques et physicochimiques).  
 
En  effet,  les  trois  laboratoires  d’analyses  de  microbiologie  &  physicochimie, 
indispensables  pour  faire  évoluer  les  industries  agroalimentaires  et  en  particulier  les 
produits d’exportation (filière crevette), avaient été retenus par le programme en phase I 
et  II.  Ce  sont:  le  Laboratoire  Central  d’Analyses  des  Denr￩es  Alimentaires  de  la 
Direction  de  l’Alimentation  et  de  la  Nutrition  Appliquée  (LCADA  -  DANA),  la  Section 
Hygiène,  Eaux  et  Aliments  du  Service  National  des  Laboratoires  de  Santé  Publique 
(SHEA/ SNLSP) et enfin le Laboratoire des Sciences du Sol, Eaux et Environnement 
(LSSEE). Bien qu’ils soient les principaux acteurs publics dans la mise en place de la 
s￩curit￩ alimentaire, les fournitures d’￩quipements, l’accompagnement et les formations 
dispens￩es n’ont, h￩las, pas abouti ￠ l’accr￩ditation. Bien que motiv￩, le personnel s’est 
d￩mobilis￩ devant l’absence de budget pour les investissements matériels et humains 
nécessaires dans la poursuite de la démarche qualité. 
 
Contre toute attente, les deux laboratoires ￠ avoir obtenu l’accr￩ditation ISO 17025 sont 
des deux laboratoires privés du secteur du génie civil : Aïwa Technical Services (ATS) et 
le laboratoire d’Essais et de Recherches en G￩nie Civil (LERGC). Ce dernier a m￪me 
été inclus au dernier moment dans le programme au vue du dynamisme de sa direction 
et des investissements importants consentis à chaque visite des experts.  
 
Les deux laboratoires accrédités il y a un an par le COFRAC sont très satisfaits de 
l’accompagnement et de l’accr￩ditation. Il en tire des b￩n￩fices en termes d’image et 
d’organisation interne. Toutefois, l’impact sur leur d￩veloppement ￩conomique n’est pas 
évident après une année. Et dans les deux cas, les directions ont plutôt vu augmenter 
les co￻ts de production avec l’accr￩ditation : principalement l’￩talonnage ￠ l’￩tranger des 
équipements  de  mesures  (en  particulier  la  presse,  qui  nécessite  des  démarches  en 
France), pas de r￩seau d’inter-comparaison pour le g￩nie civil qui n’est pas un secteur 
prioritaire du programme, audit de suivi…etc. Ainsi, il apparaît indispensable pour eux 
d’￩largir leur march￩ sur la r￩gion, et l’accompagnement dans le plan d’affaires qui est 
actuellement  effectué  par  le  programme  leur  apparaît  comme  essentiel. 
L’accompagnement arrive tardivement alors que les laboratoires sont déjà engagés. 
 
Ainsi, on constate de façon récurrente que les laboratoires privés arrivent à engager 
dans les d￩lais requis des investissements humains et financiers, ce qui n’est pas le cas 
des  laboratoires  publics,  qui  sous  la  tutelle  de  diff￩rents  minist￨res  n’arrivent  pas  ￠ 
optimiser budget et mandat.  
 
La  situation  est  à  ce  point  critique  que  le  Bénin  aujourd’hui  cr￩e  une  chaîne  de 
commandement  direct  qu'est  l’Agence  B￩ninoise  de  S￩curit￩  Sanitaire  des  Aliments 
(ABSSA), organe d’￩valuation, de gestion et de communication sur les risques sanitaires 
au Bénin. Cette structure qui vient de naître (2012) va assurer la veille sanitaire, avec le  
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soutien des services techniques et des laboratoires de référence qui lui sont rattachés. 
Avec cette agence, le Bénin se dote du Laboratoire Central de Contrôle de la Sécurité 
Sanitaire des Aliments (LCSSA) qui a pour vocation d'assurer le contrôle de tous les 
produits  alimentaires  et  agroalimentaires,  ainsi  que  des  intrants  agricoles,  à  l'import 
comme ￠ l'export. Ce laboratoire sera accompagn￩ dans sa mise en œuvre par des 
financements  de  l’Union  Europ￩enne  ￠  travers  la  Coopération  Technique  Belge.  Le 
responsable de ce programme a établi un contact avec le CTN pour capitaliser sur les 
r￩sultats du programme qualit￩ de l’ONUDI.  
 
Afin  de  lancer  des  démarches  qualité  dans  les  filières  de  production  des  produits 
prioritaires  sélectionnés  par  le  programme,  des  formations  spécifiques  ont  été 
organisées: 
 
-  dans la fili￨re ananas, avec l’appui sp￩cifique de producteurs et d’entreprise 
de transformation,  
-  dans la fili￨re anacarde, avec l’appui à la mise en place d’un syst￨me de 
tra￧abilit￩ dans l’entreprise B￩nin Cashew. 
 
En terme d’impact, ces actions, bien que pertinentes ont une portée restreinte à une ou 
deux entreprises. 
 
Enfin, si la lev￩e de la suspension d’exportation des crevettes avait été un objectif de la 
phase  I  du  programme  qualit￩,  l’assistance  particuli￨re  de  cette  fili￨re  n’a  pas  ￩t￩ 
poursuivit en phase II car la plupart des entreprises d’exportation de crevette ont ￩t￩ 
mise  en  difficulté  financière  et  toute  la  filière  de  production  est  sinistrée.  Une  seule 
entreprise exporte encore ce qui n’est h￩las pas un march￩ suffisant pour l’accr￩ditation 
de tout un système qualité export. Finalement, un document de stratégie nationale de 
promotion  et  de  d￩veloppement  de  la  qualit￩  est  en  cours  d’￩laboration  sous  la 
coordination du CTN qui doit faire le point sur toutes ces avancées et les changements 




Ananas, Cajou,  
produits de la pêche et huiles 
Laboratoires d’analyses et 
métrologie. 
3 préparations accréditation. 
1 laboratoire métrologie 
accompagné. 
2 accréditations 
laboratoire de génie 
civil. 
Entreprises PQAO.  09 entreprises 
accompagnées. 
ISO 9001 et 22000. 
Entreprises PRMN.  14 accompagnées 
Dont 6 restructurations. 
1 programme national 
de mise à niveau. 
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Burkina Faso 
 
Du fait de son appartenance ￠ l’UEMOA le Burkina Faso a b￩n￩fici￩ du PQ1, du PQ2 et 
du PRMN. Entre 2007 et 2011 les deux cellules de coordination régionale étaient logées 
dans les mêmes bureaux mis ￠ disposition par la Commission de l’UEMOA au sein de 
son siège à Ouagadougou. 
 
Plusieurs  interlocuteurs  ont  fait  des  remarques  positives  sur  les  acquis  du  PQ1 
(formation de qualiticiens ; prix national de la qualité ; nombre de certifications ISO 9000 
en hausse). Un effort important a ￩t￩ consacr￩ aux ￩quipements techniques, m￪me s’il 
faut retenir que certains ￩quipements livr￩s ￠ la fin du PQ1 n’ont pas ￩t￩ utilis￩s voire 
m￪me  install￩s  avant  l’arriv￩e  du  PQ2.  N￩anmoins,  force  est  de  constater  que  les 
interventions du PQ1 ont engendr￩ une prise de conscience g￩n￩ralis￩e de l‘importance 
de la qualité au BF notamment au niveau politique mais aussi parmi les organismes de 
laboratoires et les entreprises.  
 
Dès 1992 la Banque Mondiale avait assist￩ ￠ la cr￩ation de l’association public-privée 
ABMAQ dont le SG a assuré la présidence du comité de pilotage du PQ2. Pendant la 
p￩riode creuse entre le PQ1 et le PQ2 la BAD a consenti son support ￠ l’￩laboration 
d’une politique nationale de la qualit￩ visant à la rationalisation du système national de 
qualité. A travers le financement d´une étude supplémentaire (Cheikh Kane), le PQ2 a 
￩galement contribu￩ ￠ cette politique. Actuellement, la mise en œuvre de cette politique 
est en cours comportant des réaménagements majeurs du paysage organisationnel de 
la  Qualit￩.  On  s’attend  ￠  la  cr￩ation  d’ABNORM  qui  viendra  fusionner  entre  autres 
l’ABMAQ, FASONORM et certaines parties de l’IQM. La n￩cessit￩ et l’urgence d’un tel 
réaménagement sont ressenties à tous les niveaux pour pallier aux dysfonctionnements 
actuels du syst￨me, notamment dans le domaine de l’inspection. 
 
Pour renforcer l’appropriation du programme r￩gional par les gouvernements nationaux 
le  PQ2  avait  changé  les  procédures  par  rapport  au  PQ1  en  permettant  aux 
gouvernements  de  nommer  des  membres  de  l´administration  en  tant  que  CTN.  Ce 
syst￨me ￠ fait ses preuves, bien qu’au BF le CTN initial a d￻ ￪tre remplac￩ par manque 
d’efficacit￩ ￠ un certain moment. Actuellement, la CTN burkinab￩ est une consultante 
contract￩e par l’ONUDI. Bien qu’elle soit log￩e dans les bureaux de l’ABMAQ, celle-ci 
déplore des déficiences concernant son implication dans les prestations du PQ2 aux 
entreprises burkinabé. 
 
Plusieurs entreprises rencontrées par les évaluateurs se sont également plaintes des 
lenteurs  et  inefficacités  du  PQ2.  Il  convient  de  distinguer  deux  cas  de  figure :  des 
entreprises participantes à la fois au PRMN et au PQ2 et des entreprises assistées par 
le  PQ2  de  façon  autonome.  Concernant  cette  dernière  catégorie,  au  moins  deux 
entreprises sont attendues d’￪tre certifi￩es d’ici la fin de l’ann￩e. La mission d’￩valuation 
exprime  néanmoins  ses  réserves  concernant  la  pertinence  de  cette  assistance 
« autonome ﾻ du PQ2 aux entreprises. Au BF il s’agissait soit de bureaux d’￩tudes qui 
auraient probablement r￩ussi leur certification sans l’assistance du PQ2 soit de micro-
entreprises pour lesquelles l’ISO 9000 n’est pas encore r￩ellement ￠ l’ordre du jour. 
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Mais  des  problèmes  bien  plus  graves  sont  apparus  au  niveau  des  entreprises 
participantes ￠ la fois au PRMN et au PQ2. S’agissant l￠ d’entreprises dévouées à la 
démarche qualité de par leur sensibilité et leur taille, les difficultés semblent être dues 
principalement aux incompatibilités administratives entre les deux programmes. L’id￩e 
initiale de faire exécuter les actions de support qualité identifiés dans les « plans de 
mise à niveau » par le PQ2 était certainement excellente. Malheureusement, les deux 
cellules de coordination et les deux d￩partements de l’UEMOA se sont heurtés à des 
probl￨mes de proc￩dure surmont￩s qu’en d￩but 2012 par un protocole commun de mise 
en œuvre.  
 
Les actions du PQ2 au niveau de l’accr￩ditation des laboratoires ￩taient plus efficaces. 
En août 2012 le laboratoire de microbiologie du DTA a été le premier laboratoire du BF à 
obtenir son accréditation internationale. Le laboratoire de génotypage du CIRDES est 
attendu  d’y  parvenir  avant  la  fin  de  2012.  Le  LNSP  a  ￩galement  fait  des  progr￨s 
importants vers son accréditation, mais il ne sera pas capable de l´obtenir avant la fin du 
PQ2.  Le  LNSP  se  heurte  notamment  aux  probl￨mes  d’inflexibilit￩  et  de  manque 
d’autonomie typiques aux laboratoires publics. Le PQ2 est certainement conscient de 
l’importance  cruciale  de  ces  blocages.  La  mission  a  collecté  des  échos  très  positifs 
concernant une ￩tude suivie d’un s￩minaire sur les r￩formes n￩cessaires ￠ apporter aux 
statuts des organismes publics de qualité. Encore plus récemment le PQ2 a commencé 
de fournir son assistance à cinq laboratoires  avanc￩s afin d’￩laborer des « business 
plan ﾻ. La mission d’￩valuation estime que ces activit￩s auraient dues ￪tre lanc￩es au 
d￩but du programme, mais il semble que ceci n’a pas ￩t￩ possible parce qu’impr￩vu 
dans le planning. 
 
Plusieurs  interlocuteurs  de  la  mission  d’￩valuation,  notamment  du  secteur  privé,  ont 
souligné  que  les  progrès  incontestables  des  laboratoires  au  niveau  technique  ne 
porteront  leurs  fruits  qu’en  fonction  de  la  mise  en  œuvre  effective  des  r￩formes 
envisagées du système national de qualité dans sa globalité et du respect des principes 
de rentabilit￩ commerciale dans la gestion des laboratoires. Concernant l’optimisation de 
l’utilit￩  du  programme  pour  les  entreprises,  celles-ci  mentionnaient  également,  et  de 
façon  r￩currente,  l’absence  des  normes  r￩gionales  et  les  dysfonctionnements  des 
circuits  d’inspection  ￠  la fois  internes  et  au  niveau  des  importations. Clairement,  les 
résultats concrets sont difficiles à obtenir en ce qui concerne ces fonctions très liées à la 
dimension  régionale  du  programme  et  les  entreprises  ne  semblent  pas  avoir 
connaissance de progrès dans ces domaines. 
 
Si les milieux concern￩s au BF font preuve d’une grande sensibilit￩ et d’une attitude 
proactive dans le domaine la qualité, ceci est également le cas pour la « mise à niveau » 
des entreprises. Depuis 2008 un programme national de mise à niveau (PMN) est mise 
en œuvre par le Bureau de Restructuration et de la Mise a Niveau (BRMN). Bien que 
ces structures nationales aient clairement bénéficiés de la présence et des expériences 
du PRMN, il semble que, compte tenu des contraintes administratives et politiques qui 
lui sont propres, celui-ci n’a pas pu profiter pleinement de la pr￩sence des structures 
nationales,  de  la  m￪me  mani￨re  que  le  PMN  s’est  pos￩  des  questions  pourquoi  le 
PRMN a du mettre en place une lourde structure de mise en œuvre parall￨le ￠ partir du 
niveau r￩gional et de l’ONUDI ￠ Vienne. 
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Les entreprises b￩n￩ficiaires du PRMN rencontr￩es par l’￩valuateur ont ￩t￩  presque 
unanimes pour confirmer l’utilit￩ du diagnostic. Ils ont apprécié le caractère « holistique » 
de cet exercice dont les fruits n’ont pas tard￩s ￠ ce montrer, dans certains cas m￪me 
avant le lancement des activités de mise à niveau à proprement dites. Il est vrai que la 
constitution des équipes multidisciplinaires n￩cessaires par les consultants locaux n’￩tait 
pas toujours facile et il ne peut également pas surprendre que les priorités des « plans 
de mise à niveau » basés sur les diagnostics avaient tendance à refléter, parfois plus 
que  les  besoins  réels  des  entreprises,  les  spécialités  des  consultants.  Ceci  peut 
éventuellement  expliquer  la  prépondérance  des  « manuels  d’organisation »  et  des 
autres  activités  liés  aux  aspects  organisationnels  des  entreprises  par  rapport  aux 
questions techniques de processus de production et de marketing international. Mais le 
programme a bien saisi cette problématique et les responsables aux différents niveaux 
ont essay￩ d´apporter des solutions. L’ONUDI a identifi￩ et contract￩ les sp￩cialistes 
internationales nécessaires et le BRMN national a pleinement exercé ses prérogatives 
de  contrôle  de  qualité  des  plans  de  mise  à  niveau.  Une  mesure  supplémentaire 
consistait à engager des « coachs » pour accompagner les équipes de diagnostic mais 
l’￩valuateur a collect￩ des ￩chos mitig￩s quant ￠ l’efficacit￩ de cet instrument. 
 
Des  problèmes  plus  difficiles  à  surmonter  sont  apparus  lors  des  actions  de  mise  à 
niveau à proprement dites. Compte tenu de la variabilité des retards dus au contrôle de 
qualité, les plans de mise à niveau furent validés en deux vagues en juin et décembre 
2010.  Pour  le  Burkina  Faso  18  entreprises  ont  été  retenues  (trois  plus  que  prévu). 
Pendant que les entreprises, au moins celles disposant d’une tr￩sorerie suffisante, se 
sont lancées dans la réalisation des investissements mat￩riels, la mise en œuvre des 
environ 42 missions d’assistance immat￩rielle s’est av￩r￩e beaucoup moins ais￩e. 
 
Il semble qu’une d￩cision modifiant les principes de fonctionnement initialement arr￪t￩s 
par  le  PRMN  est  ￠  la  base  de  certains  probl￨mes  qu’￠  connu  la  mise  à  niveau 
matérielle. Tandis que dans un première temps la mise à niveau immatérielle devrait 
appliquer  la  même  procédure  que  la  mise  à  niveau  matérielle,  à  savoir  le 
remboursement ex-post des investissements par les entreprises, les instances du PRMN 
prirent  la  d￩cision  de  fournir  l’assistance  immat￩rielle  aux  entreprises  ﾫ en  nature », 
c'est-à-dire  moyennant  l’intervention  d’un  bureau  d’￩tude  international  pr￩alablement 
contract￩ par l’ONUDI. A partir de septembre 2010 celui-ci passait des sous-contrats 
avec un coordinateur national et un nombre considérable de consultants nationaux et 
internationaux  pour  r￩aliser  les  42  missions  d’assistance  immat￩rielle.  Le  BMN,  se 
trouvait devant le fait accompli des cette décision et en porte à faux par rapport à la 
procédure  de  son  propre  programme  national  correspondant  entièrement  à  celle 
initialement prévue par le PRMN. 
 
Le BMN consid￨re qu’il aurait ￩t￩ en mesure de r￩aliser les actions du PRMN selon 
cette  même  procédure,  moyennant  le  support  financier  temporaire  nécessaire  au 
renforcement  de  ses  propres  structures  et  l’expertise  des  experts  internationaux  ￠ 
mobiliser par l’ONUDI de la m￪me façon que ceci a été le cas lors des diagnostics. 
Consid￩rant l’￩tat avanc￩ du Burkina Faso compar￩ aux autres pays (en excluant le 
Sénégal qui lui aussi avait déjà son propre programme), il est probable que la formule 
envisagée par le BMN aurait pu fonctionner. Mais la question reste à poser si les six 
autres pays sans un programme national opérationnel auraient pu procéder de la même 
mani￨re. Dans l’hypoth￨se que les retards des autres pays ont n￩cessit￩ la mise en  
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œuvre des actions immat￩rielles du PRMN par bureau d’￩tude international interpos￩, 
les  BMN  du  Burkina  Faso  (et  du  Sénégal)  auraient  donc  fait  le  frais  du  principe 
d’appliquer le m￪me r￨glement dans tous les pays qui semble avoir pr￩valu au PRMN. 
 
Du  reste,  la  fourniture  « en  nature ﾻ  de  l’assistance  immat￩rielle  est  ￠  l’origine  d’un 
certain  nombre  de  dysfonctionnements  au  niveau  des  entreprises.  Des  problèmes 
graves  d’appropriation  sont  apparus  puisque  la  plupart  des  entreprises  semble  avoir 
refus￩ de fournir leurs diagnostics et leurs plans de mise ￠ niveau au bureau d’￩tude 
international qui a par cons￩quent du proc￩der ￠ l’assistance immat￩rielle sans avoir 
connaissance de l’analyse qui ￩tait ￠ la base de cette assistance. Le deuxi￨me ordre de 
probl￨mes est li￩ au manque de transparence financier de l’approche appliqu￩. Etant 
donné que le bureau international a appliqué ses propres taux internes et non publiés 
aux payements des experts internationaux et nationaux, les coûts mentionnés dans les 
plans  de  mise  à  niveau  pour  les  différentes  actions  de  mise  à  niveau  immatérielles 
n’￩taient plus applicables. Il en résulte que les entreprises burkinabés refusent de payer 
leur part de 20% des co￻ts de la mise ￠ niveau immat￩rielle. C’est ainsi que le BMN a 
fait une deuxième fois les frais du changement de procédure, puisque les 20% était 
initialement prévu de revenir au BMN pour renforcement de ses structures. 
 
Le  manque  de  pr￩cision  des  modalit￩s  d’ex￩cution  et  de  remboursement  aux 
entreprises  a  conduit  ￠  d’autres  probl￨mes.  Un  premier  questionnement  est  apparu 
quand, en cours d’exercice, la ﾫ mise à niveau spécifique » a été définie comme un 
troisième  type  de  mise  ￠  niveau.  Il  s’agit  l￠  de  formations  de  responsables  ou  de 
techniciens  de  l’entreprise  ￠  l’￩tranger  ou  de  l’acquisition  de  logiciels  ou  autres 
équipements étroitement liés à la mise à niveau immatérielle. Ces actions furent, après 
multiples  discussions,  inclus  dans  les  actions  immatérielles.  Or,  ces  prestations  ne 
faisant  pas  partie  des  termes  de  r￩f￩rences  du  bureau  d’￩tude  international,  les 
entreprises se sont retrouvées devant le choix de préfinancer ces investissements ou de 
les suspendre. Les deux cas de figure existent au Burkina Faso. Dans le premier, les 
entreprises  attendent  toujours  d’￪tre  rembours￩es.  Dans  le  deuxi￨me,  les  actions 
immat￩rielles relatives ￠ l’achat du logiciel n’ont pas eu lieu.  
 
Concernant  l’ex￩cution  des  ﾫ fiches  d’actions »  dans  le  domaine  de  la  qualité  des 
probl￨mes ￩pineux sont apparus li￩s aux difficult￩s des deux programmes d’harmoniser 
leurs procédures. Aucune entreprise bénéficiaire du PRMN rencontrée au Burkina Faso 
n’a mentionné des résultats utiles émanant des actions du PQ2. Il est vrai qu’au moment 
o￹  les  deux  programmes  ￩taient  finalement  parvenus  ￠  trouver  un  terrain  d’entente 
proc￩dural, les entreprises semblent s’avoir d￩courag￩es. Il est ￠ noter que, dans les 
cas où les actions qualités dans les entreprises PRMN ont été menées par le bureau 
d’￩tude international, les entreprises semblent ￪tre plutôt satisfaites des r￩sultats. 
 
La  plupart  des  entreprises  rencontr￩es  ont  sanctionn￩  d’une  note  plutôt  positive  les 
actions de mise ￠ niveau mat￩rielle. Il est vrai qu’un certain nombre d’entreprises sans 
tr￩sorerie  suffisante  s’est  plaint  du  fait  que  le  PRMN  n’a  pas  vers￩  les  primes 
d’investissement  en  avance  ￠  l’investissement,  mais  une  telle  proc￩dure  n’￩tait  pas 
prévue et aurait été peu justifiable. Néanmoins, la Commission de l’UEMOA, ￠ laquelle 
appartenaient le contrôle des investissements et le payement de la prime, a montré une 
certaine flexibilité en échelonnant le payement de la prime à la réalisation de 30%, 60%  
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et 100% des investissements par les entreprises. Il semble ￩galement, qu’au d￩but les 
primes étaient payées à 100% même avant la réalisation entière des investissements, 
une pratique qui néanmoins a été abandonnée par la suite. 
 
Au moment de l’￩valuation, les r￩sultats du PRMN dans les entreprises burkinabés sont 
mitigés.  La  plupart  des  diagnostics  semblent  avoir  donné  satisfaction.  Plusieurs 
entreprises  sont  également  contentes  des  résultats  des  actions  immatérielles.  Par 
exemple,  un  producteur  de  médecines  traditionnelles  a  changé  de  processus  de 
production et trouv￩ de nouveaux march￩s ￠ l’exportation gr￢ce ￠ l’intervention d’un 
expert tunisien. Un spécialiste sénégalais a apporté une expertise de très haut niveau et 
des solutions nouvelles pour la production de l’huile de coton, qui ont m￪me servi aux 
autorités burkinabés à reformuler le règlement technique relatif au fonctionnement de ce 
type  d’entreprises.  Mais  les  succ￨s  ne  sont  pas  strictement  li￩s  ￠  l’expertise 
internationale. Il semble que, par exemple, l’expertise d’un sp￩cialiste tunisien dans le 
domaine des pneus et autres articles en caoutchouc n’￩tait pas ￠ la hauteur de la tache. 
De l’autre côt￩, plusieurs entreprises ont mentionn￩ des cas d’experts nationaux qui leur 
ont permis de mettre en œuvre des innovations majeures telle que l’introduction d’une 
comptabilité  analytique  ou  encore  de  procéder  à  une  réorganisation  de  l’entreprise. 
Néanmoins, dans beaucoup de cas, les entreprises semblent être restées sur leur pour 
tirer pleinement avantage de l’expertise fournie. Souvent, elles ont eu l’impression que 
les  experts  sont  passés  « en  tourbillon ﾻ  et  qu’elles  auraient  eu  besoin  d’un 
accompagnement  plus  ￩tal￩  dans  le  temps.  Le  cas  d’une  entreprise  du  cuir  est 
également instructif dans la mesure où celle-ci n’a pas pu mettre en œuvre la plupart 
des recommandations. Malgré son dynamisme, ses investissements importants et son 
utilisation permanente d’experts de production en provenance de  l’Italie et  de l’Inde, 
cette entreprise se trouve dans l’incapacit￩ d’acheter la mati￨re premi￨re face ￠ ses 
concurrents  au  Nigéria  qui  se  trouvent  hautement  favorisés  par  des  subventions  à 
l’exportation. Depuis ces derni￨res ann￩es les probl￨mes de cette entreprise se sont 
exacerb￩s  ￠  tel  point  qu’elle  a  d￻  licencier  la  moiti￩  de  ses  effectifs.  Il  s’agit 
effectivement d’un cas ou l’entreprise aurait eu besoin de «restructuration » avant de 
pouvoir  proc￩der  ￠  la mise  en  œuvre.  Or,  au  moins  au  Burkina  Faso,  le  PRMN  ne 
semble pas avoir pu déployer un quelconque instrumentaire de restructuration. 
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Côte d’Ivoire 
 
La force de son secteur économique permet à la Côte d’Ivoire d’assumer un certain 
leadership économique dans la zone UEMOA. Ce pays représente 40 % du PIB de 
l’UEMOA  et  une  enqu￪te  (r￩alis￩e  dans  le  cadre  de  l’￩tude  de  formulation  du 
programme national de mise à niveau) répertorie 250 entreprises manufacturières dans 
le pays.  
 
Les secteurs traditionnels d’exportation sont le cacao (1er producteur mondial), le café, 
les  fruits  et  l￩gumes,  l’huile  de  palme.  Ces  fili￨res  d’exportation  sont  relativement 
lucratives,  elles sont bien organisées et  connaissent relativement peu de rejets (voir 
statistiques de l’UE). La Côte d’Ivoire est dot￩e de bonnes infrastructures industrielles 
(zone  franche,  port,  etc.).  Finalement,  il  existe  une  culture,  une  politique  et  une 
infrastructure qualité relativement bien développée. 
 
Cependant, la Côte d’Ivoire sort d’une longue p￩riode de r￩cession ￩conomique issue 
de  l’instabilit￩  politique  et  des  affrontements  armés  multiples  qui  ont  divisé  le  pays 
depuis  plus  d’une  d￩cennie.  L’ins￩curité  et  les  combats  dans  les  provinces  sont  à 
l’origine du manque d’investissement dans les fili￨res agricoles traditionnelles (ananas, 
anacardes, bananes, coton, hévéa, huile de palme) et donc on constate une baisse de 
production de ces filières dont les plantations vieillissent. 
 
Enfin, entre d￩cembre 2010 et juillet 2011, la crise politique majeure qui a vu s’affronter, 
les militants du Président sortant contre ceux du nouveau Président, a conduit à une 
v￩ritable guerre, entraînant l’arr￪t total de toute l’activité économique (pendant trois mois 
mars/ juin 2011), le pillage de nombreuses entreprises et la destruction des moyens de 
production. Il est important de signaler la destruction totale du laboratoire de métrologie 
LANEMA qui avait b￩n￩fici￩ de l’assistance du programme qualité en phase 1 et de 
nombreux ￩quipements financ￩s par l’Agence Fran￧aise de D￩veloppement (AFD). 
 
 Le Plan National de Développement – PND- adopté par le gouvernement en 2012 est 
ambitieux.  Il  met  l’accent  sur  le  d￩veloppement  ￩conomique,  est  basé  sur  les 
infrastructures et les grands projets. De nombreux bailleurs tels que la France appuie le 
gouvernement dans le financement et la mise en œuvre de ce plan. Aussi, le portefeuille 
de l’ONUDI en Côte d’Ivoire est important avec 23 millions d’euros : 
 
  Sur le plan strat￩gique, l’ONUDI intervient aupr￨s du gouvernement ivoirien en 
apportant son assistance ￠ la formulation d’une politique industrielle et au 
renforcement du cadre institutionnel afin de permettre la diversification et la 
relance du secteur industriel ivoirien. La mise à niveau, la restructuration des 
entreprises est un élément clé pour la relance économique du pays et la création 
d’emploi. 
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  Le programme régional de restructuration et mise à niveau: le PRMN. 
  Le programme Qualité et Normalisation, phase 1 qui s’est achev￩e en 2005 
et la phase 2 (PQ2) qui a démarré en 2007. Il est important de noter que 
l’ONUDI a aussi anim￩ un programme qualité plus spécifiquement orienté sur 
les contaminations ￠ l’Ochratoxine A (OTA) dans la fili￨re Cacao (achev￩ en 
2010). 
  La composante « Amélioration de la compétitivité des entreprises ivoiriennes 
des secteurs d’exportation non-traditionnelsﾻ du Programme d’Appui au 
Commerce et à l’Int￩gration R￩gionale -PACIR- financ￩ par l’Union 
Européenne. 
  
Cette composante a pour objectif la mise ￠ niveau d’entreprises ivoiriennes dans trois 
filières (non traditionnelles) : textile / confection, noix de cajou, céréales et manioc. Alors 
que le programme a été lancé en septembre 2010, les activités ont, réellement démarré 
en septembre 2011. 
 
Enfin, dans le cadre du le PACIR, un travail d’￩quipe entre l’ONUDI, le Minist￨re de 
l’Industrie et le Bureau National d’Etudes Techniques et de Développement (BNETD), a 
permis de r￩aliser une ￩tude de formulation d’un programme National de mise ￠ niveau 
et  de  restructuration  pour  la  Côte  d’Ivoire  en  cours  de  finalisation.  Ainsi,  l’ONUDI 
capitalise en même temps les expériences du PACIR et du PRMN dans cet exercice de 
formulation. Une enquête statistique non exhaustive menée par le BNETD auprès des 
entreprises du secteur manufacturier (environ 250) a permis de constituer une base de 
données de 548 entreprises manufacturières,  dont ces derni￨res seront l’objet  de la 
mise  à  niveau  souhaitée.  Enfin,  les  experts  mandatés  pour  la  formulation  de  ce 
programme ont d’ailleurs tiré des leçons importantes  sur l’acc￨s au financement des 
entreprises et l’obtention des primes, imaginant des sch￩mas pour le fonds de mise à 
niveau et  les primes différents du PRMN (voir  la note spécifique sur les innovations 
portées par les programmes nationaux Bénin et Côte d’Ivoire). 
 
Donc,  sur  la  période  2007  /2012,  le  secteur  privé  ivoirien  a  bénéficié  de  nombreux 
programmes d’assistance technique: 
 
  Les programmes r￩gionaux anim￩s par l’ONUDI : le PRMN et le programme 
Qualité. 
  PACIR, en partie anim￩ par l’ONUDI. 
  PARE PME, Projet d’Appui ￠ la Revitalisation et ￠ la gouvernance des PME, 
financé par le gouvernement ivoirien sur un don accordé par la Banque 
Mondiale (15 millions de dollars am￩ricains) mise en œuvre par l’Apex-CI, 
Agence de Promotion des Exportations. Ce programme a été lancé en juillet 
2010 et pr￩voit notamment le renforcement de capacit￩ et l’appui au 
financement des PME dans sa première composante. 
 
Ainsi, les différentes structures représentantes du secteur privé (telles que le patronat 
ivoirien CGE-CI, la Chambre de Commerce et d’Industrie de Côte d’Ivoire, l’Apex-CI) ont 
été invitées à participer à la mise en œuvre de ces diff￩rents programmes : participation 
aux différents comités de pilotage, relais de  la promotion auprès de leurs membres, 
participation  aux  formations  etc.  On  peut  imaginer  une  certaine  concurrence  des  
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programmes. D’une part dans leur pilotage, il n’existe pas de liaison entre les comit￩s de 
pilotage des différents programmes (PRMN, Programme Qualité, PACIR, PARE PME) 
où  siègent  les mêmes personnes.  Ceci  a  conduit  à  une  certaine  démobilisation  des 
participants.  D’autre  part,  dans  la  mobilisation  des  PME  membres,  le  temps  et  les 
ressources  des  entreprises  sont  limités,  les  entrepreneurs  sont  plus  enclins  à 
sélectionner les appuis efficaces. 
 
L’ancrage institutionnel et l’adh￩sion des parties prenantes ont ￩t￩ rendus plus difficiles 
du fait de cette abondance des programmes. Cela a joué particulièrement en défaveur 
du Programme Régional de Mise à Niveau. Lors de la cérémonie de lancement, quand 
en présence de tous les représentants du secteur privé, le PRMN a annoncé le plafond 
de 15 entreprises, Il est apparu marginal, devant les besoins du pays. Cette annonce a 
démotivé les entreprises et le patronat qui, semble-t-il, se sont peu mobilisés et pour la 
promotion  et  dans  le  comit￩  de  pilotage.  Tr￨s  vite,  la  formulation  d’un  programme 
national de mise à niveau est devenue la première requête du gouvernement ivoirien 
pour répondre à la contingence du PRMN.  
 
En ce qui concerne le programme Qualité, la structure de gestion du programme Qualité 
-  la Coordination Technique Nationale (CTN  – le coordinateur et son assistante) est 
financ￩e par l’ONUDI. Elle est h￩berg￩e par l’organisme national de normalisation (Côte 
d’Ivoire  Normalisation  en  abr￩g￩  CODINORM).  C’est  une  structure  l￩g￨re  et  vite 
opérationnelle,  elle  a  été  reconnue  comme  relativement  efficace.  L’ancrage  ￠ 
CODINORM est à la fois opérationnel et respecté. Le travail effectué lors de la phase 1, 
a permis une adhésion forte et un démarrage rapide de la phase 2. CODINORM est 
d’ailleurs l’acteur de r￩f￩rence en qualit￩ puisqu’il anime aussi les activités qui visent à la 
certification qualité des entreprises des trois filières du PACIR.  
 
Le Comit￩ de pilotage du programme qualit￩ a bien compris son rôle d’articulation entre 
le national et le r￩gional, en participant aux activit￩s d’harmonisation des normes, de 
mise  en  place  de  politiques  communes  au  sein  des  deux  commissions  UEMOA  et 
CEDEAO. Mis à part des contraintes budgétaires liées au fonctionnement du comité, 
toutes  les  parties  prenantes  y  ont  jou￩  leur  rôle.  Elles  ont  appr￩ci￩  l’effort 
d’￩largissement de l’UEMOA ￠ la CEDEAO et consid￨rent que le sujet a bien avanc￩, le 
facteur temps étant indispensable pour mettre en place une politique qualité commune. 
Pour cette phase II du programme, le choix des filières et des produits prioritaires aurait 
pu être plus en adéquation avec de réelles capacit￩s d’exportation. Par exemple la filière 
anacarde  a  été  choisie  pour  appuyer  la  région  du  Nord  (victime  de  la  guerre). 
Cependant  cette  filière  a  été  totalement  détruite  (routes  impraticables,  entreprises 
fermées, en faillite) et des actions de qualité seules ne peuvent être suffisantes pour la 
revitaliser.  Seules  quelques  actions  de  formation  ont  pu  être  données,  mais  pour  le 
moment de peu d’utilit￩ pour les entreprises qui aujourd’hui recherchent avant tout des 
investissements. 
  
En ce qui concerne la gestion courante des deux programmes tous les intervenants, en 
premier  lieu,  les structures de gestion nationales (CTN et  BRMN) s’accordent sur  la 
lourdeur du processus de prise de décision: 
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  La validation par les CPN des listes de bénéficiaires (consultants, entreprises 
ou laboratoires) puis cellule technique régionale, et comité de pilotage 
régional ralenti les processus alors que les entreprises / consultant ont besoin 
de réactivités pour rester compétitif. 
  Ces délais ont été aggravés en Côte d’Ivoire par le temps de r￩activit￩ de 
l’ONUDI Vienne et des structures relais ￠ l’UEMOA et bien sur la longue 
p￩riode d’interruption pendant le conflit arm￩. 
 
Interrogé sur le calendrier de ses interventions, un consultant qualité recruté par 
le programme qualité, mentionne des délais importants et de longues périodes de 
rupture d’activité :  
 
« En avril 2009, l’annonce pour la recherche de consultants qualité est publiée dans la 
presse.  Un  premier  contrat  est  signé  en  mai  2009,  le  démarrage  des  activités  de 
sélection  d’  entreprises  en  juin  2009.  S’en  suit  une  rupture  avant  le  démarrage  des 
activités d’accompagnement d’entreprises en octobre 2010. A partir de décembre 2010, 
le conflit armé arrête toutes les activités jusqu’en mai 2011. Le contrat avec l’ONUDI est 
prolongé en juin 2011, et ceci permet la reprise des activtés d’accompagnement. A la fin 
de l’année 2011, les contrats arrivent à échéance (fin de programme) et il faut attendre 
août 2012 pour recevoir de nouveau contrat et reprendre les activités en septembre 
/octobre 2012. En novembre 2012, l’accompagnement de deux entreprises reprend pour 
la préparation de leur audits à blanc prévues en décembre. Les audits d’accréditation 
auront lieu en janvier 2013. Hors ces audits seront hors délai pour le programme, ce qui 
pose  la  question  du  cofinancement.  En  novembre  2012,  il  est  prévu  aussi  d’ 
accompagner dans la préparation de business plan des laboratoires accrédités du Togo, 
Bénin et Burkina Faso .» 
 
Les consultants recrutés par le programme qualité de manière récurrente se plaignent 
du niveau de rémunération, trop souvent situé dans leur fourchette basse, ce qui est 
d’autant plus p￩nalisant quand le portefeuille d’entreprises qu’ils ont ￠ suivre d￩passe 5 
entreprises. De plus, certaines d’entre elles sont localis￩es en province, aggravant les 
surco￻ts  (les  co￻ts  de  transports  et  de  s￩jour  n’ont  pas  été  pris  en  compte  par  le 
programme et n’avaient pas ￩t￩ demand￩s ￠ l’entreprise). 
 
De manière générale, les consultants ont ￩t￩ satisfaits des formations re￧ues pour l’ISO 
17025. Les consultants formés et les entreprises accompagnés ont jugé le niveau des 
interventions (Formation / Expertise) de bonne qualité, en particulier les formations ISO 
22000 et ISO 17025, l’accompagnement ￠ l’ISO 9001. Cependant, certains regrettent 
les interruptions entre la formation et la mise en pratique (une année dans le cas de la 
formation ISO 17025).Toutes les entreprises accompagnées (ISO 9001 ou ISO 22 000) 
sont très satisfaites. Pour exemple deux unités agro-alimentaires qui ont été toutes deux 
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  La Société Ivoirienne de Charcuterie et de Salaison (S.I.C.S.) une industrie de 
charcuterie certifiée ISO 9001 avec le programme qualité attend d’investir dans 
une nouvelle unité pour obtenir l’ISO 22000. 
  Soft drinks, une industrie de production de boissons gazeuse licenciée Pepsi 
Cola pr￩pare l’ISO 22000.  
 
Elles  attendent,  en  effet,  un  impact  important sur  leur  image  et  donc sur  leur  vente 
(marché national et régional).  
 
Le  BNETD  (accompagn￩  ￠  la  norme  ISO  9001)  est  le  bureau  d’￩tudes  public.  Tr￨s 
satisfait, il souhaite désormais diffuser la démarche qualité dans toutes les organisations 
et projets dont il a le mandat de gestion. Les deux laboratoires accrédités 17025 sont 
très satisfaits. Dans les deux cas, ce sont des laboratoires privés : 
 
Le laboratoire Castelli, importante pêcherie qui produit et exporte du thon en conserve, 
est le laboratoire d’analyses de la conserverie. Son directeur se montre très satisfait de 
l’appui re￧u car le laboratoire avait besoin d’￪tre accr￩dit￩ pour maintenir sa d￩marche 
qualit￩ ￠ l’export et l’accompagnement de l’ONUDI a renforc￩ sa d￩marche vis-à-vis de 
sa direction. Même si les tests et analyses sont vérifiés en interne lors de la réception 
dans les usines de Bretagne et Italie, le directeur du laboratoire voit cette accréditation 
comme un gage de croissance et de durabilité vis-à-vis de sa direction internationale. Il 
est prêt à envisager de faire des analyses pour tiers. 
 
Dans  le  cas  du  Cabinet  d’Ing￩nierie,  de  Formation  et  de  conseil  en  environnement, 
agroalimentaire  et  en  d￩veloppement  Rural  (ENVAL),  l’accr￩ditation  a  beaucoup 
augment￩ sa visibilit￩ et de fait permis l’augmentation du chiffre d’affaires. La direction 
d’ENVAL envisage aujourd’hui le financement de sa croissance par l’ouverture de son 
capital. Il est en discussion avec des investisseurs français (Investisseurs et Partenaires 
-IPEDEV). 
 
Le bénéfice est moins évident pour les autres laboratoires accompagnés qui sont des 
établissements  publics :  le  Laboratoire  National  de  Santé  Publique  (LNSP),  le 
Laboratoire Central d’Hygi￨ne Alimentaire (LCHAI). Ce dernier laboratoire qui fait parti 
du Laboratoire National d’Appui au D￩veloppement Agricole (LANADA), établissement 
public  National  à  caractère  administratif  placé  sous  la  tutelle  du  Ministère  de  la 
production  animale  et  des  ressources  halieutiques,  illustre  bien  le  problème  de  la 
durabilit￩ / efficacit￩ de l’accompagnement des ￩tablissements publics.  
 
LCHAI a ￩t￩ accompagn￩ en phase 1 du programme Qualit￩ et a re￧u d’ailleurs un 
certain  nombre  d’￩quipements.  L’objectif  de  la  phase  2  du  programme  ￩tait  de 
l’emmener vers l’accr￩ditation ISO 17025. Hors l’￩quipement HPLC qui devait ￪tre fourni 
par le programme SFP en 2005 n’a jamais ￩t￩ re￧u, le spectrophotom￨tre et l’￩tuve 
livrés lors de la phase 1 du programme qualité, ne marchent plus (livraison arrivée en fin 
de garantie, pas de service maintenance, pas de connaissance des fournisseurs pour 
les pi￨ces de rechanges). En conclusion, si les formations ￠ l’ISO 17025 ont ￩t￩ de 
bonne  tenue  et  apportent  beaucoup,  il  apparaît  que  l’accompagnement  pour  
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l’accr￩ditation a du ￪tre report￩e quand de nouveaux ￩quipements seront achet￩s et 
que les travaux de mise en sécurité seront effectués.  
 
La probl￩matique de ce laboratoire qui n’a pas les moyens d’assumer la maintenance 
des  ￩quipements  offerts  ni  d’investir  dans  le  bâtiment,  est  symptomatique  des 
laboratoires publics qui manque de budget. Et si la satisfaction de l’assistance technique 
est au rendez-vous, le manque de budget récurrent anéantit régulièrement les soutiens 
techniques  et  financiers  apport￩s  par  le  programme  qualit￩  (ou  par  d’autres).  La 
frustration des personnels formés de cet établissement public et leur démotivation sont 
perceptibles. 
 
Finalement, il est n￩cessaire de proc￩der ￠ l’accompagnement des laboratoires publics 
(tels que les laboratoires de LANADA (microbiologie et étalonnage, LANEMA, le LNSP) 
dans  un  changement  de  statut  et  dans  la  pr￩vision  d’un  plan  d’affaire.  La  r￩flexion 
amorcée  par  le  programme  qualité  est  primordiale  pour  rendre  efficace  la  politique 
qualit￩ et aboutir ￠ l’accr￩ditation.  
 
Sur l’aspect mise ￠ niveau, la satisfaction vis-à-vis du PRMN est beaucoup plus mitigée. 
Les  entreprises,  les  parties  prenantes  et  le  BRMN  signalent  de  nombreux  points 
d’am￩lioration. 
 
L’organisation  du  PRMN,  pr￩voit  que  les  Bureaux  de  Mise  ￠  Niveau  soient  des 
structures financ￩es par le gouvernement et appuy￩es techniquement par l’ONUDI. En 
Côte d’Ivoire, le BRMN a eu beaucoup de mal ￠ se mettre en place (changement de 
directeur après un an de fonctionnement), à acquérir un budget : le bureau a déménagé 
4 fois depuis sa création. Actuellement, il est situé dans un bureau loué par le Ministère. 
Sa  localisation  est  difficile,  l’immeuble  ￩tant  identifi￩  comme  Minist￨re  de  la  Sant￩, 
aucune  autre  signal￩tique  n’existe.  Il  n’a  pas  de  mat￩riel  informatique,  tr￨s  peu  de 
ressources pour recruter du personnel, pas de véhicule pour se déplacer. Ce manque 
de budget ne permet pas de stabiliser le personnel, le BRMN ne travaille aujourd’hui 
qu’avec des experts, parfois juniors. Il a encore moins de budget pour communiquer 
largement.  
 
Le peu de visibilit￩ du BRMN ne lui permet donc pas d’￪tre tr￨s cr￩dible aux yeux des 
entreprises. Ceci est accentué par le fait que le PRMN a alloué un budget identique par 
pays pour  organiser communication, conférence,  etc. Hors, les niveaux de vie et  de 
r￩mun￩ration  en  Côte  d’Ivoire  sont  nettement  plus  ￩lev￩s  que  dans  d’autres  pays 
voisins, ainsi les budgets « communication conférences » sont sous dimensionnés pour 
la Côte d’Ivoire. 
  
Ceci peut expliquer une certaine marginalisation par le secteur privé du PRMN en Côte 
d’Ivoire d’autant qu’aux probl￨mes financement rencontr￩s généralement dans le PRMN 
sont venus s’ajout￩s : 
 
  En ce qui concerne les diagnostics, la nécessité pour les consultants de faire 
partie d’un cabinet conseil, ce qui a p￩nalis￩ des consultants ind￩pendants 
ivoiriens. Peu ont participé au programme.  
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  L’intervention d’Euroconsultants s’est faite en direct ￠ travers son 
représentant sur place sans introduction ni suivi de la part du BRMN. Le 
BRMN a donc ensuite eu du mal à intervenir lors de litiges entre les 
entreprises et les consultants, ce d’autant que le BRMN n’avait pas 
connaissance des termes de références des consultants négocié directement 
entre l’ONUDI Vienne et le cabinet Euroconsultants. Ainsi, la direction de la 
société Protein Kissé La (PKL), une entreprise qui produit des céréales, est 
en litige avec  Euroconsultants et n’a pu ￪tre appuy￩e de la part du BRMN 
pour résoudre le litige. La direction déplore cette absence de réponse 
institutionnelle à ses plaintes. 
  Le manque d’information ou les changements de directives (achat ou pas du 
logiciel de comptabilité) ont encore pénalisé le BRMN. Les entreprises ont 
regretté le manque de clarté et de transparence sur les investissements 
immatériels et matériels. 
  Certaines  des  entreprises  ivoiriennes  dans  la  période  ont  été  pillées  et 
saccagées. Il leur a été difficile de mobiliser des investissements ensuite pour 
suivre le plan de mise à niveau. Elles ne peuvent donc pas postuler à la 
prime. 
  
Actuellement  la  société  Ivoirienne  D'Hévéa  (IDH)  spécialisée  dans  la  production  de 
caoutchouc est la seule des 13 entreprises ivoiriennes accompagnées par le PRMN à 
avoir  reçu  la  prime  correspondant  à  son  investissement  matériel.  Très  satisfaite  du 
programme,  la  direction  regrette  cependant  le  manque  de  clart￩  sur  l’￩ligibilit￩  des 
investissements qui sont pris en compte (ou pas) dans le calcul de la prime. 
 
D’autres  soci￩t￩s  accompagn￩es  par  le  PRMN,  comme  la  charcuterie  SICS,  D￪gue 
Délices (qui produit un dessert lacté traditionnel ivoirien), doivent trouver les ressources 
financi￨res  ext￩rieures  pour  mettre  en  œuvre  leur  investissement  matériel  et  ne 
recevront  la  prime  (si  ces  délais  de  paiement  sont  acceptés  par  la  Commission  de 
l’UEMOA) qu’une fois l’investissement r￩alis￩. L’acc￨s au financement des entreprises 
restant difficile, il est important de signaler l’initiative du BRMN Côte d’Ivoire qui a facilité 
la recherche de financement pour les sociétés bénéficiaires du PRMN, en négociant un 
accès « collectif » avec la banque AFREXIMBANK. Cette initiative doit être capitalisée 
pour  les  programmes  à  venir,  il  apparaît  nécessaire  que  les  BRMN  deviennent  des 
accompagnateurs vers le financement. Ces m￪mes remarques ont d’ailleurs ￩t￩ reprises 
dans l’￩tude sur l’acc￨s au financement, composante du PRMN qui vise à évaluer la 
faisabilit￩ d’un fonds de Mise ￠ Niveau. 
 
Chronogramme des programmes « appui aux PME et aux systèmes qualité » en 
Côte d’Ivoire: 
2000/2005  2007 / 2009  2010  11.2010 / 
 09.2011 
09.2011/2012 





  PRMN  PRMN  PRMN fin 
    PACIR  PACIR  
  PARE PME  PARE PME  PARE PME  
  66 
 
Rappel des principaux résultats PRMN et PQ2: 
Produits / 
filières prioritaires PQ2 
Fruits et légumes, 
cajou et Emballage bois (palette) 




3 préparations accréditation. 
1 laboratoire métrologie 
LANEMA accompagné (à 
travers PTB). 
2 accréditations (ENVAL et 
CASTELLI).Laboratoire 
national de santé publique 
en préparation pour son 
examen d’accr￩ditation. 
Entreprises PQAO.  11 entreprises 
accompagnées  
pas d’entreprises certifi￩es. 
Soft drinks, SICS, BNETD, 
SIPEFCI, SOPIE (dissoute) 
pour le référentiel ISO 
9001. 
PKL, SICS, SOFT Drinks, 
SIPEFCI, SITASA (Pour le 
référentiel ISO 22000). 
Accompagné pour le 
compte du PRMN 
(SITASA, DEGUE DELICE, 
CAJOU de FASSOU, 
IVOMA, IDH, CONDICAF) 
Au BPF, BPH, HACCP, 
ISO22000. 
Entreprises PRMN..  13 accompagnées 
(dont 4 restructurations). 
3 entreprises finalisent la 
mise à niveau (jusqu’aux 
investissements matériels). 
IDH (Hevéa) a reçu la 
prime. 
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Ghana 
 
Together with Nigeria, Ghana is one of the most prosperous and developed economies 
of the ECOWAS community, as also reflected by the advanced state of development of 
its National Quality Infrastructure (NIS). Companies and private sector representatives 
interviewed by the evaluation mission unanimously agreed that the country’s advanced 
NIS is one of the factors driving Ghana’s export competitiveness. 
 
Quality is clearly mentioned as a priority in Ghana’s Industrial Policy and as such actively 
pursued by the Government. It hasn’t come as a surprise that, in parallel to the WAQP, 
Ghana  sought  and  obtained  SECO  funding  for  a  national  TCB  project,  which  is 
implemented in cooperation with UNIDO since 2007. In 2013 this national programme 
will enter into its second phase (5 mill USD) in parallel with TRAQUE, another national 
TCB programme funded by the EU (9 mill euro) for which TA is being provided by a 
private  consultancy  firm.  The  EU  funds  similar  TCB  country  programmes  in  other 
countries,  either  at  an  early  stage  of  implementation  (e.g.  Côte  d’Ivoire)  or  in  a 
preparatory stage (Nigeria). Hence the interest of the Ghana case to understand the 
(potential) complementarities between national TCB initiatives and the WAQP. 
 
The  development  of  the  Ghana/UNIDO/SECO  national  TCB  programme  from  its 
preparatory  stages  in  2006  to  the  design  of  the  forthcoming  2013-2017  phase 
demonstrates a coherent TCB approach. The initial emphasis has been on building core 
SMTQ functions, but with a clear emphasis on serving priority economic sectors. Among 
other  achievements,  the  national  programme  reached  accreditation  of  several 
laboratories at the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA). Arguably, its biggest success has 
been the accreditation of the pesticides residue laboratory at the GSA. This laboratory 
plays a significant role for the cocoa sector, which is a backbone of Ghana’s economy, 
as well as for fruits and vegetable exports, a sector in which pesticides are of growing 
buyer concern. Building on these successes, the initial SMTQ focus is now shifting under 
the  second  phase  of  the  national  programme  to  a  genuine  value  chain  approach 
addressing compliance and competitiveness issues in a holistic manner.  
 
At the country level, all necessary steps were taken to ensure coherence between the 
national  programme  and  the  WAQP.  Most  importantly,  both  programmes  have  been 
governed by the same Steering Committee, under the strong leadership of a private 
sector representative. The SC played a quite decisive role in the formulation of the next 
phase of the national programme. Stakeholders also underlined that the UNIDO mid-
term  evaluation  in  2009  has  been  instrumental  for  strengthening  the  needs  driven 
approach and ownership of the national programme. 
 
By  contrast,  national  ownership  of  the  WAQP  has  been  rather  weak.  Initially, 
stakeholders did have the distinct impression of a “one-size-fits-all” approach failing to 
take into account Ghana’s advanced status in SMTQ. There is no doubt that the WAQP 
management was fully aware of Ghana’s potential role as regional SMTQ leader, which 
is why they decided to locate the Regional Management Unit (RMU) of the WAQP in 
Accra before the ECOWAS Commission insisted on its relocation to Abuja. However, 
Ghana  stakeholders  did  not  perceive  significant  benefits  from  the  initial  18  months  
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presence of the RMU in Accra. On the contrary, during this period the programme has 
been perceived as largely inactive. Significant ownership of the WAQP developed only in 
2010, when the decision was made to use Ghana’s portion of the WAQP funding for 
purchasing metrology equipment. In spite of this important move, national ownership of 
the WAQP  remained constantly threatened by other factors, such as implementation 
delays. 
 
Despite its successes in SMTQ development, the case of Ghana provides equally clear 
evidence of persisting systemic failures of its NQI. However, such failures are by no 
means limited to Ghana but rather a general shortcoming in many developing countries, 
which is why UNIDO’s thematic evaluation of SMTQ interventions of 2010 recommended 
applying a more systemic TCB approach in all UNIDO programmes. It should however 
be emphasized that, in its design, the Ghana national programme did already address 
systemic  issues  by  going  beyond  a  mere  bilateral  partnership  with  the  MoTI. 
Partnerships  were  also  set  up  with  other  ministries  and  their  affiliates,  such  as  the 
Ministry of Health with its Food and Drugs Board (FDB) and the Ministry of Food and 
Agriculture with the PPRSD.  
 
It is quite remarkable that the national programme also tried to contribute to developing a 
national Quality Policy, an exercise that also entailed attempts for a comprehensive NIS 
mapping. However, the national Quality Policy has not yet been adopted and illustrates 
as such the difficulties of inter-ministerial coordination in SMTQ and food safety, two 
fields that despite their apparent technical nature prove to be politically loaded not only 
in Ghana but in most other countries.  
 
As  a  result,  dysfunctionalities  and  unclear  administrative  roles  continue  to  exist,  as 
demonstrated by the example of Ghana’s groundnuts sector that is reported here for 
illustrative purposes. As early as 2002, the aflatoxine problem became widely recognized 
as a major threat to groundnuts exports from Ghana, leading to an inspection by the 
FVO in 2006 and the adoption of an action plan, including the need for an accredited 
aflatoxine  laboratory.  However,  as  recently  as  in  September  2012  the  government 
decided to suspend groundnut exports because the problems identified 10 years ago are 
still not solved. Stakeholders interviewed fully recognize that this voluntary ban has been 
motivated not so much by a lack of laboratory capacities but rather by the persisting 
systemic anomalies of Ghana’s food inspection function. 
 
Although highly aware of quality issues, Ghana stakeholders perceived only a rather 
limited ownership and relevance of the WAQP. Their main interest in this programme 
has  been  connected  to  purchasing  calibration  equipment  for  the  GSA.  Besides  this, 
certain  ancillary  WAQP  activities  took  place,  such  as  financial  contributions  for 
organizing the World Standards Day in Ghana. More importantly, the WAQP went also 
into supporting the certification of two enterprises (cocoa and tuna) for ISO 22000. This 
activity has been useful but not crucial. Its pioneering and demonstration effect is being 
weakened  by  the  fact that  another  eight  local  companies  had  already  achieved  ISO 
22.000  certification  before,  four  of  them  under  the  national  programme.  Given  the 
presence of three international ISO 22000 certification bodies on the Ghana market, it is 
also not sure, whether there is room for the GSA as a fourth provider of such services. 
On the other hand, it may well be that private food standards such as ISC and BRC are  
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of  bigger  practical  relevance.  As  a  100%  export  business,  the  tuna  company  visited 
under this evaluation is for example entirely dependent on ISC and BRC certifications 
delivered  by  organizations  from  abroad,  while  ISO  22000  is  perceived  as  potentially 
relevant but not crucial. Interestingly, similar  points  challenging the ISO focus of the 
WAQP were already made by the UNIDO certification expert who visited Ghana in 2009. 
 
With regard to the genuine regional contributions of the WAQP, the GSA’s role as a 
model and a benchmark under the thematic networks set up by the  WAQP is to be 
mentioned as a point of major importance, although not so much for Ghana but for other 
countries. For example, the seven other countries under the non-UEMOA component 
agreed to adopt some of the chemical and microbiological testing methods used at GSA 
as common harmonized methods.  
 
However, interviewed did not hide a certain degree of frustration, because the WAQP did 
not  address  those  aspects  of  regional  harmonization  in  which  Ghana  is  particularly 
interested. The  harmonization  of  product  standards  is  a  case  in  point.  For  example, 
Ghana  is  a  big  importer  of  fruit  juices,  mostly  from  Nigeria  and,  in  the  absence  of 
regionally harmonized standards and inspection rules, the FDB cannot avoid conducting 
regular inspection missions to Nigeria and other countries. 
 
The so called “regional reference labs” are another dimension where the WAQP could 
potentially  demonstrate  regional  relevance.  This  option  is  being  discussed  among 
WAQP  stakeholders  both  for  testing  and  calibration  laboratories.  Of  course,  by  its 
advanced  technical  status  in  the field  of  Quality,  Ghana  would  be  the  most  obvious 
candidate  to  host  such “regional”  laboratories. Any  additional  support for  its  national 
laboratories  that  could  be  provided  under  a  regional  rationale  would  therefore  be 
welcome. However, under a political angle, the option of elevating only one country in 
the region to a “reference” status would be hardly viable. In turn, Ghana stakeholders 
were rather skeptical whether, in a foreseeable future, laboratories in other countries of 
the region could be developed up to the level of genuine points of reference for Ghana. 
 
In  this  connection,  the ways  of  the GSA  to  obtain  calibration  traceability  for  its  own 
calibration  laboratories  is  reported  here  as  a  potentially  interesting  input  into  the 
“reference laboratory” debate. Currently, the GSA is catering its calibration traceability 
from the PTB. A rough estimation of the cost involved indicates amounts of about 5000 
euro every second year for weight and volume and 5000  Euros every five years for 
pressure. Traceability costs for temperature are more costly. However, through a recent 
investment of 60.000 euro into higher secondary standards, the GSA has been able to 
bring down the interval for pressure traceability from one to three years and to save 
60.000 euro of traceability costs every second year. This estimation indicates that, at 
least  in  the  foreseeable  future,  the  creation  of  one  or  several  regional  metrology 
reference  laboratories  could  hardly  be  justified  purely  on  cost  saving  grounds. 
Furthermore, the idea has been floated under the TRAQUE programme to establish a 
Ghana  National  Metrology  Institute  as  a  new  national  traceability  source  outside  the 
GSA. Although good practice in industrialized countries may indicate the need for such a 
separation of roles, the priority of such an investment is highly controversial in Ghana. It 
can  be  concluded from  the  above  that, to  date,  the  WAQP  has  experienced  certain 
difficulties in addressing Ghana’s genuine needs for regional harmonization.   
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Looking  into  programme  efficiency,  delays  have  been  another  area  of  concern.  For 
example,  the  ISO  22000  certification  exercise  was  launched  in  2009  but  came  to 
standstill  until  early  2012,  causing  frustration  among  beneficiaries.  Fortunately,  the 
national programme was flexible enough to pursue some of the certifications under its 
own funding. Another case of significant delays has been the purchasing of calibration 
equipment for the GSA. The decision to go for calibration was made in 2010; the expert 
writing the specifications fielded in March 2011; the premises ready in October 2011; but 
the equipment was only delivered in October 2012. The duration of 18 months between 
specifications and delivery of equipment is considered excessive, although stakeholders 
recognize that part of this delay may be due to bottlenecks on the side of equipment 
manufacturers. 
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Nigeria 
 
With a population estimated at 162.5 million and GDP of US$ 235 billion (2011), Nigeria 
is by far the largest economy of the ECOWAS community. Accounting for about 55% of 
West-Africa’s GDP, the country is referred to as the region’s economic powerhouse. 
  
Nigeria’s National Quality Infrastructure (NQI) is quite advanced. Of the different core 
legislations in this field, the following are highlighted: Decree establishing the Standards 
Organization  of  Nigeria  -  SON  (1971);  Food  and  Drugs  Decree  (1974);  Decree 
establishing  the  National  Agency  for  Food  and  Drugs  Administration  and  Control  – 
NAFDAC (1993); National Policy on Food Hygiene and Safety (2000) as part of the 
National Health Policy. The two parastatals SON and NAFDAC are among the key pillars 
of the NIS. In brief, SON’s mandate is multi-sectoral and covers areas such as standards 
development  (based  on  ISO  series),  mandatory  conformity  assessment,  inspection, 
quality promotion, product registration, product certification including the Nigeria quality 
mark called NIS (Nigeria Industrial Standards), awards for excellence, quality systems 
training and quality certification NIS ISO 9001:2008. SON is the enquiry point for TBT 
issues. NAFDAC’s mandate is focused on food, cosmetics, medical devices and bottled 
water, covering regulation, registration, inspection including monitoring of labeling, and 
certification (for local production, imports, and exports). NAFDAC is the enquiry point on 
SPS issues. Both organizations have laboratory services for testing. 
  
As  regards  metrology,  the  Department  of  Weights  and  Measures  (DWM)  under  the 
Federal  Ministry  of  Trade  and  Investment  (established  in  1960  as  a  Division  now 
Department)  is  in  charge  of  the  enforcement  of  legal  metrology  regulations  (e.g. 
verification  of  weighing  and  measuring  instruments;  calibration  of  volume  measuring 
equipment  used  at  oil  export  terminals;  training).  DWM  is  the  custodian  of  Nigeria’s 
primary  standards  of  measurement  of  mass  and  length  -  and  as  such  linked  to  the 
International  Bureau  of  Weights  and  Measures  (IBWM).  The  Department  represents 
Nigeria  in  internal  legal  metrology    (including  the  International  Organization  of  Legal 
Metrology,  IOLM).  Moreover,  SON’s  Metrology  and  Instrumentation  Directorate 
(scientific and industrial metrology) provides instrument calibration services as regards 
temperature,  mass,  pressure,  volume,  dimension  and  electrical,  offering  also 
maintenance  and  repair  services  for  testing  equipment  (electrical/electronic,  civil  and 
mechanical  engineering,  chemical  technology,  food  testing,  textile  testing).  SON  is 
member  of  regional/international  organisations  such  as  African  Regional  Metrology 
(AFRIMET). 
 
At the enterprise level, the interviews confirmed the importance attached to “quality”, 
driven  by  multiple  factors,  in  particular  the  vision  of  management,  requirements  to 
maintain or  expand exports, and product  distinction on the local market  by a quality 
mark, apart from the need for compliance with regulations. It was mentioned that the 
business  membership  organizations  stimulate  enterprises  to  engage  on  the  “quality 
route”; similarly, SON and NAFDAC’s awareness raising of enterprises and consumers 
was mentioned, highlighting the importance of standards and quality. 
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Notwithstanding the more advanced state of the NQI in Nigeria compared to the situation 
in  many  ECOWAS  member  countries,  there  are  certainly  gaps  (even  if  there  is  no 
indication  of  a  comprehensive  mapping  of  the  NQI,  of  its  shortcomings  including 
challenges in coverage of Nigeria’s 36 States). WAQP has sought to address some gaps 
identified at the start of the programme, focusing in particular on (i) the strengthening of 
selected  laboratories  and  support  towards  their  accreditation,  (ii)  some  (minor) 
assistance in the field of metrology and (iii) support to selected pilot enterprises towards 
HACCP/ISO 22000 certification (see below).  
 
Considering the size of the country and the distribution of project resources over no less 
than 16 countries, Nigeria’s part in WAQP can be considered small yet served as the 
foundation  for  a  successor  (large  scale)  national  programme  (under  preparation  by 
UNIDO; EU funding foreseen). In addition to the EU funding of WAQP and its successor 
national  programme,  also  Nigeria’s  self-financing  capacity  and  efforts  are  to  be 
highlighted (to illustrate: Federal Government funding in the field of metrology; funding 
by large companies for quality certification by SON). In terms of related assistance, in 
particular the support through USAID’s West Africa Trade Hub project (that ended in 
2010) is to be mentioned, in that it has assisted NAFDAC in its efforts to prepare for the 
ISO 17025 standard (covering e.g. comprehensive internal audits including a “laboratory 
sample  cycle  test”  and  international  proficiency  testing).  It  is  to  be  recognized  that 
WAQP’s support to NAFDAC could built on preparatory work undertaken with USAID 
support. 
 
WAQP-Nigeria focused on the preparation for accreditation against ISO 17025 of the 
following laboratories, covering advice, staff training and equipment:  
 
SON: (i) Food chemistry lab concerning the following parameters: proximate analysis of 
foods; estimation of metal contaminants in water and foods and (ii) microbiology lab – 
concerning  the  following  parameters:  total  plate  counts,  coliforms  –  Escherichia-coli, 
staphylococcus aureus, yeasts and molds. 
 
NAFDAC:  (i)  Pesticides  residues  lab  -  concerning  the  following  parameters:  organo-
chlorines, organo-phospates, carbamates, pyrethroids and (ii) mycotoxines lab. 
 
To date the project’s support to NAFDAC is most advanced: the retained labs required 
minor upgrading and emphasis has been on putting in place the quality system, with 
minor additional equipment. NAFDAC initially requested support for a new micro-biology 
lab, but this idea was dropped, as considered too costly for the project to cover. The 
equipment  provided  through  WAQP  was  installed  in  June  2012,  documentation  was 
provided and through on site advice and remote guidance by regional expertise (Ghana) 
followed by training on internal quality audits, the selected labs have been prepared for 
the  mock  audit  that  took  place  end  September  2012  (expertise  from  COFRAC  and 
Senegal). At present some corrective actions are being taken and as per the road map 
established, the actual audit is planned to take place before end 2012 by a US-based 
organization  retained  based  on  competitive  bidding.  A  few  issues  still  need  to  be 
addressed  by  NAFDAC:  the  issue  of  calibration  of  some  lab  equipment  is  not  yet 
resolved,  in  the  absence  of  accredited  equipment  calibration  services  in  Nigeria.  
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NAFDAC was also advised to purchase a scanning device to monitor equipments in the 
absence of staff (weekends). 
 
As regards SON the decision was taken to support the implementation of the plan to 
create new chemical and microbiological testing laboratories (rather than refurbishing the 
old existing food chemistry laboratory established in 1995 with equipment purchased in 
1991  within  the  context  of  prior  UNIDO  assistance  -  that  was  found  to  need 
replacement).  There  were  delays  in  the  completion  of  the  new  premises  by  SON, 
meaning that the equipment purchased (that arrived in stages between May 2011 and 
June 2012) could not be installed until July 2012. The experts from Ghana (see above) 
provide guidance in the implementation of the quality system. For now the mock audit is 
not yet planned (not expected to take place until end 2012). Staff raised some issues as 
regards the equipment provided by WAQP: some being incomplete, others not properly 
installed or not tested as part of installation process. SON needs to solve a calibration 
concern as regards some lab equipment, given vibrations resulting from the operation of 
two large generators situated near the building. Finally, the decision to have two micro-
biology labs in parallel at the level of SON (a new one to be accredited and the old one 
for “needs that do not require accreditation”) is not fully understood. 
 
The two organizations appreciated the exposure to other laboratories (study tours in 
India  and  Sri  Lanka),  yet  some  considered  there  was  too  little  practical  training  on 
specific  equipments.  Following  a  perceived  “gap  in  project  support”  in  2011,  training 
picked  up  again  in  2012,  when  regional  trainings  (covering  different  countries)  were 
conducted in Nigeria at NAFDAC premises, in particular on food analysis, pesticides 
testing,  and  internal  audits.  Overall  the  labs  were  appreciative  of  the  quality  of  the 
expertise  provided  through  WAQP  and  sensed  that  the  support  entered  into  higher 
speed since the regional expert of accreditation and conformity assessment joined the 
project management team in Abuja. 
 
The planning of the support to the labs of NAFDAC and SON has been ambitious, when 
one  compares  the  initial  target  (lab  accreditation  in  March  2010)  versus  the  actual 
situation (first accreditation not before end 2012 as regards NAFDAC). Some mentioned 
inadequacies in communication, such a last minute information on expert visits. It is to 
be noted that the cooperation with the two labs is not subject to a MoU. Equipment 
constitutes an important part of the support, yet once the list of equipment needs was 
identified with involvement of the labs, they said to have been not involved in decision 
making on prioritization of equipment purchases, nor informed of what equipment was 
ultimately purchased by the project until “the boxes arrived”. Also, and surprisingly, the 
beneficiaries  are  not  aware  of  the  maintenance  conditions/schedule  during  and  after 
warrantee (and want to have this information).  
 
Despite the fact that the importance of business plans has been stressed at various 
points in time (by the first lab expert and during regional meetings held in Conakry and 
Accra), it is an area that has not been given due attention yet by the organizations. SON 
referred the corporate strategy of the organization whereas NAFDAC wants to develop a 
business plan (and would like advice in this respect), realizing that once accredited, this 
needs to be reflected also in the pricing of the services offered by the labs. To the extent 
they  are  both  mandated  to  do  inspections,  there  is  no  indication  of  “worry”  about  
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customers  (customers  are  often  in-house  or  other  public  entities  which  may  affect 
income generation if services are provided free of charge). It is to be mentioned that the 
enterprises visited by the mission used laboratory services to check conformity of the 
results emanating from their own labs; however, none of the enterprises interviewed 
used SON/NAFDAC laboratories for such testing, given as argument that ‘they test our 
products anyway as part of their inspection”. 
 
Concerning metrology, WAQP’s support in Nigeria has remained limited. The DMW was 
invited  to  a  number  of  regional  workshops  organized  by  WAQP  (including  one  in 
cooperation with PTA), such as on the harmonization of testing of instruments (Senegal) 
and the workshop pertaining to the ECOWAS quality policy (Togo). WAQP paid DMW’s 
first  year  “corresponding  membership”  of  IOLM  (€  4,400/year;  expires  end  2012). 
Regular  payment  of  membership  fees  seems  an  issue  (and  raises  a  sustainability 
concern as regards renewal of IOLM membership). It was mentioned that DMW is also 
to renew its membership of BIPM (France) required for its calibration services. For now 
DMW’s revenues are mainly generated by inspection. DMW observed that it has worked 
more actively with PTA than with WAQP. Reference was made to a national Government 
funded programme on metrology that is under preparation, covering capacity building 
and provision of equipment. Concerns were raised by DMW about overlaps between 
SON’s Metrology Department and DMW (neither is well equipped, “cannot have two sets 
of  primary  standards”, and  there  is  need for  combined  legal,  industrial  and  scientific 
metrology infrastructure that has international acceptance). 
 
Despite  WAQP’s  intention  to  follow  a  priority  product  approach  when  strengthening 
SMTQ functions (halieutic products/fish being initially identified as priority for Nigeria), 
project implementation in Nigeria did not have this focus. Whereas the first mission of 
the laboratory expert initially recommended the introduction of a quality management 
system and staff training for the chemical and microbiology laboratories of the Federal 
Department  of Fisheries (in addition to laboratories of SON and NAFDAC), this was 
dropped (reason given to the evaluation mission: lack of funding). Also as regards the 
certification support to enterprises, there is no sector focus. There is no indication that 
the focus on the pesticides lab (NAFDAC) and the selection of two enterprises engaged 
in cocoa bean processing for certification support has any relation to the problems faced 
by Nigeria (2010) when there was a threat to get a ban on cocoa bean exports to the EU 
given the high level of pesticides (meanwhile said to have been addressed). 
 
The  process  concerning  WAQP’s  certification  support  to  enterprises  (HACCP/ISO 
22000: 2005) in Nigeria has been long and to date none of the 7 companies ultimately 
retained reached the final stage of accreditation, notwithstanding the quite advanced 
state of preparations towards certification to date. The reported delays are attributable 
mainly to the project implementation process rather than to efforts of the companies 
themselves (the latter expressed their frustration as regards the delays). Several issues 
need to be raised on the manner in which this component was implemented, starting 





  75 
“Route followed in enterprise selection” 
The one-time advertisement placed in April 2009 covered a call for interest that referred 
to national pilot enterprises that, once selected, would be supported towards certification 
to  standards  such  as  ISO  9001,  ISO  14001,  ISO  22000,  HACCP,  BRC  and 
GLOBALGAP. There is thus a gap between the actual service offering (HACCP, ISO 
22000) and the much wider range of standards mentioned in the advertisement. A total 
of 58 enterprises expressed interest. It is unclear from the (extremely general) mission 
report of the international expert in quality assurance (September 2009) to what extent 
the list of 58 companies had been reviewed at that stage by the expert and his report 
lacks information on the certification capabilities in Nigeria. 
Considering  delays  in  the  actual  start  of  the  enterprise  support  and  given  the  large 
number of interested companies, it was decided by the National Steering Committee to 
start the activities with food safety training (conducted by National Coordinator and SON 
staff). The chosen path for enterprise selection was based on the test scores of the 
exam at the end of a 4 days training of enterprise staff held in Lagos. All 58 companies 
were represented (some by more than one staff) and the 24 companies that scored 
above 75% went to the next round. The candidate enterprises were visited (21 out of 
24),  as,  indeed,  the  state  of  the  premises  play  a  key  role  in  determining  enterprise 
readiness. Staff of the 24 companies that passed the first round was subjected to a 
second round of training. Enterprise staff having attended the training confirmed that the 
training sessions were of interest and in particular considered it ‘refresher training’ (to the 
extent they have relevant background in food quality/safety issues). 
A total of 17 remained (those having passed the second  test, apart from  some that 
dropped out) that were all qualified staff but the number was still considered too big. It 
was at this stage that product priorities were listed (not mentioned in the advertisement, 
namely yam, cassava; cocoa; pineapple; Arabic gum (with emphasis on processing and 
eliminating agricultural production). This resulted in the list of 7 enterprises ultimately 
retained (selected around August 2011, based on the state of the enterprises and the 
estimate of what the project could financially support; they are all large scale enterprises 
selected, as they are likely ‘winners’ expected to be able to meet the requirements within 
the project cycle’). Those not retained among the 58 enterprises that responded to the 
advertisement have not (yet) been re-contacted by the project so far to be informed of 
their non-inclusion as pilot enterprises.  
The  7  retained  enterprises  are  in  multiple  sectors:  cocoa  processing, poultry,  sugar, 
noodles, juice, and cassava starch. In the interviews the number of 7 was considered 
insignificant and the recommendation was made to follow a sector approach rather than 
spreading demonstration over multiple sectors. When asked, the companies confirmed 
to be ready to act as “ambassadors” to advocate the importance of quality systems and 
certification, using business organizations such as MAN or their sector associations as 
vehicle. Whereas they believe in the importance of the ISO 22000 certification route, the 
companies  producing  for  the  local  market  mentioned  that  this  effort  would  not 
necessarily translate into an increase in sales in the short run. Even though the ISO 
label would be recognized by the controlling authorities, it was questioned if the end user 
of their products would be ready to pay extra for a product with the quality label (showing 
the importance of consumer awareness campaigns). 
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The 7 companies retained include 3 companies of the same holding. As focus is on pilot 
enterprises  that  are  expected  to  generate  a  demonstration  effect,  the  inclusion  of  3 
companies of the same holding is not clear. The evaluation mission learned that a fourth 
company  under  the  same  holding  is  already  certified  ISO  22000,  which  raises  the 
question if - despite its interest in the programme - the holding truly needs such pilot 
demonstration funded under WAQP.  
 
To accompany the selected companies, three national auditors were selected, trained (4 
days) and certified in August 2011. Due to administrative obstacles that resulted in an 
extremely long process of recruitment, it is only one year later, i.e. in August 2012 that 
these auditors were introduced to the companies assigned to them. Somewhat unlike 
common practice, there has been no involvement of the companies in the selection of 
their “coach” and the companies interviewed had no written information on the duties of 
the  coach.  In  fact,  the  project  formalizes  the  cooperation  with  the  companies  only 
towards  the  end  of  the  process,  whereas  it  would  seem  appropriate  for  the  parties 
involved to agree on the conditions (respective duties and responsibilities) in the form of 
a MoU much earlier on, i.e. once retained. Even if verbally briefed during company visits 
by  the  project  experts,  the  companies  interviewed  did  not  have  a  road  map  of  the 
interventions of their coach that are spread out over a three months period. Moreover, 
none of the companies interviewed was aware that the company was to pay a portion of 
the  initial  certification  audits  (a  important  communication  gap  that  should  not  be 
addressed just prior to certification). With a planned intervention of 52 days, the coaches 
are  in  principle  quasi  full-time  involved  in  the  work  at  hand.  Considering  the  quite 
advanced stage of some companies in terms of their food safety management system, 
the intensity of the support – standard for the 7 companies – is not fully clear. It was 
observed that the frequency of the coaches’ on-site visits is so far less than planned (no 
detailed report on progress) and the likelihood that the planned objectives as regards 
this component are achieved by end 2012 is questioned. In brief, on top of earlier delays 
incurred, at present there is no indication of speedy implementation of the support at the 
enterprise level through the system of coaching.  
 
The question  can  be  raised  if  certification  of  a  limited  number  of  auditors  (3)  called 
National  Food  Safety  System  consultants  (HACCP  and  ISO  22000)  is  an  adequate 
approach for Nigeria (and even for  smaller  countries). Capacity building anchored in 
national  institutions  rather  than  individual  experts  would  have  been  a  more 
comprehensive and sustainable approach. This is all the more true for Nigeria (SON) 
that is already engaged in national ISO 22 000 certification (Nigerian version). SON’s 
accreditation is an issue not covered by the project yet for the sake of sustainability the 
international recognition of SON’s work in this field seems highly relevant. Given delays, 
some companies went ahead in the meantime, paid for local conformity assessment, 
obtained  the  ISO  22000  (SON  variant)  and  are  now  engaged  in  the  internationally 
recognized process financed through WAQP. The “international recognition” based on 
international  best  practices  is  what  drives  them  to  take  part  in  a  second  round  of 
certification (which in the case of exporters is expected to reduce buyers’ audits) , even 
though there have been instants of confusion for enterprises that meanwhile acquired 
their SON ISO 22000 certification. Also SON staff had raised concerns, as if WAQP 
engaged in “competition” with the national system, which generated also questions v.à.v. 
the National Coordinator located in SON (see below).   
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A major 2 days major awareness programme was said to be planned for mid November 
2012 within the context of WAQP - Nigeria. The timing is not understood, to the extent 
the  awaited  accreditations  and  certifications  will  not  have  been  completed  by  then, 
implying  that  testimonials  of  project  outcomes  at  such  event  will  be  based  on  non-
completed interventions.  
 
As  regards  local  coordination, WAQP  has  been  coordinated  since  March  2009  by  a 
National Technical Coordinator (consultant, based in but not staff of SON) who has been 
the  main  contact  person  for  the  different  partner  organizations  and  enterprises 
interviewed and visited them regularly. Being “in the middle of the different parties” and 
considering the delays in project implementation, the coordinator position has not always 
been easy. Moreover, the coordinator felt having multiple bosses with each having their 
expectations:  “Vienna”,  UNIDO-Lagos,  CTA  and  team,  and  SON.  The  Steering 
Committee put in place (presided by SON and with private sector – NACCIMA – as Vice-
President) covers the main stakeholders, including Ministry of Trade and Investment, 
DWM, Nigeria Export Promotion Council, Consumer Protection Council, MAN and Plant 
Quarantine  Department.  In  total  the  SC  met  about  5  times,  and  absence  of funding 
(including transport to Abuja for those based in Lagos) was mentioned as main obstacle 
faced by the SC.  
 
Finally, several local partner institutions are aware of the new national programme under 
preparation (EU funding) but expressed a concern ‘where that programme is going” and 
indicated their desire to be actively involved in its design. It was emphasized by the local 
institutions t to envisage counterpart funding to have more interest and commitment of 
the local partners and within the spirit of ensuring ownership. 
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Sénégal 
 
Sur le plan industriel, le Sénégal est considéré comme étant le pays le plus avancé au 
sein  de  l’UEMOA,  ensemble  avec  la  Côte  d’Ivoire.  C’est  aussi  le  seul  pays  qui  a 
devancé le PRMN avec son propre programme de mise à niveau national (PMN) lancé 
en 2004 sur financement fran￧ais avec l’assistance technique de l’ONUDI. Par ailleurs, 
le Sénégal a bénéficié du PQ1 à partir de 2001.  
 
Concernant le volet mise à niveau, les deux programmes, BMN et PRMN, ont été mises 
en œuvre en parall￨le par le Bureau de Mise ￠ Niveau (BMN). Cr￩e d’abord en tant que 
direction  de  l’Agence  de  D￩veloppement  et  d’Encadrement  des  PME  (ADEPME),  le 
BMN a trouvé une plus grande indépendance organisationnelle à partir de 2007. Son 
statut lui permet de g￩rer des fonds importants d’une mani￨re enti￨rement transparente 
et d’employer des experts ￠ un niveau de salaires similaire au secteur priv￩. A l’heure 
actuelle, l’￩tat s￩n￩galais a dot￩ le BMN d’un budget annuel de 300 millions de FCFA. 
L’￩quipe du BMN est compos￩e de 12 cadres de haut niveau disposant d’une expertise 
pointue en mati￨re d’industrie et de finance. 
  
La première phase du PMN (2004 – 2010) ￩tait dot￩e d’un budget d’environ 10 millions 
d’euros. Le volume de la 2
e phase (2011 – 2015) se situant près de 20 millions euros, le 
budget accumulé des deux phases du PMN est donc environ 30 fois plus grand que la 
part du S￩n￩gal dans le budget du PRMN. La question de l’utilit￩ du PRMN pour le 
Sénégal se pose donc en termes de sa complémentarité, de son originalité et de sa 
valeur ajoutée par rapport au PMN. 
 
Cette valeur ajoutée du PRMN a été mise en cause par les changements de procédures 
du PRMN qui étaient pourtant initialement conçues sur le modèle du PMN Sénégal. En 
développant  une  nouvelle  démarche  -  certes  homogène  à  travers  les  huit  pays 
participants mais très différente par rapport au PMN - le PRMN n’a gu￨re pu capitaliser 
sur  les  acquis  du  PMN,  notamment  en  ce  qui  concerne  une  utilisation  efficace  des 
bureaux d’￩tudes et experts disponibles au S￩n￩gal.  
 
Cette expertise nationale est bien développée du fait que, depuis un certain nombre 
d’ann￩es,  le  S￩n￩gal  s’est  dot￩  d’un  tissu  de  bureaux  d’￩tudes  et  de  cabinets  de 
consultants  capables  de  fournir  les  « services  de  développement  des  entreprises » 
(business development services : BDS) considérés adéquates - en quantité et en qualité 
-  au  niveau  de  d￩veloppement  industriel  du  pays.  Selon  l’avis  du  PMN  et  des 
entreprises, les fournisseurs des BDS constituent le véritable atout pour la mise à niveau 
industrielle au Sénégal, puisque se sont eux qui motivent les entreprises de participer 
dans le programme et qui les accompagnent dans leur démarche de modernisation tout 
en créant des relations de confiance et des interactions multiples. C’est ainsi que le 
pr￩sident du Comit￩ de Pilotage et d’autres interlocuteurs enqu￪t￩s ont soulign￩ que 
« la mise à niveau est une affaire de proximité ».
6 
                                                 
6 Voir le vaste corps de litt￩rature sur les “spatial innovation systems”.  
  79 
Le PMN Sénégal insiste donc beaucoup sur la continuité et la relation de confiance qui 
doit exister entre l’entreprise et son fournisseur de BDS. Dans 90% des cas, ce binôme 
reste intact au fil de la démarche à commencer par la candidature commune, en passant 
par le diagnostic et la mise à niveau immatérielle jusqu’￠ l’obtention des primes. En 
octroyant  aux  participants  ses  propres  bureaux  d’￩tudes  –  très  souvent  un  pour  le 
diagnostic et un autre pour la mise à niveau immatérielle – le PRMN est allé dans le 
sens opposé. 
 
Plusieurs  dirigeants  d’entreprise  consult￩s  par  l’￩valuateur  se  sont  plaints  de  cette 
incoh￩rence de la d￩marche du PRMN. En mettant l’accent sur la maîtrise de la langue 
et de l’environnement local, ils ont regrett￩ de ne pas avoir pu utiliser l’expertise locale. 
Dans plusieurs cas même la comp￩tence technique des consultants internationaux s’est 
trouvée  mis  en  cause.  Malheureusement,  les  entreprises  les  plus  motivées  ont  été 
p￩nalis￩es  le  plus.  En  adoptant  la  d￩marche  du  PMN  telle  qu’elle  ￩tait  ￩galement 
prévue  par  le  PRMN  à  ses  débuts,  à  savoir  choix  et  contraction  du  fournisseur  de 
l’expertise pour la mise ￠ niveau immat￩rielle par l’entreprise en vue d’obtenir la prime 
usuelle de 80%, ces entreprises se trouvaient en porte-à-faux par rapport à la démarche 
modifiée  du  PRMN  qui  avait  choisi  de  fournir  l’expertise  ﾫ en  nature »  à  travers  un 
bureau  d’￩tude  international.  Un  inconv￩nient  de  cette  approche  consistant  en  l’in 
transparence  des  coûts  effectifs  de  la  mise  à  niveau  immatérielle,  aucune  des 
entreprises b￩n￩ficiaires n’a rembours￩ les 20% des coûts au BMN, tel que prévu dans 
les procédures du PRMN. 
  
Une  confusion  similaire  règne  en  ce  qui  concerne  les  actions  « Qualité »  et  les 
procédures pour obtenir la mise à niveau spécifique (logiciels et autres). Pour les actions 
« Qualité », il était convenu que le Programme Qualit￩ Afrique de l’Ouest (PQAO) les 
prendrait en charge. Malheureusement, des retards considérables sont apparus suite 
aux incompatibilités entre les procédures du PRMN et du PQAO. Par ailleurs, plusieurs 
bureaux  d’￩tudes  ont  déclinés  les  propositions  du  PQAO  à  cause  du  niveau  de 
r￩mun￩ration consid￩r￩ inacceptable car en dessous des prix de revient. L’ensemble de 
ces  entraves  a  conduit  au  fait  qu’au  moment  de  l’￩valuation  aucune  entreprise 
concern￩e n’avait b￩n￩fici￩ d’un appui dans le domaine de la Qualité.  
 
Le dossier le plus épineux semble ￪tre les payements de primes d’investissement par la 
Commission  de  l’UEMOA  accusant  des  retards  de  plus  d’un  an.  Au  moment  de 
l’￩valuation,  seulement  4  des  15  entreprises  participantes  avaient  donc  obtenu  leur 
prime. Le pr￩sident du Comit￩ de Pilotage (COPIL) n’pas cach￩ ses r￩elles inqui￩tudes 
concernant les d￩faillances de la mise en œuvre du PRMN au S￩n￩gal et notamment le 
manque de respect des engagements prises auprès des entreprises qui ne cessent de 
se plaindre auprès du COPIL et du BMN. En fait, les entreprises participantes au PRMN 
se trouvent doublement p￩nalis￩es par le fait qu’ils ne sont pas admis ￠ la nouvelle 
phase du PMN tant que leur dossier aupr￨s du PRMN n’est pas clos.  
 
En  r￩sum￩,  les  interlocuteurs  rencontr￩s  par  l’￩valuateur  ont  ￩mis  des  avis  positifs 
concernant le rôle de l’ONUDI dans la conception et la mise en œuvre du PMN. Mais ils 
ont  vivement  critiqu￩  le  PRMN  pour  lequel  ils  n’ont  pas  pu  observer  des 
complémentarités significatives par rapport au PMN.   
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  Les autorités politiques et le BMN ont perçu le PRMN comme un « nivellement 
par le bas ﾻ par rapport au PMN. Ils consid￨rent qu’il y a eu une trop grande 
ing￩rence de l’UEMOA dans la gestion des activit￩s au niveau local et insistent 
qu’une plus grande autonomie et flexibilit￩ seront indispensables dans une 
éventuelle phase de déploiement du PRMN. 
  Les consultants ont considéré la formation de base de cinq jours délivrée au 
début du PRMN comme un saupoudrage et refusé de soumettre les rapports de 
diagnostic sous forme de formulaires informatisés, tout en reconnaissant que le 
canevas standard du PRMN est utile et pourrait être adopté pour le PMN.  
  Les entreprises regrettent les difficult￩s de s’approprier et d￩plorent les délais. 
Les grandes entreprises reconnaissent comme un atout la décision du PRMN 
d’offrir son support ￩galement aux grandes entreprises (diff￩rent de la politique 
du PMN de réserver un accès privilégié aux PMEs). 
 
Le Programme Qualit￩ de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (PQAO) trouve son ancrage institutionnel 
au  S￩n￩gal  au  niveau  de  l’Association  S￩n￩galaise  des  Normes  (ASN).  ,  Cette 
Organisation  Non  Gouvernementale  ￠  but  non  lucratif  issue  de  l’ancien  Institut 
S￩n￩galais  des  Normes  en  2002,  l’ASN  anime  un  r￩seau  de  274  experts  de  la 
normalisation. Sous son égide 246 normes nationales ont été élaborées et mises en 
vigueur.  
 
Sur le plan r￩gional, l’ASN est le partenaire correspondant de NORMCERT. Dans le 
cadre de cette organisme régional crée sous la première phase du Programme Qualité 
(PQ1) l’ASN a particip￩ dans l’￩laboration de 40 normes r￩gionales. Ces normes ont ￩t￩ 
valid￩es  mais  l’ASN  regrette  que,  suite  ￠  un  manque  d’opérationnalisation  de 
NORMCERT, ces normes ne sont malheureusement pas encore en vigueur.  
 
L’ASN  s’occupe  ￩galement  de  la  certification  des  produits  ￠  travers  des  marques 
nationales. A l’heure actuelle une seule marque nationale existe, ￠ savoir pour l’huile 
d’arachide. Dans le cadre du PQAO un plan d’action vise ￠ la cr￩ation de marques 
régionales  au  niveau  de  l’UEMOA.  La  Côte  d’Ivoire  et  le  S￩n￩gal  seraient  pr￩vus 
comme les pionniers dans ce domaine.  
 
Concernant la certification des systèmes de management (ISO 9000 ; ISO 14000 ; ISO 
22000 ; etc.) l’ASN constate que, similaire ￠ d’autres pays en voie de développement, 
les coûts de la certification constituent un facteur limitant. Or, au lieu de se substituer 
aux organismes de certification existants en proposant les mêmes services à plus bas 
prix, l’ASN a opt￩ pour une approche plus originale pour résoudre ce problème qui vise 
à dynamiser le marché local de la certification par les organismes privés. Vu la réduction 
importante des coûts de certification ISO 9000 entre 2007 (10 millions de FCFA) et 2012 
(3  à  4  millions  de  FCFA)  cette  politique  semble  porter  fruits.  Avec  au  moins  cinq 
organismes  privés  de  certification,  le  marché  de  la  certification  système  au  Sénégal 
semble ￪tre fonctionnel et l’ASN souligne que les multiples interventions de formation du 
PQ1  et  du  PQ2  ont  contribué  à  cette  évolution  positive  en  augmentant  le  nombre 
d’auditeurs qualifi￩s. 
  
  81 
Les laboratoires constituent un autre domaine où le PQAO semble avoir eu des impacts 
positifs. Depuis 2001, le PQ1 et PQ2 ont assisté une dizaine de laboratoires à Dakar. 
Pour  la  plupart  d’entre  eux  ce  support  était  surtout  de  nature  immatérielle  mais  le 
CERES  Locustox  et  le  Laboratoire  d’Analyses  et  d’Essais  de  l’Ecole  Sup￩rieure 
Polytechnique, avaient aussi reçu des équipements pendant le PQ1. En 2008 un expert 
ONUDI  identifiait  quatre  laboratoires  comme  étant  prêts  à  entamer  le  processus 
d’accr￩ditation : CERES Locustox; Laboratoire BIO 24 (médical); Laboratoire HIDAOA 
(Hygi￨ne  et  Industrie  des  Denr￩es  Alimentaires  d’Origine  Animale);  Laboratoire  de 
l’Institut Pasteur (LSHAE). En 2010, CERES Locustox et  Laboratoire BIO 24 étaient 
effectivement  assistés,  ensemble  avec  le  Laboratoire  National  de  Contrôle  de 
Médicaments et le Laboratoire du Commerce Intérieur (LCI). Début 2012, BIO 24 était 
parmi le groupe des sept premiers laboratoires de la zone UEMOA accrédités. CERES 
Locustox  fait  partie  du  deuxième  groupe  des  11  laboratoires  de  la  zone  dont 
l’accr￩ditation pourrait se faire avant la fin de phase transitoire. 
 
En s’ouvrant vers les laboratoires m￩dicaux le programme a fait preuve de flexibilit￩ 
dans  le  choix  des  laboratoires  accompagn￩s.  Cette  d￩cision  d’abandonner  la 
concentration  initiale  sur  l’agro-alimentaire  a  été  motivée  par  le  souhait  d’honorer 
l’excellence  et  de  maximiser  le  nombre  de  laboratoires  accr￩dit￩s  afin  de  donner 
d’avantage de ﾫ grain à moudre » aux auditeurs formés sous le programme. Lors des 
entretiens avec l’￩valuateur les responsables des laboratoires b￩n￩ficiaires ont fait des 
commentaires  positifs  concernant  les  formations  et  autres  prestations  du  PQAO.  Le 
laboratoire Bio 24 ne pense pas avoir pu achever son accréditation sans le support du 
PQAO et a mentionn￩ tout un ensemble d’impacts positifs. 
 
Néanmoins, des lacunes continuent à exister dans le dispositif national des laboratoires 
orient￩s vers l’agro-alimentaire. Concernant le poisson, un des produits prioritaires au 
S￩n￩gal,  aucun  des  laboratoires  officiels  de  l’Autorit￩  Comp￩tente  (HIDAOA ; 
Laboratoire  d’Analyses  et  d’Essais  de  l’Universit￩  Cheikh  Anta  Diop;  Institut  des 
Technologies Alimentaires et CERES Locustox) n’est encore accr￩dit￩, ￠ l’exception du 
LSAHE  de  l’Institut  Pasteur.  Ceci  est  d’autant  plus  regrettable  que  deux  autres 
programmes  importants financ￩s  par  l’UE  ont pr￪t￩  leur  support  aux  laboratoires  en 
question, à savoir le «Sustainable Fisheries Programme (SFP) » et le « Programme de 
renforcement et de développement des capacités commerciales (PRDCC)». 
 
Un rapport préparé sous le SFP
7 mentionne à plusieurs reprises les appuis du PQ1 qui 
« auront significativement contribu￩ ￠ initier la d￩marche d’accr￩ditation ISO 17025 des 
principaux laboratoires de contrôle du Sénégal ». Mais le même rapport recommande 
« qu’une concertation soit ￩tablie entre les 2 Programmes (PQ2, SFP) notamment pour 
une planification et une optimisation des appuis ».  
 
Le  même rapport  constate  une  concurrence  assez  marqué  entre  les  laboratoires  de 
Dakar où « la politique des prix vise un alignement systématique sans tenir compte du 
                                                 
7  Rapport  de  Mission  sur  l’￩valuation  des  laboratoires  d’analyse  du  S￩n￩gal  pour  la  détermination  des 
possibilit￩s d’obtenir une accréditation ISO/CEI 17025 ; Marc Fegueur ; SFP (octobre 2009).  
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coût réel et de la rentabilité ». Par conséquent, les laboratoires ne sont pas en mesure 
d’assurer  sur  leurs  fonds  propres  les  frais  d’accr￩ditation.  Selon  ce  rapport  « aucun 
laboratoire n’a effectu￩ un calcul approfondi du co￻t de ses prestations ». Le rapport 
démontre que les prix des analyses au Sénégal sont excessivement bas par rapport aux 
pays voisins (Mauritanie, Maroc, Guinée Conakry) et que « les laboratoires de Dakar 
sont en microbiologie de 25 à 53% moins chers qu’un laboratoire européen accrédité 
17025 et pour la chimie en moyenne 74% moins chers ». Il va de soi que, dans de telles 
conditions, la pérennité des laboratoires ne peut pas être assurée.  
 
Force est de constater que le PQAO ne s’est pench￩ que tardivement sur ces questions, 
pourtant cruciales, de rentabilité et de la politique des prix des laboratoires. Initialement, 
la  même  approche  limitée  aux  questions  techniques  a  régné  au  PQAO  en  ce  qui 
concerne  les  questions  de  statut  des  laboratoires  publics  qui,  de  commun  accord, 
exercent une forte influence sur la rentabilité. Une étude relative à ce sujet réalisée en 
2010 n’a pas encore eu des effets  tangibles sur  la politique de soutien concrète  du 
PQAO. Le PRDCC semble adopter une position beaucoup plus dure à ce sujet. Suivant 
une intervention de la D￩l￩gation de l’UE dans le comit￩ de pilotage, le PRDCC avait 
suspendu son support au Laboratoire du Commerce Intérieur, tant que celui-ci n’avait 
pas encore adopté un mode de gestion commercial et transparent. Comme dans le cas 
du  SFP,  un  meilleur  alignement  entre  les  diff￩rents  programmes  financ￩s  par  l’UE 
semble possible. 
 
Les représentants des laboratoires ont confirm￩ l’importance majeure de la maintenance 
des  équipements  pour  assurer  la  durabilité  de  leurs  services.  A  ce  sujet  ils  ont 
mentionné  la  présence  de  l’entreprise  commerciale  ﾫTechnical  House»  à  Dakar  qui 
repr￩sente des fournisseurs d’￩quipement sophistiqu￩ de laboratoires pour l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest. L’￩quipe de techniciens de ﾫTechnical House » rend des services précieux aux 
laboratoires ￠ Dakar mais aussi dans d’autres pays de la r￩gion. Le PQAO s’est servi 
des services de cette entreprise pour assurer la pérennité des laboratoires équipés par 
le programme en Guinée-Bissau et au Cap Vert. Il a aussi engagé une étude avec cette 
entreprise visant ￠ la cr￩ation d’un centre de maintenance pour l’Afrique de l’Ouest. Les 
représentants des laboratoires proposent au PQAO d’explorer des solutions innovatrices 
du type « public/privé » dans ce domaine. 
 
Plusieurs  interlocuteurs  ont  mentionn￩  l’int￩r￪t  de  la  mise  en  r￩seau  r￩gionale  des 
laboratoires par le PQAO. Depuis la fin 2011 une dizaine de laboratoires de la région 
b￩n￩ficie  d’un  financement  allou￩  par  la  r￩gion  Wallonie/Bruxelles  qui  semble  avoir 
donné un nouveau souffle à cette dimension du PQAO. 
 
Concernant  la  dimension  régionale  du  programme,  les  chargés  de  qualité  et  des 
auditeurs de formés par le PQAO ont regrett￩ que le SOAC n’ait pas encore trouv￩ son 
statut juridique définitif tout en insistant que le PQAO devrait intensifier ses efforts pour 
offrir des opportunit￩s aux charg￩s de qualit￩ et auditeurs de laboratoires d’exercer leur 
métier.  Tant  que  le  SOAC  n’est  pas  encore  en  mesure  d’exercer  un  r￩el  pouvoir 
d’accr￩ditation, une recherche de solutions int￩rimaires s’impose. Deux options ont ￩t￩ 
évoquées.  
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Le  PQAO  pourrait  d￩velopper  sa  propre  grille  de  crit￨res  pour  appr￩cier  l’￩tat 
d’avancement des laboratoires en voie d’accr￩ditation. En s’inspirant de la norme ISO 
17025, cette grille serait plus adaptée à la situation réelle des laboratoires dans la région 
dont  la  plupart  n’est  pas  encore  apte  ￠  l’accr￩ditation.  L’OMS  a  ￩t￩  cit￩e  ￠  titre 
d’exemple.  Celle-ci  a  développé  une  « Liste  de  contrôle  pour  l’accr￩ditation  des 
laboratoiresﾻ  qu’elle  utilise  pour  classer  les  laboratoires  cliniques  et  de  sant￩ 
publique en cinq cat￩gories allant d’une ￠ cinq ￩toiles. En effet, un tel syst￨me pourrait 
permettre ￠ l’ONUDI d’exercer un certain ﾫ pouvoir normatif » sur le développement des 
laboratoires d’analyse ￠ vocation industrielle dans les pays en voie de d￩veloppement. 
La mise en œuvre de ce syst￨me par le PQAO permettrait aux auditeurs et agents de 
qualité des laboratoires d’￩voluer en parall￨le et en harmonie avec l’am￩lioration des 
capacités des laboratoires de la région.  
 
L’autre option ￩voqu￩ pour donner aux auditeurs de laboratoires un champ d’ex￩cuter 
leurs  compétences  consisterait  en  un  programme  de  stages  ou  d’observateurs  ￠ 
d￩velopper par le PQAO ensemble avec des organismes d’accr￩ditation dans les pays 
industrialis￩s,  en  l’occurrence  francophones  (COFRAQ/France ;  SAS/Suisse ; 
BELAC/Belgique ; ILNAS/Luxembourg ; etc.). 
 
Dans le domaine de l’inspection, deux organismes ont bénéficiés des actions du PQAO, 
à savoir la Direction de la Production des Végétaux (DPV) et la Division des Inspections 
et  du  Contrôle  de  la  Direction  des  Industries  de  transformation  et  de  la  Pêche 
(DIC/DITP).  Le  représentant  de  la  DPV  a  illustré  les  effets  positifs  des  méthodes 
d’inspection  plus  rigoureuses  par  l’exemple  des  exportations  de  mangues  qui  sont 
passées de 400 tonnes et 71 notifications en 2000 à 8000 tonnes et deux notifications 
en 2012. Il a confirm￩ que l’analyse ISO 17020 effectué par le TUNAC dans le cadre du 
PQAO a été utile en identifiant des points faibles, entre autres concernant la nécessité 
d’accr￩ditation des laboratoires de contrôle. La DPV vient de cr￩er un service qualit￩ 
pour mettre en œuvre la norme ISO 17020. 
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Sierra Leone 
 
Sierra Leone is still recovering from 10 years of civil war. The country ranks still low in 
GDP and HDI but prospects for economic growth and poverty reduction are good, due to 
the considerable potential in minerals, mining, agriculture and fisheries. 
 
Governed  by  the  1996  Standards  Act,  the  Sierra  Leone  Standards  Bureau  (SLSB) 
became legally operational in 2000. The SLSB is governed by an Executive Board with 
representatives from all concerned Ministries and the private sector. The Organization 
has signed a MoU with the Ghana Standards Authority (GSA), which has been providing 
training opportunities for SLSB staff. Since 2008, UNIDO has been supporting the SLSB 
with setting up its chemical and microbiological laboratories, which were inaugurated in 
April 2011 by the President of Sierra Leone and the Director General of UNIDO. Until 
this date, the SLSB had been using external testing laboratories, e.g. at the university. 
The metrology laboratory, also equipped by UNIDO, is expected to become operational 
in 2012. In the medium term, SLSB aspires to become one of the metrology reference 
laboratories  under  the  WAQP.  To  this  end,  an  entirely  new  metrology  building  is 
currently under construction. 
 
UNIDO provided much of its material and training support to the SLSB under a special 
national project funded by Norway and Finland. Under the same project, the Government 
received support from an international UNIDO consultant in 2010 and 2011 to develop 
its National Quality Policy (NQP). The NQP outlines the National Quality Infrastructure 
(NQI) and defines the roles of the involved ministries and institutions. In October 2012 
the president promulgated the NQP after a lengthy process with extensive stakeholder 
involvement. The NQP is now ready for implementation but a related action plan has not 
yet been developed. 
 
The decision to devote considerable efforts to developing the NQP was prompted by a 
certain  degree  of  duplication  that  had  occurred  earlier  on  between  the  Sustainable 
Fisheries Project (SFP) and the WAQP (both EU funded). Both projects put particular 
emphasis on fish because of the EU ban for fish exports from Sierra Leone.  
 
However, while UNIDO supported the chemical and microbiological laboratories at the 
SLSB, the SFP supported the National Pharmaceutical Laboratory (NPL) to become the 
reference laboratory of the Competent Authority (CA) for fish. Both  institutions come 
under  the  Ministry  of  Health.  The  SFP  equipped  the  NPL,  among  others  with  some 
sophisticated equipment for histamine testing,  but  unfortunately  without  providing the 
necessary training. 
  
In the meantime, the CA does use the newly created capacities of the SLSB laboratory 
for  water  testing  but  the  required  laboratory  capacities  for  fish  testing,  one  of  the 
conditions for lifting the export ban, are still not available, neither at the NPL, nor at the 
SLSB. Moreover, the CA did not yet benefit from the WAQP action line for inspection 
support.  While  the  World  Bank  funded  “West  Africa  Regional  Fisheries  Project” 
(WARFP)  is  focusing  on  the  Ministry  of  Fishery,  the  CA  is  suffering  from  lack  of  
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equipment, training and is, hence, not fully operational. It is hoped that the conditions to 
overcome  these  drawbacks  are  set  since  UNIDO  has  included  a  work  package  to 
provide support to the CA under its above mentioned national project. The coherence of 
UNIDO’s intervention strategy and its priority on the fishery sector is also documented by 
another UNIDO project aiming to setting up a national fishery training institute. 
 
But  the  biggest  problem  of  Sierra  Leone’s  fishery  sector  is  caused  by  the  country’s 
insufficient  capacity  to  prevent  illegal  fishing  by  better  inspection  and  control 
mechanisms.  The  WARFP  estimates  the  cost  of  illegal  fishing  in  West  Africa  to  be 
around  300  million  USD.
8  A  recent  study  of  the  UK  based  Environmental  Justice 
Foundation  (EJF)  documented  pirate  fishing  in  Sierra  Leone  coastal  waters  and 
laundering of the illegal catch into the European seafood market by vessels accredited to 
export fish to the EU. EJF provided also evidence of illegal catches being transhipped at 
sea onto large refrigerated cargo vessels destined for East Asia.
9 
 
But a well functioning inspection system is not only crucial for fishery. The issue attracts 
also  high  attention  from  companies  and the  larger  public  in  other  areas.  Industry 
representatives of the SLSB Executive Board mention severe quality problems with 
imported machinery and spare parts as a major concern and would like to see improved 
controls for compliance with international standards as a priority of the SLSB. The same 
industry representatives mentioned a need that the 1996 Standards Act be “modernized” 
and aligned to the NQP. It should be mentioned here that, since 2011, the Government 
has  granted  a  key  role  in  inspection  to  the  private  company  Africa  Links  Inspection 
Company Ltd, a subsidiary of a similar company in Ghana.  
 
In Sierra Leone, the WAQP supported three manufacturing companies (bottled water; 
baby food; fish) for HACCP compliance and, eventually, ISO 22000 certification. To this 
end,  UNIDO  contracted  a  national  expert  with  relevant  experience  in  this  area  who 
provided  training,  conducted  gap  analyses  and  worked  with  the  companies  towards 
producing the necessary documentation. All three companies are of medium to large 
scale and seem to have the potential to reach certification. The water company
10 is part 
of a conglomerate of firms manufacturing soft and alcoholic beverages, cosmetics, 
plastic and other products. The baby food company has a strong position on the national 
market and is exporting to Ghana. The company benefits, in addition to the certification 
activity, from the newly created testing capacities of the SLSB laboratory. 
 
The fish processing company
11 belongs to one of the biggest investors of Sierra Leone. 
The company owns 14 trawlers and a complete dockside facility including a 120m quay. 
In 2010/2011 the company invested into an entirely new state -of-the-art fish processing 
plant with a planned capacity of 100 t/d. For planning and implementing this investment, 
                                                 
8 Estimation of the cost of illegal fishing in West Africa; MRAG (2010) 
9 www.ejfoundation.org 
10 www.shankerdas.sl 
11 http://www.sierrafishingcompany.com  
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they made use of a number of foreign experts and consultants. However, at the moment 
of the evaluation, all investment activities had come to a complete standstill.  
 
The  effectiveness  of  this  line  of  action  was  hampered  by  several  interruptions  of 
activities and limited enterprise commitment. In his final report of September 2012 the 
national expert pointed out that only the water company had shown some commitment 
while  the  two  others  did  not  follow-up  on  the  gap  analysis  and  could  hence  not  be 
considered for the next steps in the certification process. Moreover, it appears that all 
three companies would have been able to conduct the HACCP activities by themselves 
and  bear  the  cost  of  contracting  the  national  expert  by  themselves  without  financial 
support from the WAQP. The potential added value of the programme, if any, stems 
therefore from a number of networking and training events for companies and HACCP 
experts organized by the WAQP at the GSA in Accra in the course of 2011 and 2012. 
 
It should be highlighted that Sierra Leone’s progress with developing its NQI is due to 
the  complementary  support coming from the  national  project  and  the  WAQP.  In  this 
respect, Sierra Leone could be considered a model case for other countries. But there is 
an urgent need for the Government to make practical use of the recently promulgated 
NQP as a basis for developing a quality action plan with coherent funding propositions 
for donors in this area. UNIDO could of course play a leading role with developing and 
accompanying this plan.  
 
Given the considerable shortcomings of Sierra Leone’s transport infrastructure it remains 
to be seen whether it is realistic that the SLSB could be hosting in the near future one of 
the ECOWAS metrology reference laboratories.  
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Togo 
 
Le  Togo  a  connu  une  longue  crise  sociopolitique  (1990-2005)  qui  a  annulé  sa 
croissance économique pendant la période (entre 0 et 1 % voire parfois négative). Ceci 
a  conduit  à  un  affaiblissement  du  secteur  privé,  déjà  confronté  aux  contraintes 
structurelles du Togo (march￩ ￩troit, co￻ts des facteurs, main d’œuvre peu form￩e). La 
richesse du Togo réside essentiellement dans son secteur agricole (60% du PIB) alors 
que le secteur industriel reste limité aux industries extractives, au BTP et aux industries 
alimentaires (grandes entreprises de production de boissons, farine, huile).  
 
La strat￩gie d’intervention de l’ONUDI au Togo de  2002 - 2006, à travers le Programme 
qualité,  illustre  bien  le  défi  de  la  croissance  économique  durable  par  le  biais  de  la 
relance  du secteur industriel. Elle pr￩voit d’ailleurs  une intervention sp￩cifique sur la 
mise en place d’un syst￨me de qualit￩ et de normalisation au Togo qui r￩pond ￠ la 
volont￩  de  l’Etat  de  favoriser  les  fili￨res  d’exportation :  Café,  Thé,  Cacao,  Coton, 
produits de la mer, et d’autres.  
 
Aussi, en 2007, le Programme R￩gional de Restructuration et de l’Industrie (PRMN) et le 
Programme Qualit￩ de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (PQAO) sont en ligne avec les objectifs du 
pays et leurs résultats sont très attendus à la fois par le secteur privé et par le Ministère 
de l’Industrie. La priorit￩ donn￩e aux industries agro-alimentaires correspond bien à la 
volont￩ politique. La s￩lection des produits prioritaires tel que le caf￩ et le cacao n’est 
pas tout à fait pertinente car la qualit￩ de ces deux commodit￩s n’est pas un majeur 
problème au Togo. A l’inverse l’intervention sur la fili￨re ananas a ￩t￩ importante en 
termes de formation aux bonnes pratiques sur le calibrage et pour l’obtention de labels 
priv￩s pour l’agriculture biologique. Toutefois, l’impact, par exemple l’augmentation des 
exportations, reste difficile à mesurer. 
 
Pour le Minist￨re de l’Industrie et le secteur priv￩, le PQAO au Togo a ￩t￩ relativement 
efficace.  Tous  les  industriels  sont  satisfaits  de  leur  accompagnement  ￠  l’exception 
d’EPSILON, une petite entreprise qui transforme des c￩r￩ales. Il semble que tous les 
industriels se soient appropriés la démarche qualité et aient contribué à sa diffusion. Par 
exemple,  ￠  l’occasion  de  la  journ￩e  porte  ouverte  sur  l’industrie  togolaise,  il  a  été 
question de la qualit￩ et des normes. La soci￩t￩ Vitale qui produit de l’eau min￩rale en 
bouteille, a fait une large promotion de sa récente certification ISO 22000 obtenue dans 
le cadre du PQAO. Il semble que les principales faiblesses du programme aient été les 
d￩lais d’ex￩cution et la faible utilisation des consultants nationaux dans le programme. 
Le Coordinateur Technique National regrette l’￩troitesse budg￩taire qui a cantonn￩ les 
activités dans la capitale,  empêchant la diffusion plus large du Programme à tout le 
territoire national. L’articulation entre le PQAO et le PRMN a ￩t￩ bonne ; des formations 
groupées  à  la  qualité  ont  été  réalisées  pour  les  entreprises  participantes  aux 
Programmes. 
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Le PQAO a permis de sensibiliser les autorit￩s politiques togolaises sur l’importance de 
la qualit￩, notamment la normalisation, la m￩trologie, la certification et l’accr￩ditation. 
Ainsi, un résultat concret du programme est la promulgation de deux lois cadres:  
 
  Loi cadre N° 2009-016 du 12 août 2009 portant organisation du schéma 
national d'harmonisation des activités de normalisation, d'agrément, de 
certification, d'accréditation, de métrologie, de l'environnement et de la 
promotion de la qualité au Togo. 
  Loi N° 2009-025 du 30 octobre 2009 sur la Métrologie Légale. 
 
La loi cadre N° 2009-016 organise le schéma national des activités de normalisation, 
d’agr￩ment, de certification, de m￩trologie et de promotion de la qualit￩ et cr￩e la haute 
autorit￩ de la qualit￩ et de l’environnement, le fonds national de promotion de la qualité, 
les agences de normalisation, de métrologie, de promotion de la qualité, ainsi que le 
comit￩ togolais d’agr￩ment. Depuis lors, le gouvernement n’a pas encore vot￩ de budget 
pour rendre effective la loi et opérationnelles les agences, ceci pouvant être expliqué par 
le changement fr￩quent du Ministre de l’Industrie (quatre Ministres de l’Industrie se sont 
succédés en 5 ans).  
 
Un autre résultat important du Programme qualité est  la formation de consultants et 
d’auditeurs  qualité,  ainsi  que  de  cadres  et  techniciens  des  services  d’inspection 
alimentaire de l’Etat et des laboratoires. Toutefois, l’engagement de l’Etat, initi￩ gr￢ce au 
Programme, reste à pérenniser pour rendre le système qualité opérationnel et durable.  
 
Le point focal de l’ONUDI constate que le Programme qualit￩ a fait son œuvre et que le 
comité national de pilotage a bien fonctionné. Cependant, il regrette qu’il n’y ait pas eu 
une implication plus forte  des autorités qui aurait peut-être pu être obtenue par  une 
valorisation  du  Programme qualit￩  plus  importante  de  la  part  de  l’ONUDI  aupr￨s  du 
Ministère. D’ailleurs, dans le document de Stratégie de Réduction de la Pauvreté 2009- 
2011 du gouvernement, il note que la promotion des sources de croissance et les filières 
export  demeurent  une priorit￩  avec  l’am￩lioration  du  climat  des  affaires  mais que  la 
politique qualit￩ et l’appui aux agences concern￩es disparaît ainsi que dans l’UNDAF 
2009 -2012.  
 
La  direction  de  l’￩levage  (autorit￩  comp￩tente  pour  la  p￪che)  est  satisfaite  de 
l’accompagnement re￧u, essentiellement des formations et un appui ￠ la mise en place 
du système documentaire conforme à la norme ISO 17020 pour les services d’inspection 
et quelques ￩quipements (mireur d’œufs). Elle se r￩jouit surtout de l’accompagnement 
des  laboratoires  Institut  Togolais  de  Recherche  Agronomiques  (ITRA)  et  de  l’institut 
National D’Hygi￨ne (INH) vers l’accr￩ditation. 
  
Toutefois, si le PQAO a tenu ses engagements sur la filière « pêche et produits de la 
mer ﾻ, la lev￩e de l’auto-suspension des exportations de ces produits vers UE (survenue 
en 2003 suite ￠ une visite de la DG Sanco) n’a pas abouti compl￨tement. En effet, si des 
autorisations d’exportation ont ￩t￩ obtenues pour des soci￩t￩s de production de cigales  
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de  mer  et  langoustes,  elle  n’est  pas  lev￩e  pour  le  pays.  En  effet,  le  quai  de 
d￩barquement des poissons frais n’ayant pas ￩t￩ mis aux normes (comme envisag￩ par 
le  « Sustainable  Fisheries  Programme ﾻ,  SFP,  financ￩  par  l’UE),  l’exportation  des 
poissons vers l’UE n’est toujours pas autorisée et celle-ci reste marginale. Cela a un 
impact concret pour le laboratoire ITRA. Il a été dot￩ d’un ￩quipement (co￻teux) pour les 
analyses des métaux lourds et histamines lors de la phase 1 du Programme Qualité, 
mais  n’a  pas  assez  d’analyses  à  effectuer  (pour  les  inspections)  pour  rentabiliser  ni 
l’￩quipement ni la formation du personnel. 
 
C’est pour cela que l’ITRA a souhait￩ un accompagnement au cours de la phase 2 pour 
d’autres analyses physicochimiques des aliments qui pourraient ￪tre rentabilisées sur 
des tests de produits ￠ l’import. Hors l’accr￩ditation n’a pu aboutir du fait du manque 
d’analyses (un nombre minimum d’analyses doivent ￪tre pratiqu￩es) et du manque de 
maintenance de l’￩quipement, depuis lors tomb￩ en panne (sans espoir de réparation, 
par manque budgétaire récurrent du laboratoire). 
 
Au contraire l’INH, laboratoire public (￠ gestion autonome), a abouti ￠ l’accr￩ditation ISO 
17025 pour les analyses microbiologiques. L’INH qui effectue ￠ la fois des analyses 
biomédicales et aussi des analyses microbiologiques pour le compte de l’Etat, a été 
accompagné pendant 9 ans (phase 1 et 2) par le PQ 1 et PQ2 à travers des formations, 
l’achat  d’￩quipements  et  de  r￩actifs  pour  les  analyses  histamines.  Lors  du  PQ2 
l’accompagnement  est couronn￩  de  succ￨s  avec  l’accr￩ditation  du  laboratoire  par  le 
COFRAC en décembre 2011. Actuellement le laboratoire vient de subir son audit de 
suivi. La direction de l’INH a jug￩ d’une grande valeur l’accompagnement et la formation 
qui ont permis une meilleure organisation du laboratoire et a dynamisé les équipes. 
 
A  court  terme,  le  laboratoire  a  gagné  en  notoriété,  mais  pour  le  moment  le  retour 
économique  (par  exemple  l’augmentation  des  analyses  test  de  la  fili￨re  p￪che,  des 
entreprises)  n’est  pas  ￩vident.  Aujourd’hui,  le  laboratoire  doit  investir  d’autant  pour 
maintenir son accréditation, en métrologie (vérification des instruments au Ghana, Bénin 
et en France), en audit de suivi, en maintenance (tous les équipements achetés par le 
Programme en phase 1 sont en ￩tat de marche). L’audit de suivi men￩ par le COFRAC 
est d’autant plus couteux que l’expert viendra de France. Pour la direction du laboratoire 
INH, il est donc indispensable d’￪tre accompagn￩ dans la r￩alisation d’un plan d’affaire 
et d’une strat￩gie de commercialisation pour rentabiliser son accréditation. Celle-ci est 
en cours.  
 
Deux autres succ￨s du PQAO au Togo constituent l’accompagnement du laboratoire 
d’h￩matologie de l’INH et de celui de biochimie de la clinique BIASA ￠ l’accr￩ditation 
selon la norme ISO 15189 (Biologie médicale). 
 
En termes d’impact sur les entreprises, on constate que les certifications ISO 22000 / 
ISO  9001  ne  se  traduisent  pas  encore  par  une  augmentation  des  ventes  au  niveau 
national. Deux entreprises sont les témoins du phénomène ; la Société Générale des 
Grands  Moulins  du  Togo  (SGMT)  qui  produit  des farines  améliorées  désormais ISO 
9001 et la soci￩t￩ Nioto qui r￩alise l’￩grenage et la production d’huile de coton. Dans les  
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deux cas, si la certification et les démarches qualité leur amènent plus de sécurité au 
travail, plus de productivité, elles nécessitent certains investissements (dont les audits 
de suivi, etc.). Ces investissements répercutés (ou non) dans le prix de leurs produits 
(c’est le cas des farines de bl￩ enrichit en vitamines de SGMT), ne permettent pas aux 
entreprises de rester concurrentielles vis à vis des farines importées de faible qualité et 
à bas prix (qui entrent sans taxes dans le marché). Ceci met en évidence la limite de la 
démarche qualité quand  le  cadre  l￩gal  et  fiscal  n’est  pas  effectif  ￠  l’entr￩e  du  pays 
(service inspection, autorisation de mise à marché) et ne joue pas pleinement son rôle 
de protection des consommateurs. 
 
Ainsi, l’impact d’une d￩marche qualit￩ pour une entreprise n’est actuellement rentable 
que  sur  les  filières  export  car  elle  permet  un  retour  sur  investissement  par 
l’augmentation  des  ventes.  Il  en  va  de  m￪me  de  la  d￩marche  d’accr￩ditation  des 
laboratoires qui reste à viabiliser.  
 
Finalement,  pour  un  tissu  industriel  réduit  comme  au  Togo,  une  recommandation 
pourrait  ￪tre  d’accompagner  plus  les  d￩marches  de  certification  priv￩es  pour  les 
entreprises de type Bio/ équitable/global gap /Tesco qui pourront être immédiatement 
rentabilis￩es ￠ l’export. Il pourrait ￪tre aussi utile d’appuyer plus systématiquement la 
sensibilisation  des  associations  de  consommateurs  ainsi  que  leur  démarche  de 
revendication auprès des autorités publiques. En ce qui concerne le programme de mise 
à  niveau,  toutes  les  parties  prenantes,  en  premier  lieu  le  directeur  du  Bureau  de 
Restructuration et de Mise à Niveau (BRMN) conviennent que le résultat du programme 
est mitigé /moyen. Le BRMN a eu des difficultés à recruter 15 entreprises participantes 
(quota qui lui était octroyé) du fait des critères de sélection peu adaptés à la réalité du 
tissu industriel togolais. Celui-ci est essentiellement constitué de grands groupes (qui 
n’ont pas forcement besoin des ﾫ primes ») ou de micro-entreprises (hors programme). 
Ceci  explique  que  seulement  huit  entreprises  ont  participé  dont  quatre  grandes 
entreprises. Toutes les entreprises reconnaissent la valeur du diagnostic, toutefois elles 
déplorent :une certaine cacophonie (beaucoup d’informations floues en particulier sur 
les investissements matériels éligibles ou non, des informations erronées sur les achats 
de logiciels ont été données) ; 
 
La lenteur d’ex￩cution des investissements immat￩riels ; 
 
Certaines entreprises se sont plaintes de la qualité des prestations délivrées par les 
consultants dans le cadre des investissements immatériels. Les cadres de la SGMT ont 
regrett￩ des interventions tr￨s th￩oriques voire g￩n￩ralistes. Dans certains cas, ils n’ont 
rien appris et ont même « perdu du temps ».Un excès de documentation / contrôle pour 
vérifier les investissements matériels et ￠ l’inverse un manque de communication sur 
leur remboursement. 
 
Les  grandes  entreprises  ayant  adhéré  au  PRMN  restent  très  dubitatives  quant  à  la 
pertinence de l’accompagnement. Pour ce qui est de la prime, ces entreprises peuvent 
financer  les  investissements  et  la  prime  représente  une  aide  financière  (non 
négligeable). Mais elle est délivrée après beaucoup de bureaucratie et de contrôles.  
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Le cas de la brasserie BB (grande brasserie au capital international) est instructif. La 
société avait prévu les investissements n￩cessaires dans son plan d’investissement. De 
ce fait, elle a effectué la demande de prime rapidement en 2011. La société a reçu un 
accus￩ de r￩ception du dossier puis n’a plus re￧u de nouvelles. C’est en juillet 2012 que 
le service comptabilit￩ de l’entreprise a compris que la prime avait ￩t￩ pay￩e lorsqu’une 
ligne  de  crédit  de  51 000 000  CFA  (prime  plafond  dans  son  cas)  apparaît  sur  son 
compte  bancaire  sans  autre  détail,  ni  plus  de  communication  de  la  Commission  de 
l’UEMOA. Dans le cas des entreprises en restructuration, la recherche de financement 
vient avant pour pouvoir investir et la prime ne leur sert pas d’effet de levier. Le cas de 
l’ONAF – l’Office National des Abattoirs et Frigorifiques - illustre bien le phénomène. 
Cette entreprise publique qui doit être privatisée attend un changement de statut pour 
attirer de nouveaux investisseurs et, sans ces financements, ne peut mettre en œuvre 
les formations reçues. 
 
Concernant les petites entreprises, le cas d’EPSILON (membre de l’association AAFEX) 
est int￩ressant. L’administrateur g￩n￩ral d’EPSILON a ￩t￩ tr￨s satisfait du diagnostic et 
de  l’accompagnement  des  experts.  Sa  soci￩t￩  a  beaucoup  ￩volu￩e  grâce  au 
programme (passage de 12 employés à 40). Si l’entreprise n’a pas souhait￩ poursuivre 
la d￩marche qualit￩ selon ISO 22000, elle reste ￠ la recherche d’un financement pour 
agrandir son outil de production. Elle n’a pas la capacit￩ d’investir en propre mais il 
semble  que,  gr￢ce  au  programme  (image  de  l’ONUDI  et  UEMOA),  les  portes  d’une 











1 laboratoire accrédité 
(INH) 
Microbiologie alimentaire. 
2 Laboratoires en attente des 
r￩sultats de l’￩valuation 
d’accr￩ditation par COFRAC 






4  entreprises certifiées 
 
BB Vitale (ex Miah Vitale), 
SGMT, Nouvelle. 
SOTOTOLES et ATS 
ISO 22000 et ISO 9001 
Entreprises PRMN 
 
8 entreprises accompagnées 
 
Seule BB Togo a reçu la prime 
SGMT est en attente  
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The  WAQP  in  Cape  Verde  (CV)  was  launched  in  February  2008.  Being  the  only 
lusophone  country  among  the  16  countries  covered,  a  language  problem  had  to  be 
surmounted  at  the  start  of  the  programme,  as  documents  and  communication  were 
primarily  in  French  and  English.  Initially  the  Conseil  Consultatif  of  the  Agence  de 
Régulation et de Contrôle des produits pharmaceutiques et alimentaires (ARFA) acted 
as WAQP’s Steering Committee (SC). In July 2009 the Counterpart Minister designated 
a new SC (independent from ARFA) and the national coordination office was relocated 
from Mindelo to Sao Vincente (where the majority of exporting industries is based). The 
SC met once a year and included representatives from the private sector. The priority 
products identified for CV are fish, grog (eau de vie), cheese and water.  
 
A  Forum  on  quality  infrastructure  (June  2009)  resulted  in  a  road  map  and  with  the 
support  of  the  WAQP;  the  legal  framework  for  a  National  Quality  System  has  been 
elaborated  (meanwhile  adopted  as  Law  No.8,  March  2010).  The  programme  also 
supported  the  creation  of  the  National  Quality  Institute  (IGQ)  that  includes  also  a 
Department in charge of industrial  and legal metrology. The operationalisation of the 
institute is ongoing.  
 
As regards testing, at the start 4 labs were visited and 3 fields of testing were initially 
identified: chemical, micro-biology and pesticide residues. Ultimately one lab is being 
assisted in the current transition phase towards implementation of a quality system and 
accreditation, namely LOPP, with focus on chemical testing and quality control (fish) and 
micro-biology.  Lab  staff  participated  in  study  tours  and  the  labs  also  take  part  in 
performance assessment (lab comparisons) in cooperation with a reference lab in the 
UK. 
 
The lab equipment was received in staged in the period March – July 2012 (handed over 
in a ceremony that was given media coverage), training of staff took place, followed by a 
mock audit. Accreditation was said to be planned for February 2013. As the lab faced 
maintenance  problems,  these  were  essentially  resolved  with  replacement  by  new 
equipment. Maintenance being raised as a problem in several other countries as well, 
more emphasis is needed on strengthening maintenance capacities in the region. 
 
Concerning ISO related capacities, one consultant was trained in Ghana on ISO 22000 
and 10 internal auditors were trained on ISO 22000. According to the project reports, CV 
became  corresponding  member  of  ISO  in  2011.  Although  initially  aiming  at  support 
towards  ISO  22000  certification  of  5  enterprises  (fisheries,  water,  airline  catering, 
restaurant), in its transition phase WAQP is reported to be engaged in support in HACCP 
implementation  of  3  enterprises  (started  since  December  2011  and  expected  to  be 
completed by end 2012). With respect to metrology, after some delays in the purchasing  
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process,  the  equipment  for  IGQ’s  lab  (LABCAL)  –  covering  legal  metrology,  mass, 
volume and temperature - , was finally shipped end September 1012 and supposedly 
arrived by now in CV. There is no indication if the same has been already installed. 
 
In terms of inspection, the country has different inspection services (General inspection 
against fraud, Fisheries, Agriculture, and Health). All services benefited from training, but 
there is no indication of efforts aimed at accreditation.  
 
The  cooperation  between  the  WAQP  and  FAO  is  to  be  noted,  covering  the  joint 
assessment  of  the  regulatory  framework  pertaining  to  food  safety,  the  revision  of 
legislation and joint training of inspectors. Also the search for synergies with EU funded 
support in field of fisheries was mentioned. 
 
At this stage there is no Quality Award system in CV. Concerning visibility, the WAQP 
reached  the  national  press  (2011)  at  the  occasion  of  the World  Standards  Day  and 
World Metrology Day. A special effort was undertaken to sensitize journalists in the form 
of a regional training event conducted in February 2011 bringing together journalists 
from  the  region  as  facilitators  to  raise  consumer  awareness  of  quality  issues.
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Gambia 
 
The WAQP was launched in March 2008, with fish, peanuts and cashew as targeted 
priority products. The priorities were linked to problems faced with Gambia’s exports, 
particularly  fish  bans  given  quality  problems  and  aflatoxin  problems  in  groundnuts. 
Resultantly, the commitment of the Government to the programme was said to be high. 
The SC covered an equal distribution of public and private sector representatives. 
 
At the policy level, the programme supported the review of the country’s 1977 legislation 
on weights and measures and the development of a road map for capacity building of 
staff in the field of metrology. The regional expert on metrology assisted the country in 
the  drafting  of  “The  Gambia  legal  metrology  Act  2012”  as  well  as  its  implementing 
decree “The Gambia unit of measurement Rules”. Consultations on this new legislation 
are ongoing and validation is foreseen in a workshop planned for end 2012. 
 
The  WAQP  paid  for  Gambia’s  corresponding  membership  of  the  International 
Organization for Legal Metrology. There is no information if payment of membership is 
meanwhile covered from national resources. Revised legislation pertaining to metrology 
is  expected  to  be  promulgated  soon.  The  National  Metrology  Lab  of  the  Gambia 
Standards Bureau received office equipment as well as, with delays in delivery, legal 
metrology equipment and mass, volume and temperature equipment. The same was 
delivered  end  September  2012  and  it  is  known  if  the  same  is  by  now  installed. 
Regarding testing, of the 5 labs visited at the start of the programme, two have been 
retained for support in the transition phase, namely: 
 
  FFHQCL’s micro-biology lab - assisted towards accreditation; 
  NPHL’s chemical lab - assisted towards implementation of a quality system. 
 
Lab staff participated in study tours and the labs participate in performance assessment 
(inter-lab  comparisons)  in  cooperation  with  a  reference  lab  in  the  UK.  Delays  were 
reported in the provision of the equipment (already in 2010 the ROM drew attention to 
gaps between training of lab staff and delays in the actual upgrading of the labs in which 
they work). There is no information by when the accreditation of FFHQCL is planned. 
 
Cooperation between WAQP and FAO was highlighted, covering the joint assessment of 
the  regulatory  framework  pertaining  to  food  safety,  support  to  the  revision  of  the 
legislation and also joint training of inspectors (2009/10). The WAQP was reported to 
have supported the creation of the food inspection body.  
 
Concerning  enterprise  assistance,  of  the  11  initially  identified  enterprises,  2  receive 
support in the WAQP’s transition phase, namely one in the field of fisheries and the 
second one manufacturing bottled water. Both cover support in the implementation of 
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Guinea-Bissau 
 
Guinea – Bissau (GB) has received support through three interrelated programmes: the 
first Quality Programme (QP1, UEMOA, 2001-2005), the successor programme (WAQP) 




The coordination mechanism put in place under QP1 in 2002 continued under WAQP. 
Its  priority  products  were  cashew,  fruits,  vegetables,  and  halieutic  products  to  which 
building  materials  were  added  (within  the  context  of  the  cooperation  with  the 
restructuring and upgrading programme). However, looking at the enterprises supported, 
there was a clear sector focus, in that the priority ultimately became cashew. In WAQP’s 
transition phase, the enterprises identified and retained were not considered advanced 
enough for support towards certification and required basic support in quality control, 
with emphasis on traceability (see below). Out of the 8 enterprises categorized as less 
advanced and not ready for certification, 6 were enterprises in GB. 
 
Gaps  in  traceability  in  the  cashew  sector  were  found  to  be  a  key  issue,  given  the 
importance of the sector for GB and the potential effect on the country’s exports to the 
EU. Support to enterprises focused on the introduction of a traceability system (covering 
technical assistance of some 4 months) and 3 enterprises achieved good progress in 
this regard. Project experts emphasized the need for further strengthening the national 
traceability system and support to enterprises. Apart from traceability issues, enterprise 
awareness was said to have increased of the importance of putting in place BPH and 
BPF, HACCP and ISO standards (9001 and 22000). 
 
GB has launched since 2005 a National Quality Award (started during QP1 and with 
sustained support of WAQP). There has been a second edition in 2010. Both the 2005 
and 2010 edition covered 3 winning enterprises. The gap between the events (5 years) 
seems an indication that the competition is still dependent on project support and is not 
yet fully institutionalized. 
 
As regards metrology, the Council of Ministers approved in July 2012 a Decree and 
corresponding regulations for metrology. It is to be noted that the national metrology 
institutions  (Direction  de  la  Métrologie  and  Laboratoire  National  de  la  Métrologie) 
received some support in the form of equipment (related to mass; volume; temperature; 
pressure). Progress as regards legal metrology in the country (LNMGB; laboratory) was 
seen  as  a  result  of  support  from  WAQP.  Also  PTB  was  reported  to  have  provided 
equipment to LNMGB. 
 
Concerning  standards,  WAQP’s  support  to  the  Direction  de  la  Normalisation  and 
Promotion de la Qualité was highlighted, which covered training of staff, purchase of 
equipment, documentation including the payment for the subscription to the standards 
data base of the Portuguese Quality Institute (IPQ). It is to be noted that QP1 had paid 
for GB to be a corresponding member of ISO, yet since then the country was said to be 
behind with its payments to ISO and rather opted for corresponding membership of IPQ.  
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As regards membership payments through a technical assistance programme this issue 
of sustainability is of concern.  
 
Both national and regional standards have been adopted/ improved. The regional ones 
cover  edible oils, cashew, cotton and flour. Product certification has been subject  of 
awareness building and training activities. So far there is no system of labelling of the 
listed  priority  products,  although  this  is  under  preparation  for  cashew  nuts  based 
products.  
 
Finally, it is to be mentioned that assistance also included the training of five consultants 
in 2010, of which two are now certified auditors in ISO 9001. In the same year, WAQP 
supported  the  organization  of  awareness  building  activities  to  celebrate  the  World 
Standards Day (14 October 2010). There is no indication if this is pursued without project 
support. 
 
With  respect  to  the  testing  laboratories,  the  list  of  labs  retained for  support  towards 
accreditation or establishment of a quality management system (QMS) includes no lab in 
GB. Initially (2008) seven labs were identified and retained in GB for further support, of 
which 2 in view of support in the preparation towards accreditation, one for QMS and two 
for specific support. Of these the fish inspection lab (LICQP) had been subject to a mock 
audit in 2010 yet was not advanced enough to be retained for further support in this 
regard. However, the country benefited from training of lab staff in terms of awareness 
building on the requirements of ISO 17025 and metrology issues, as well as support in 
the elaboration of a quality manual. In total five labs received equipments (LNV, LNSP 
and CIPA, PV and LNMGB). Attention is drawn to south- south cooperation in the form of 
Senegalese expertise that provided support to in particular two labs (CIPA and LNV) and 
also completed the installation of metrology equipment (LNMGB). Feedback from labs 
shows. 
 
It was reported that the quality of the services provided by the labs that benefited from 
WAQP support has improved. The Boards of most of the labs now include a person 
responsible  for  quality  issues.  As  regards  inspection,  staff  from  respectively  phyto-
sanitary and veterinary inspection services was trained. 
 
The  SC  was  reported  to  have  met  periodically  and  included  representatives  of  the 
private sector. Visibility was given to WAQP’s activities through in particular newspaper 
articles, workshops and TV. interview of the national coordinator. Since March 2011 the 
coordination team includes a person dedicated to communication.  
 
As regards cooperation with the restructuring and upgrading programme (see below), 
WAQP supports since February 2011 a total of 7 enterprises in the field of preparation 
for ISO 9001 and traceability.  
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Restructuring and Upgrading Programme 
 
The Upgrading Bureau covers core staff (four persons) based in one single office in the 
Ministry of Industry. During the project’s first (pilot) phase, funding came entirely from 
UEMOA, covering the equipment of the office (70%) and the remainder for salary (it is 
not  clear  if  this  included  the  entire  salary  or  ‘topping  up’  of  salary).  When  UEMOA 
funding ended, this affected salary payment during two years (and thus most likely staff 
motivation). Only one staff has been replaced since the start. Staff training has been 
limited to one training (of Director of Upgrading Bureau and Financial Analyst) in 2008 
(Dakar), focused on the procedures manual of the programme. There is limited funding 
for covering the operations of the Bureau, including for logistics to ensure the required 
follow-up and support at the enterprise level. 
 
To date the Bureau is project related: the Government has not created the Bureau as a 
legal entity and has not (yet) made available national resources for a national upgrading 
programme. A national programme has been formulated (that is being translated into 
Portuguese and English) and once cleared by the Government, donor funding will be 
sought. 
 
The  preconditions  of  the  upgrading  programme  were  found  to  be  ‘heavy’  given  the 
context of enterprises in GB (their size and situation). Need for restructuring was cited as 
one of the constraints). Although integral part of the programme as per its design, there 
is no indication of a set of distinct service offerings focused on enterprise restructuring in 
the programme. 
 
A total of no less than 27 national consultants have been trained (including 2 staff of the 
Bureau). The number of consultants used in the implementation of project activities is 
low: 4 (diagnostics of enterprises). This is related to the number of enterprises covered: 
from  13  selected  based  on  the  pre-diagnostic  assessment  to  7  ultimately  (4  were 
considered  ‘not  ready’  and  2  pulled  out  during  the  implementation  phase  due  to 
difficulties related to the pre-financing of immaterial investments). It is not clear why the 
final  report  of  the  programme  (March  2012)  refers  to  9  enterprises  all  focused  on 
restructuring  rather  than  upgrading.  The  figures  refer  to  material  investments  by  9 
enterprises (rather than 7 enterprises), which shows that 2 could apparently not pre-
finance immaterial investments yet engaged in material investments. 
  
Whereas the quality of the diagnostic reports was appreciated, the time planning for the 
implementation  of  immaterial  investments  was  considered  ambitious.  Overall,  the 
assistance provided by the UNIDO subcontractor was considered good (rated as best 
regarding  accounting  and  marketing  and  satisfactory  regarding  production  and  work 
safety issues). Review of the subcontractor’s report shows that the intensity of support 
varied quite substantially: 5 enterprises received the equivalent of 7 days of expertise 
whereas 2 received respectively 45 and 25 days of support; there is no explanation for 
this  work  distribution  in  the  report.  The  interventions  were  carried  out  by  5  experts; 
including one national expert (the latter had proportionally much more time inputs than 
the international experts, as he covered 58% of the total of days). Some flexibility was 
shown  by  covering  also  a  collective  activity  of  importance  for  all  enterprises  in  the 
cashew sector (involving sensitization of relevant stakeholders to the problem of access 
to financing for the purchase of raw material inputs).  
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There was a gap in the follow-up as regards the use of the software provided. As per 
information  as  of  August  of  the  Upgrading  Bureau,  none  of the  enterprises  received 
“primes”  related  to  the  material  investments  made  (mentioned  as  weak  point  in  the 
programme).  As  according  to  the  UEMOA  Commission  (October  2012)  by  now  all 
“primes” have been paid, this is assumed to included the cases in GB. Overall, it was 
indicated  that  the  beneficiary  enterprises  improved  their  organisation  and  accounting 
and as such there is positive assessment of the results of the pilot phase. 
 
The 7 enterprises retained are the same as the one retained under the WAQP (see 
above), selected based in particular on their potential for growth. These enterprises are 
spread over  different sectors (there is partial overlap between the ones identified as 
priority  sector/products  by  the  upgrading  programme  versus  WAQP  as  regards  GB). 
There  was  said  to  be  a  strong  cooperation  between  the  two  programmes  in  GB  as 
regards quality related issues (QMS, BPH, BPF, HACCP, ISO 9001, and ISO 22000).  
 
No reference was made to other related programmes, apart from efforts to cooperate 
with the Reinforced Integrated Framework that did not result in synergies. 
  
Visibility of the programme has been pursued by covering the major events organized in 
the media (TV, radio, press), although funds to pursue awareness rising of the business 
community were said to be missing. 
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Guinea 
 
The WAQP’s country coordination office is operational since April 2009 and the country 
SC – with active private sector participation, met so far 8 times. The initial list of priority 
products was rather long: coffee, cocoa, fish, and fresh fruits and vegetables. Particularly 
for the fisheries sector quality issues were to be addressed, given inspections (2006) 
that questioned the quality of the labs and export bans. Fish exports went down by as 
much as 80% in 2006/2007. There is however no indication that fish was indeed given 
top priority under the WAQP. 
 
As regards metrology, Guinea’s legislation in this respect dates back to 1990. Supported 
by the WAQP, the Institut Guinéen de Normalisation et de Métrologie (IGNM) received 
office  equipment  and,  with  considerable  delays,  legal  metrology  equipment,  mass, 
volume and temperature equipment end September 2012 and it is not clear if the same 
has been installed to date. Earlier on the metrology lab has received equipment from 
PTB. So far accreditation of IGNM’s metrology lab is not envisaged. Prior to receipt of 
the  equipment,  several  training  activities  were  conducted  at  the  national  level  and 
Guinea participated also in regional trainings. There is no indication that the WAQP paid 
for IOLM membership, but it was reported that the country is behind in payment. Guinea 
has  participated  as  observer  in  meetings  of  SOAMET  (covering  cooperation  of  the 
country as non-UEMOA country with UEMOA within the framework of metrology support 
from PTB). 
 
Concerning  standardization,  the  Director  of  the  institute  took  part  in  a  study  tour  to 
Botswana  and  South  Africa  (together  with  other  ECOWAS  member  countries). 
Moreover, staff of the Institute’s documentation centre was trained in Tunisia (INNORPI) 
and the organization took part in and also hosted regional technical workshops. It was 
reported that Guinea is member of ISO since 1986. Since 2009 the WAQP has paid the 
country’s  membership  –  as  a  result  of  which  the  country  had  access  to  ISO 
documentation, training activities and ISO’s General Assembly. As in the case of other 
countries,  the  sustainability  of  payment  of  membership  fees  through  a  technical 
assistance  project  can  be  questioned,  especially  as  the  country  supposedly  paid  its 
membership since 1986.  
 
National standards in the fields of food processing and building materials were reported 
to have been developed/ improved. No regional standards have been adopted to date.  
With respect to labs, of the 5 labs initially visited, the following were ultimately retained 
for support in the transition phase of the project:  
 
  Laboratoire du Centre d’Etude et de Recherche de l’Environnement (CERE) - 
support towards accreditation (chemical); 
  Laboratoire Central Vétérinaire de Diagnostic (LCDV) - support towards 
implementation of its quality system (micro-biology). 
 
Lab  staff  participated  in  study  tours  and  the  country  takes  part  in  performance 
assessment (inter-lab comparisons) in cooperation with a reference lab in the UK. At 
present CERE is not yet accredited (planned for end 2012). LCDV served as a case  
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study  in  a  regional  thematic  working  group  on  accreditation  of  testing  labs  (held  in 
Guinea in October 2010 and in October 2011).  
 
It is to be noted that - with national resources - IGNM built a new infrastructure for labs 
and offices (envisaging 10 labs). This mobilisation of local funding can be considered an 
indication of the importance attached by the Government to quality issues. 
 
As regards certification, the country took part in regional technical meetings on product 
certification  and  quality  awards  (attended  by  IGNM  and  the  Chamber of  Commerce, 
Industry and Handicrafts). However, so far there is no Quality Award in Guinea. There is 
also  no  indication  of  ISO  certified  consultants/auditors  in  Guinea  organized  through 
WAQP  related  training.  This  being  said,  reference  was  made  to  several  awareness 
workshops focused on ISO 9001 and ISO 17025. 
 
Advice  was  provided  and  training  was  organized  through  the  WAQP  for  different 
inspection  services,  namely  the  Office  National  de  Contrôle  de  Qualité  (ONCQ),  the 
Service  des  Industries  et  de  l’Assurance  Qualité  des  Produits  de  la  Pêche  et  de 
l’Aquaculture (SIAQPPA) and the Direction Nationale des Services Vétérinaires of the 
Ministry of Livestock. At present the ISO 17020 accreditation of these services is not 
envisaged. 
 
With respect to enterprise level support, it was noted that the list of companies supported 
during the transition phase of the WAQP does not include any enterprise from Guinea. 
For reasons not understood, the programme’s focus in Guinea has been mainly focused 
on the meso level (institutional capacity building), with no indication to what extent and 
how  the  support  infrastructure  has  benefited  enterprises,  not  even  in  the  form  of 
demonstration. 
 
Finally, visibility of the activities undertaken through WAQP has been dealt with through 
press articles in the main local newspapers and through the local radio and TV. 
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Liberia 
 
Coming  out  of  a  conflict  situation,  the  quality  infrastructure  in  Liberia  was  seriously 
affected, with very weak national testing capacity etc., making the support envisaged 
through  WAQP  relevant  for  the  country.  Its  Coordination  Office  is  operational  since 
January 2008 and the SC was reported to have met at least four times a year, with 
active participation of private sector representatives. Priority products initially identified 
were fish, cocoa, fruits and vegetables, but there is no direct link observed between 
these priorities and the ultimate focus of activities undertaken by the WAQP in Liberia. 
 
The most important achievement of the programme for Liberia covers support to the 
establishment of the National Standards Laboratory/NSL; advice, equipment and staff 
training  were  aimed  at  the  micro-biology  and  chemistry  lab.  Complementary  funding  
was  mobilized  together  with  the  Ministry  of  Commerce  and  Industry  (cost-sharing 
between  Liberia  and  UNIDO  –  latter  totalling  €  250,000),  which  made  it  possible  to 
renovate the infrastructure needed for the micro-biology, chemical labs and metrology 
labs. This was in fact a precondition for Liberia to be able to benefit from the WAQP. The 
NSL was inaugurated on 9 Sept 2011 by the President of Liberia and be considered a 
combined  effort  of  Liberia,  UNIDO  and  the  WAQP). Whereas  the  lab  was  ready  by 
September, major delay in the training of internal auditors was reported (ROM 2012). 
 
Lab staff was reported to have participated in study tours and NSL is participating in 
proficiency  tests  in  cooperation  with  a  reference  lab  in  the  UK.  The  planning  of  the 
envisaged accreditation of the chemical lab is not yet fixed. As regards the micro-biology 
lab, support is focused on the implementation of the lab’s quality system.  
 
With respect to metrology, there has been delay in the delivery of equipment (envisaged 
for 2011 yet delivered end September 2012). There is no information if the equipment 
(legal  metrology,  mass,  volume,  and  temperature)  has  meanwhile  been  installed. 
Maintenance of lab equipments was not (yet) part of the training conducted. 
 
Regarding certification, the WAQP trained some 12 consultants and auditors, both in 
Liberia and abroad (Kenya). Two national certification experts were trained and guided 
in their work by a regional certification expert. There is no indication of WAQP support to 
inspection services. 
 
The  theme  of  standards  is  covered  by  the  Division  of  Standards  of  the  Ministry  of 
Commerce and Industry – that received inter alia office equipment from the WAQP. So 
far no national or regional standards were said to have been adopted and there is no 
national quality award programme to date.  
 
Liberia is a corresponding member of ISO and it was reported that membership was paid 
for the past 3 years from WAQP resources. Incidentally, the programme also paid for the 
country’s  corresponding  membership  of  the  International  Organization  for  Legal 
Metrology.  As  mentioned  in  other  country  cases,  payment  of  membership  fees  from 
project resources raises a sustainability concern. 
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Support  to  enterprises  envisaged  in  the  transition  phase  a  total  of  8  identified  and 
preselected  enterprises.  Ultimately  the  transition  phase  of  the  WAQP  covered  4 
enterprises (of which 3 manufacturing bottled water and 1 pepper sauce); for all four the 
aim is to accompany them in the introduction of HACCP. Support was reported to have 
started in 2010 to date. None of the four enterprises have been certified so far and this is 
expected to be done by December 2012. It is not clear what explains this quite long 
process: the situation at the enterprise level, the speed of the project or both. The ROM 
mission (2012) estimated the likelihood that the certification targets would be achieved 
within the duration of the project as “unlikely”. 
 
An expert mission (2010) to assess the implementation of SPS measures and assist in 
developing a road map for SPS priorities resulted in cooperation with WTO ‘s Standards 
and Trade Development Facility (in view of the formulation of a programme to be funded 
through  the  Reinforced  Integrated  Framework).  There  has  been  also  a  search  for 
synergies with EU funded support in field of fisheries (strengthening fisheries products 
health  conditions)  but  there  is  no  information  on  eventual  joint  activities.  There  was 
reported to be cooperation with the Agriculture Programme supported by the EU (ROM 
2012).  
 
In terms of visibility, reference was made to the WAQP at the occasion of the celebration 
of World Consumers’ Right Day (supported by the programme in 2009 and 2010) and of 
World Metrology Day. Moreover, major sensitization activities of WAQP were subject of 
press articles, as well the inauguration of the NSL. Several experts of the programme 
gave interviews on radio or tv in the margin of their missions to Liberia.  
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Mali 
 
As UEMOA member country, Mali has been part of QP1, its successor WAQP and the 




The office that coordinated QP1 since June 2002 continues the same role as regards the 
WAQP. Over time the main challenges faced by the national coordinating office (office 
equipment, support staff) were said to have been solved, apart from logistics (vehicle for 
office operations, not foreseen in the project). Whereas the SC met on average six times 
a year, with public and private sector representation, the participation rate was said to go 
down.  Already  end  2010,  EU’s  ROM  mission  referred  to  weakness  in  appropriation 
especially by the private sector (expected to be playing an active role in awareness 
building of the business community). Visibility of the programme has been sought by 
covering the major events organized in the press. 
 
Priority products identified at the start were mangoes, karité and meat/livestock. Based 
on a study of the main obstacles faced as regards quality and conformity assessment 
capacities, several types of training were organized. E.g., 23 inspectors received training 
on a system of auto-control covering mangoes in July 2011 (in cooperation with PCDA, 
see below), some 70 technical staff were trained on BPF, BPH, and targeted training 
(planned) focused on production, extraction and conservation of karate butter based on 
guidelines prepared by the National Karité Federation. Similarly, the preparation of and 
training on a guide covering the meat (including preparation, transport and conservation) 
is under preparation.  
 
The search for cooperation with related efforts such as the Programme Compétitivité 
Diversification  Agricole  (PCDA/WB)  is  commendable,  given  similarities  as  regards 
objectives,  priority  products  (mangoes,  shea  and  meat/livestock).  A  list  of  common 
activities was established as basis for a MoU. The training of inspectors (mangoes) held 
in July 2011 aimed was based on guide (auto-control) developed by PCDA. There is no 
information if further joint efforts took place. When asked about impact, the WAQP – 
notwithstanding the modest range of its support – was said to have influenced exports of 
mangoes  and  karité,  together  with  other  projects  and  programmes  covering  quality 
issues.  
 
Mali’s  legal  and  regulatory  framework  dates  back  to  1992  (Loi  portant  création  du 
système  national  de  normalisation  et  de  contrôle  de  la  qualité)  and  related  Decree 
(1992) defining the organisation and functioning of the system. The planned institutions 
were  established  much  later.  AMANORM  (Agence  Malienne  de  Normalisation  et  de 
Promotion  de  la  Qualité)  was  created  in  March  2012  and  its  operationalisation  is 
ongoing. For now there is no service involved in product certification and there is no 
quality label yet. The organization is a public entity with financial autonomy.  
 
WAQP paid for Mali’s subscription to AFNOR’s data base SAGAWEB and SAGACD, just 
as PQ1 paid for Mali to be corresponding member of ISO; however, as the country was  
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behind with payments due to ISO, this membership was suspended by ISO, but Mali 
paid  up  itself  and  is  again  corresponding  member  since  2010.  WAQP  also  provided 
support  to  organisation  of  14  Oct  2009  World  Standards  Day  (communication; 
awareness building event). Since 2002 the country has elaborated and/or adopted 156 
national standards and 3 regional standards regarding cotton (fibre, grain, thread). 
 
As  regards  metrology,  the  former  Metrology  section  of  the  Direction  Nationale  du 
Commerce  et  de  la  Concurrence  (DNCC)  became  a  Division  within  DNCC  in  2011. 
Thanks to the mobilisation of resources, the construction of new national metrology lab is 
ongoing. Availability of qualified staff in this field was mentioned as a challenge. Like 
other  countries,  WAQP  provided  some  equipment  (mass;  volume;  temperature; 
temperature;  pressure)  in  2010;  earlier  (2004)  DNCC  received  other  metrology 
equipment from PTA. It is not clear if the equipment has already been installed, to the 
extent the new lab is under construction. 
 
WAQP  retained  the following  lab  in  Mali  for  support  towards  accreditation  during  its 
transition phase; the Laboratoire National de Santé/LNS (micro-biology). Another lab - 
Laboratoire  Vétérinaire/LCV  was  retained  for  support  towards  implementation  of  its 
quality  system,  with  focus  on  pesticide  residues  testing.  Both  labs  took  part  in 
performance testing (inter-lab comparisons), already had a mock audit and the Ghana 
Board of Standards has provided support to them in the field of equipment calibration. 
Feedback from  one  of  the  labs  shows  appreciation  of  the  training  of  staff (ISO  and 
metrology issues), the national and regional workshops, the provision of equipment, the 
advice and funding of the mock audit. Like the two labs mentioned above, a third lab, the 
Laboratoire  de  Nutrition  Animale/LNA  has  received  support  since  2003  –  since  QP1 
(focused on mycotoxines testing), but is not listed among the ones covered by WAQP 
during the transition phase. LCV was reported to see some increase in the demand for 
testing in the past years and funded its participation in performance tests.  
 
The labs received some equipment under QP1 (2004) and additional equipment under 
WAQP  in  2010.  All  labs  in  Mali  were  said  to  face  problems  with  respect  to  the 
maintenance of the equipment and unfortunately regional training in this field – initially 
foreseen under WAQP - did not take place.  
 
As  regards  inspection  services,  focus  has  been  on  phyto-sanitary  and  veterinary 
inspection. In total 2 staff of each service has been trained and the respective institutions 
(Direction Nationale des Services Vétérinaires and Direction Nationale de l’Agriculture) 
are preparing the documentation according to ISO 17020. Accreditation is not planned in 
the short run. 
 
With respect to ISO, QP1 and WAQP have trained consultants (4) and national auditors 
(6); 4 of them are certified, work in the private sector and are engaged in these services 
on  a  part-time  basis.  The  project  involved  them  in  enterprise  support  under  the 
supervision of regional experts. 
 
Support  to  enterprises  in  WAQP’s  transition  phase  covered  2  enterprises  (plastics; 
consulting firm), focused on ISO 9001 support. These two enterprises are also listed as 
beneficiaries of the Restructuring and upgrading programme, from which 8 additional  
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enterprises were supported by the WAQP. Of this one company was certified ISO 22000 
as early as December 2010 following WAQP support in the period 2009-2010. Another 
company (not included in the list of companies covered in the transition phase) self-
financed its ISO 9001 certification mid 2012. For the remaining enterprises certification is 
not yet obtained and work towards either putting in place of a QMS (aiming at ISO 9001) 
or HACCP system is ongoing. 
 
In general, it was noted that more enterprises have taken the “quality route”, with or 
without project support; some went ahead by themselves, considering the delays in the 
start of the support to enterprises (also reported by ROM 2010). Different quality related 
training  were  said  to  have  stimulated  a  “culture  qualité”  in  Mali.  3  enterprises  got  a 
national quality prize (second edition, 2010; the first edition was in 2004). Participation in 
the quality contest 2010 covered 24 enterprises, an increase compared to 2004 (17).  
 
As regards regional issues, it is to be noted that among the evaluators trained with the 
context of SOAC, there are two experts from Mali. Moreover, two institutions in Mali have 
been retained among the envisaged regional technical centres: the Institut d’Economie 
Rurale  (category  meat,  milk/milk  products;  fruits  and  vegetables)  and  CERFITEX 
(cotton).  There  is  no  information  available  on  the  support  to  these  Centres  to  date, 
beyond an initial assessment mission. 
 
Restructuring and Upgrading Programme 
 
A  total  of  37  consultants  have  been  trained  in  Mali,  but  reports  available  to  the 
evaluation mission do not specify to what extent they have been used in diagnostics and 
follow-up support of enterprises. The 15 enterprises retained partially converge with the 
list of priority sectors/products identified for Mali (considered too many, i.e. 9). It was 
noted that the final report of the programme (March 2012) refers to 16 (and not 15 
enterprises)  that  all  invested  and  expect  (and  supposedly  meanwhile  received)  their 
‘prime’. 
 
The  subcontractor  (recruited  for  the  implementation  of  immaterial  actions  covered 
support to the 15 companies) indicated that, with a few exceptions, most enterprises 
were  said  to  have  been  cooperative  and  appreciative  of  the  41  missions  carried  in 
different fields (about half of which were production related). The subcontractor’s final 
report  does  not  show  the  breakdown  in  terms  of  expertise  inputs  (division  of  labour 
between international and national experts) and does not give details of the perceived 
results of the support (although this may be included in the enterprise specific reports – 
not seen by the evaluation mission). In its final report the subcontractor has however 
drawn attention to a number of important issues entitled lessons, such as non-access to 
the diagnostic reports as baseline for its interventions, questions on the prioritization of 
actions in the diagnostic report (such as at times more emphasis on accounting software 
than on the organization of the production and sales – considered more urgent).  
 
Finally, certain donor coordination problems (overlaps) were reported, in that the Belgian 
Cooperation engaged in upgrading type of support, including enterprise diagnostics and 
the  preparation  of  upgrading  plans.  Surprisingly  some  companies  appear  to  have 
undergone a diagnosis twice.  
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Mauritania 
 
Mauritania  (since  2000  no  longer  member  of  ECOWAS)  was  retained  among  the 
countries covered by the WAQP, thus bringing the total to 16 (15 ECOWAS countries 
+1).  The  programme  was  launched  in  the  country  in  March  2008  and  its  SC  was 
reported to have met so far no less than 14 times, with a quite active participation of the 
private sector in programme steering. The country’s priority products were fish, mineral 
water and milk products.  
 
The main achievements reported relate to the support to the selected labs (see below), 
and awareness building on the importance of quality aimed in particular at enterprises 
engaged in dairy processing and water bottling. The country participated also in regional 
technical meetings, such as on the harmonization of testing methods. 
 
At the policy level Mauritania adopted in 2010 important legislation as regards quality, 
namely Law No. 2010-003 concerning standardization and the promotion of quality and 
Law No. 2010-030 covering the organization of metrology in the country. Implementing 
decrees are reported to be under preparation to date, implying that not all institutions 
foreseen by the 2010 legislation have been established. 
 
Following the initial visit of six labs by the lab expert (2008), the following testing labs 
under the Office Nationale pour l’Inspection Sanitaire des Produits de la Pêche et de 
l’Aquaculture - ONISPA - were retained for further support by the WAQP: 
 
  ONISPA Nouadhibou - towards accreditation ISO 17025 (micro-biology) – 
planned for end 2012. 
  ONISPA Nouadhibou - towards implementation of its quality system (chemical - 
fish). 
  ONISPA Nouakchott - toward implementation of its quality system (micro-
biology). 
  ONISPA Nouakchott - towards implementation of its quality system (chemical - 
fish). 
 
The selection shows the direct link between fish as one of the priority products and the 
focus  of  the  lab  upgrading  efforts.  The  equipment,  lab  consumables  and  technical 
documentation were received in stages in the period April 2011 – February 2012. Lab 
staff  participated  in  study  tours  and  the  labs  take  part  in  proficiency  testing  in 
cooperation with a reference lab in the UK. It is to be noted that prior to the WAQP; the 
labs were also part of such inter-lab comparisons as regards micro-biology, chemical 
and heavy metals testing (such as IAEA since 2003 and Quasimeme since 2005). Also 
local training was organized, resulting in six technical auditors and three quality auditors 
among lab staff trained. 
 
The recipients (labs) questioned why the first round of lab assessments (2008 and 2009) 
were undertaken by an English speaking expert. There was also found to be a major gap 
between  initial  planning  and  actual  implementation  of the  activities  (lengthy  process, 
taking into consideration that the first assessment took place in 2008 and to date the  
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accreditation process is not completed). There appears a gap in communication on the 
process followed, in that the labs raised the question which would be the accreditation 
body (expected to be TUNAC).  
 
The service capacity was reported to have improved as a result of the assistance. As 
regards fish and fish products, ONISPA reported an important and steady increase in the 
number of tests carried out for both enterprises and public entities: from 3010 in 2006 to 
8000 in 2011. Of these 60% were tests carried out for enterprises (2011). There seems 
to be no change in the absolute number of clients over the years (50 private and 10 
public), which means that testing by the same entities is intensified. 
 
The  WAQP  has  provided  advice  with  respect  to  the  rehabilitation  of  Mauritania’s 
metrology lab in view of the conformity of the building (which took the form of in situ and 
remote  advice  by  the  regional  metrology  expert).  The  rehabilitation  is  meanwhile 
completed and the equipment for legal metrology, mass, volume and temperature was 
delivered mid September 2012. There is no indication if the same has been meanwhile 
installed.  The  WAQP  paid  since  January  2009  for  Mauritania’s  corresponding 
membership of the International Organization for Legal Metrology. The continuation of 
such payment by the programme over several years can be questioned. 
 
As regards standardization, the WAQP has supported the Direction de la Normalisation 
et de la Promotion de la Qualité in different ways: study tour for its Director, training of 
staff in charge of the documentation centre in Tunisia (INNORPI), office equipment, and 
technical documentation. In general, staff took part in national and regional technical 
workshops. So far no regional standards have been adopted in Mauritania. With respect 
to national standards, reference was made to ongoing standards development in the 
field of flour. 
 
There  is  no  indication  of  WAQP  support  to  inspection  services  or  of  support  to 
enterprises towards certification. The list of enterprises covered during the programme’s 
transition phase does not include any enterprise from Mauritania. For now there is no 
quality award programme in Mauritania. 
 
The ROM 2012 highlighted the fact that the country – not having been part of the first 
quality  programme  (UEMOA),  the  country  is  somewhat  behind  compared  to  other 
countries in the region. 
 
Finally, concerning the WAQP’s visibility, reference was made to media coverage over 
the years at the occasion of the celebration of World Standards Day, World Day for the 
Rights of Consumers and World Metrology Day.    
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Niger 
 
As UEMOA Member State, all three interrelated programmes covered Niger: the first 
Quality Programme (QP1, UEMOA, 2001-2005), the successor programme (WAQP) as 




The local coordination office was set up in November 2007, with the support of the local 
authorities. In addition to the period meetings (10) of the SC (with active participation of 
the private  sector), both the President  and Vice-President  of SC supported the local 
coordinator in case of urgent issues to be addressed.  
 
In brief, the priority products identified for Niger were onions, meat/livestock and niébé 
(vegetable) and based on reporting, there has been a link between the priority products 
and the selected activities (e.g., awareness building and training such as regarding meat 
processing (from fresh to dried), production and storage of onions, use of pesticides, 
quality of seeds, training on TBT and SPS measures. Consultants and national auditors 
were trained on quality management and certification and there has been training and 
participation  in  regional  events  pertaining  to  standardization  (including  training  of  2 
evaluators linked to SOAC). The programme was stated to have contributed to creating 
a “culture qualité” in the country. 
 
More specifically, as regards testing, the WAQP supported the following laboratories:  
 
*Laboratoire Nationale de Santé Publique et d’Expertise (LANSPEX): the lab received 
some equipment under QP1 and additional equipment under WAQP  (delivered early 
2010). LANSPEX takes part in inter-lab performance tests, had a mock audit, follow-up 
support to address gaps identified by TUNAC including remote guidance by a regional 
expert to preparation LANSPEX for its accreditation (physic-chemical/medicines testing) 
that is envisaged before end 2012. It is to be noted that LANSPEX is listed among the 
envisaged regional technical centres, with focus on meat and milk/milk products. 
 
*Laboratoire Nationale de l’Ecole des Mines et de la Géologie (EMIG): the lab received 
some equipment (mass and temperature related) early 2010.  
 
Three  other  labs,  supported  under  QP  1,  were  not  part  of  WAQP  in  that  their 
accreditation  was  not  envisaged  at  this  stage.  Maintenance  of  lab  equipment  was 
mentioned  as  a  problem  not  only  in  Niger  but  in  the  region  at  large.  Training  of 
technicians was recommended in a study conducted in 2010 at the level of UEMOA but 
has not been organized so far. 
 
Concerning standards, the programme paid for the subscription of the Direction de la 
Normalisation  to  AFNOR’s  data  base  SAGAWEB.  PQ1  paid  for  Niger  to  be 
corresponding member/ISO, the country was subsequently behind with payment (and 
threatened to be suspended), yet regularized its membership reinstated since January  
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2012.  At  present  40  national  standards  have  been  adopted  covering  inter  alia  food, 
chemical products, water and environment; for now no regional standards were said to 
have been adopted by the country. 
 
Consultants have been  trained on ISO 9001 and 22000 have been trained and one 
private consultant became certified auditor ISO 9001. The country’s certification body 
(Agence  Nationale  de  Vérification  et  de  Conformité  aux  Normes  (AVCN)  received 
support from the programme in the form of staff training on ISO/CEI 65 guidelines. The 
country has not yet started with quality labelling.  
 
As far as metrology is concerned, WAQP provided support to the metrology lab of the 
Direction de la Normalisation, de la Promotion de la Qualité et de la Métrologie, covering 
some equipment (mass; volume; temperature). The equipment arrived in stages in the 
period October 2010 – December 2011. A ceremony was organized on 22 November 
2011, presided by the Minister of Mines and Industrial Development. Also PTB provided 
equipment to the metrology lab in previous years (2006 and 2008). At this stage no 
accreditation is envisaged. 
 
With respect  to  inspection,  2  inspectors  of  respectively  the  Direction Générale  de  la 
Protection des Végétaux and la Direction Générale des Services Vétérinaires took part 
in  a  regional  training  (Dakar,  2011),  which  was  followed  by  a  series  of  national 
workshops,  aimed  at  preparing  the  documentation  required  for  ISO  17020  (with 
emphasis  on  its  utilisation  at  border  control  posts).  The  regional  harmonization  of 
inspection  documents  among  phyto-sanitary  and  veterinary  services  was  considered 
vital. 
 
Support to enterprises in WAQP’s transition phase covered two entities including a hotel 
and a bio-medical lab, both aiming at ISO 9001 certification (mock audit took place); 
these are the only enterprises supported that are considered ready for undergoing ISO 
9001 audit towards certification. Moreover, 4 enterprises listed as ‘less advanced’ were 
envisaged to be supported during the transition phase: 2 in milk processing (ISO 9001, 
BPH, BPF), one in furniture (ISO 9001, BPH, BPF), and one in  leather (BPH, BPF, 
training  on  environment).  These  companies  were  among  the  ones  included  in  the 
cooperation  with  the  Restructuring  and  Upgrading  programme,  not  of  which  are 
expected to be certified in the short run (see below). 
 
Since 2004 Niger  organizes quality awards; following 2004 and 2010, the country is 
currently  preparing  its  third  edition  (2012).  WAQP  supports  to  date  its  organization. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the number of enterprises participating in 2012 is lower than in 
2004 (6 versus 13). Within the context of UEMOA’s Award (2010) a company from Niger 
(Niger Lait) won a special award (réalisation de produits) in addition to its national quality 
award in that same year. 
 
The Government of Niger wishes to formulate a national quality policy and requested 
support of WAQP in July 2012. There is no indication to which extent this has been/can 
still be covered within the context of the transition phase. WAQP did already provided 
support to revision of statutes of national standards organization.  
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Finally, visibility of the programme was censured by covering the major events organized 
in  the  media (press)  and  diffusion  of key  messages  on quality  and  metrology  via  tv 
(prepared in cooperation with the project team and planned to be diffused with funding 
by the national bodies concerned).  
 
Restructuring and Upgrading Programme 
 
Set up with the support of UEMOA complemented by the country, the Upgrading Bureau 
is operating as planned with a core staff of four  (Director, Financial Expert, Industry 
Expert and Administrative Assistant). The team of experts benefitted from training on the 
operations manual and pre-diagnostics (2008). 
 
Since February 2011 the Upgrading Bureau is formally established as an autonomous 
structure with an annual budget allocation. The Bureau has substantially grown since its 
creation,  now  covering  10  staff  (Director,  5  experts,  1  accountant,  1  Administrative 
Assistant, and two support staff including a driver. The initial core staff of 4 is part of the 
current  team.  Cooperation  between  the  Upgrading  Bureau  in  Niger,  the  coordinating 
team  in  Ouagadougou  and  UNIDO  HQ  was  considered  good.  However,  the 
communication  line  between  UNIDO  and  the  UEMOA  Commission  was  considered 
heavy and long (in the sense that UEMOA’s view on all issues was sought), explaining 
delays incurred. 
 
The  SC  was  reported  to  have  met  regularly  and  included  several  private  sector 
representatives. In general, the private sector was reported to have played an active role 
in decision making by the SC, in stimulating enterprises to adhere to the programme as 
well as in the formulation of a national programme (in place and subject to a first budget 
allocation in 2012).  
 
The list of priority products is in line with the needs of the country but is considered long 
(10 sectors/product areas) as a way to focus the upgrading support in its pilot phase. Not 
surprisingly, there was little relation between the list and the 10 enterprises covered by 
the support. 
 
A  total  of  37  national  consultants  were trained  on  the  upgrading  approach,  some  of 
which  took  part  in  the  diagnostics  of  10  enterprises:  5  were  involved  in  each  2 
diagnostics in 2009 and 1 participated in one diagnostic. Of the 4 national consultants 
that took part in the next stage, i.e., the implementation of immaterial assistance, 3 were 
also part of the diagnostics phase (there is no information if this concerned the same 
enterprises). Notwithstanding the importance of national capacity building, the question 
can  be  raised  if  training  that  big  a  pool  of  national  consultants  (37)  is  justified  and 
appropriate, if the rate of their actual involvement in the programme has been quite low. 
 
The selection of 10 enterprises was made by the National SC based on the established 
criteria. Several delays were incurred, to start with as regards the actual start of the 
enterprise diagnostics. Subsequently, there have been delays in the diagnostics phase 
that were attributed to either the consultants or the enterprises concerned. Thereafter, 
there  was  reported  to  have  been  gap  between  the  upgrading  plan  and  the  start  of  
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support to its implementation. Subsequent delays in the implementation of the immaterial 
actions  were  mainly  attributed  to the  enterprises  and  the rating  of the  quality  of the 
immaterial support varied from excellent to satisfactory. The issue of ‘special activities’ 
(software) created confusion (i.e., on who was to purchase the same) and resulted in the 
non-implementation  of  such  planned  activity  in  some  cases.  Overall,  the  process  to 
obtain the ‘primes’ was considered correct albeit slow.  
 
In  brief,  of  the  10  enterprises  included  in  the  pilot  phase,  6  were  assessed  as  very 
interested and actively involved. Two out of 10 faced problems (one closed before the 
diagnostic report was finalized) and 4 obtained a ‘prime’ (3 in 2011 and 1 in 2012). There 
is no information available why in the end half of the enterprises did not make a request 
for  a  ‘prime’  (no  need  for  material  investment?  no  capacity  for  material  investment? 
discouragement ex ante to engage in a process to claim a subsidy?). 
 
As regards the implementation of immaterial activities, the selected subcontractor carried 
out 43 missions targeted at 9 companies (on average almost 5 per company). More than 
half  of  these  activities  were  labelled  as  production  related.  Cooperation  with  the 
enterprises was said to have varied from very difficult to smooth. There is no information 
on  the  work  distribution  in  terms  of  international  and  national  expertise.  Not  having 
access to the enterprise specific reports, it is difficult to assess the actual results of the 
assistance provided at the level of the enterprises – which is not reflected in the final 
report of the sub-contractor. 
 
It is to be highlighted that the Bureau put in place its own M&E system that shows that 
there have been tangible results in terms of reduction in losses, improved organization of 
production,  re-arrangement  of  lay-out  allowing  for  the  installation  of  new  equipment, 
improvement of hygienic practices, installation of lab facilities, … 
 
Cooperation  with  the  WAQP  was  well-conceived,  in  the  sense  that  the  national 
coordinators ere member of the other programme’s SC and the programme coordination 
teams  have  invited  one  another  to  training  organized  by  each  programme.  There  is 
however  no  indication  for  effective  cooperation  with  other  programmes  and  projects 
focused on enterprise support (the Upgrading Bureau is at this stage in the process of 
identifying such programmes). 
 
As regards visibility, it is recognized that not much has been done so far, apart from a 
few communications on the programme via press and radio. In future, there is a desire to 
use TV as medium to sensitize enterprises. 
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Annex 6: List of persons met 
PERSONS MET 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
BERNARD BAU  INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 




UNIT CHIEF OF PTC/TCB/CIU  UNIDO 
RAFIK FEKI   INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT 
OFFICER, PTC/BIT/CUP  UNIDO 
GERARDO PATACCONI  UNIT CHIEF OF PTC/BIT/CBL  UNIDO 
NILGUEN TAS  UNIT CHIEF OF PTC/BIT/CUP  UNIDO 
PENIN  EXPERT LABORATOIRE, 
CONSULTANT  UNIDO WAQP 
MOUILLET  EXPERT LABORATOIRE, 
CONSULTANT  UNIDO WAQP 
VINCENT DEFAUX    COFREPECHE / SFP 
MOUSSA SIDIBE   
ENTREPRENEURS  
EN AFRIQUE 
DE SAINT VINCENT    ADEPTA 
 
PERSONNES RENCONTRÉES AU BÉNIN 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
LUC INGENBLEEK    OMS 
CLAUDE LALEYE  CTN  ABENOR 
ZACHARRI SATCHINI  VICE PRÉSIDENT CPN  BRASSERIE BÉNIN 
YOUSSOUF MAMA SIKA   CHEF SERVICE 
CERTIFICATION  ABENOR 
DORIS AGNILA  CADRE ABENOR  ABENOR 
MICHEL NANOUKON  CADRE ABENOR  ABENOR 
DE SOUZA  CONSULTANT INDÉPENDANT   
CRÉPIN ZEVOUNOU  DIRECTEUR  LERGC 
CLAUDE HUBERT KONA  RESPONSABLE QUALITÉ  LERGC 
AIRY TONATO   DIRECTEUR   BRMN 
JACQUES HOUENASSOU  EXPERT FINANCIER  BRMN 
MATHIEU KPOHIHOUN  EXPERT INDUSTRIEL  BRMN 
LOKO RAFFET  MEMBRE CPN / PRÉSIDENT 
ANIB 
ASSOCIATION NATIONAL 
DES INDUSTRIES DU BÉNIN 
MICHEL ADANDJEKPO  RESP.  QUALITÉ  SOPAB 
DENIS GAHOU  RESP. APPROVISIONNEMENT  SOPAB 
DANSOU LÉOPOLD  DIRECTEUR  SOCIA BÉNIN 
WALTER HOUENOUVO  RESP. MOYENS GÉNÉRAUX   ÉTÉ/ EAU TECHNOLOGIE 
ENVIRONNEMENT   
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PERSONNES RENCONTREES EN COTE D’IVOIRE 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 





BRUNO VAN EECKOUT  COORDINATEUR GÉNÉRAL  CEL. DE COORDINATION 





AHOTI   CTN  CODINORM 




MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE 
KOUTOUA CLAUDE  VICE PRÉSIDENT CPN  COMITE NATIONAL DE 
PILOTAGE QUALITE 
KOFFI SINCLAIR  CONSULTANT   INDÉPENDANT 
MESSOUM PACOME  CONSULTANT   INDÉPENDANT 
LAUBOUET AUGUSTIN  CELLULE QUALITÉ  BNETD 
KRASSE CHRISTIANE   DRH  BNETD 
YAPO ATSE  ETUDES /CONSEIL 
TECHNIQUES   BNETD 
ATTAH KOFFI  PLANNIFICATION / 
AMÉNAGEMENT TERRITOIRE  BNETD 
KACOU NAOMU  DG / SDQUD   BNETD 
TANOH AHOVA  DIRECTEUR   LABORATOIRE LCHAI 
KOFFI MATHIAS  CHEF DE SERVICE CHIMIE  LABORATOIRE LCHAI 
ANOMAN ADJO 
THERESE  
CHEF DE SERVICE 
MICROBIOLOGIE  LABORATOIRE LCHAI 
N'GUESSAN BERTRAND  CHEF DE SERVICE QUALITÉ  LABORATOIRE LCHAI 
CAMARA RÉGINE  RESPONSABLE MÉTROLOGIE  LABORATOIRE LCHAI 
FELIX GUILMOTO  DIRECTEUR  




BROU EDWIGE CAREW  RESPONSABLE QUALITÉ 




DR TANOH    LABORATOIRE LCHAI 
ADIL HAMDAN  DIRECTEUR DE PRODUCTION  SOFT DRINKS 
ABO KOFFI ANTOINE  RESPONSABLE QUALITÉ  SOFT DRINKS 
IBRAHIMA KABA  CHEF DU LABORATOIRE  CASTELLI 
AMOUSSAN BAKARI 
RAYMOND  DIRECTEUR  BRMN   
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PERSONNES RENCONTREES EN COTE D’IVOIRE 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
KAKOU AMON 
CHRISTELLE  EXPERT   BRMN  
ACHI ATSE GABRIEL  EXPERT QUALITÉ  BRMN  
TUO NAMOGO ADAMA  EXPERT FINANCIER JUNIOR  BRMN  
NURUDILE OYEWOLE  EXPERT COMMUNICATION  BRMN  
KONAN N'GUESSAN  EXPERT FINANCIER   BRMN  
NICOLAS DJIBO  VICE PRÉSIDENT CNP  VICE PRESIDENT CCI COTE 
D'IVOIRE 
SANHOUN GREAT MARIE   DIRECTRICE  DÉGUÈ DELICE 
EUGÈNE KREMIEN  PDG  IDH 
KOFFI KOFFI  SOUS DIRECTEUR 
COMPATBILITÉ  IDH 
 
    
  116 
PERSONNES RENCONTREES AU BURKINA FASO 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
GUY-AMÉDÉE 
AJANOHOUN 
COMMISSIONER   UEMOA 
N'GOYET KOFFI  DIRECTEUR DE LA 
NORMALISATION ET DE LA 
PROMOTION DE LA QUALITÉ 
UEMOA 
BALLA DIONG  DIRECTEUR DE L'ENTERPRISE 





CHARGÉE DE L'INDUSTRIE  UEMOA 
BERNARD G. ZOUGOURI  SECRÉTAIRE GÉNÉRAL  MINISTERE DE 
L'INDUSTRIE, DU 
COMMERCE ET DE 
L'ARTISANAT 
RICHARD HANDS  CHEF DE SECTION, 
INTEGRATION RÉGIONALE 
DÉLÉGATION DE L'UNION 
EUROPÉENNE  
AU BURKINA FASO 
FRANCOISE LE LOSQ  CHARGÉE DE PROGRAMMES, 
SECTION INTÉGRATION 
RÉGIONALE, SECTEUR PRIVÉ 
ET CULTURE 
DÉLÉGATION DE L'UNION 
EUROPÉENNE  
AU BURKINA FASO 
MAROU SAWADOGO  CHARGÉE DE PROGRAMMES, 
SECTION INTÉGRATION 
RÉGIONALE, SECTEUR PRIVÉ 
ET CULTURE 
DÉLÉGATION DE L'UNION 
EUROPÉENNE  
AU BURKINA FASO 
PATRICK SALLES  CONSEILLER DU PRÉSIDENT 
POUR LA MISE EN OEUVRE DU 
PROGRAMME ECONOMIQUE 
RÉGIONAL (PER) 
UNION ECONOMIQUE ET 
MONETAIRE OUEST 
AFRICAINE 
MARCEL GBAGUIDI  HEAD OF SUB-OFFICE OF THE 
TECHNICAL COORDINATION 
UNIT OF THE WEST AFRICA 
QUALITY PROGRAMME AT 
UEMOA COMMISSION 
PROGRAMME QUALITE 
AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST 
LOMPO LÉONTINE  COORDONNATRICE 
TECHNIQUE NATIONALE 
PROGRAMME QUALITE 
AFRIQUE DE L'OUEST; 
COMPOSANTE UEMOA 
TRAORE SYLVANUS  DIRECTEUR  BUREAU DE 
RESTRUCTURATION ET DE 
MISE A NIVEAU COMITE DE 
PILOTAGE NATIONAL 
ABDOULAYE NABOLE  PRËSIDENT DU COMITE DE 
PILOTAGE DU PRMN ET 
DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL  
FILSAH - FILATURE DU 
SAHEL 
OUSSÉINI OUEDRAOGO  SECRÉTAIRE PERMANENT  ASSOCIATION BURKINABE 
POUR LE MANAGEMENT DE 
LA QUALITE  
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PERSONNES RENCONTREES AU BURKINA FASO 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
TRAORE MOUSSA  DIRECTEUR DE LA 
FACILITATION DES AFFAIRES 
LA MAISON DE 
L'ENTREPRISE DU BURKINA 
FASO 
COMBARI MICHEL  RESPONSIBLE ASSURANCE 
QUALITÉ 
CENTRE NATIONAL DE LA 
RECHERCHE SCIENTIFIQUE 
ET TECHNOLOGIQUE 
FRANCOIS TRAORE  AUDITEUR QUALITÉ CERTIFIÉ 
IRCA, DIRECTEUR 
INSTITUT DE MANAGEMENT 
CONSEILS ET FORMATION 





COMMERCE ET DE 
L'ARTISANAT 
SAM P. BARNABÉ  DIRECTEUR DE PRODUCTION  SOCIETE TAN ALIZ 
N.J. FLAUBERT OUOBA  TECHNOLOGUE LAITIER, 
DIRECTEUR 
LAITERIE MODERNE  
LE PROFESSIONNEL 
OLÉ ALAIN KAM  JURISTE CONSULTANT, 
ASSOCIÉ GÉRANT 









L'ELEVAGE EN ZONE 
SUBHUMIDE 
RODOLPHE JOÉL KY  EXPERT QUALITÉ COTON, 
AGROÉCONOMISTE - CHEF 
CLASSEUR CHEF DE SERVICE 
SOCIETE BURKINABE DES 
FIBRES TEXTILES 
MOUMOUNI KONATE  DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL  SAVONNERIE PARFUMERIE 
DU HOUET 
SANOGO SORY  DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL  STAB SARL 
DAKUYO PANDO 
ZEPHINN 
DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL  LABORATORIES PHYTOFLA 
KIMI LEONCE  COMPTABLE  ADI SARL  
CIPE WIMONDON  ST H.S.B.C    
BARRO MAMADOU  GESTIONNAIRE  SOFIS  
ISABELLE GARANGO  D.G.A.  SAP OLYMPIC  
ADAMU SANOU  DAP  SAP OLYMPIC 
SAMBOA SOUMAHILA  DAF  SOTRIA-B 
MARIUS GAGRÉ  DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL  CINTECH, CABINET 
D'INVESTIGATION 
TECHNIQUE D'EXPERTISE 
ET DE CONTROLE 
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PERSONS MET IN GHANA 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
FRANK VAN ROMPAY 
UNIDO REPRESENTATIVE 
 IN GHANA 
UNIDO 




TCB & WAQ PROJECTS 
UNIDO 


















CHEETHAN MINGLE  PRINCIPAL  FOOD AND DRUGS BOARD 
PETER OBENG  DEPUTY DIRECTOR (AGRIC)  GHANA EXPORT 
PROMOTION COUNCIL 










AGUSTIN VIZCAINO  TRI MARINE 
REPRESENTATIVE  TRI MARINE 
NAA ATSWEI NYAKPO  FSMS & QMS LEAD 
CONSULTANT 
NOESIS - FOOD SAFETY & 
QUALITY MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTING 
PAUL AYEH  GENERAL MANAGER - 
OPERATIONS 
ICHE COCOA INDUSTRY 
LTD. 







QUALITY, SAFETY, HEALTH 
AND ENVIRONMENT 
RESOURCES (QSHE) 
FRITS HENDRIKS  QUALITY EXPERT 
TRAQUE - TRADE RELATED 
ASSISTANCE & QUALITY 
ENABLING PROGRAMME 






TRAQUE - TRADE RELATED 
ASSISTANCE & QUALITY 
ENABLING PROGRAMME 
MINISTRY OF TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY 
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PERSONS MET IN NIGERIA 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
RAYMOND TAVARES  UNIDO REGIONAL OFFICE  UNIDO 
TEAM  WAQP TECHNICAL 
COORDINATION UNIT  UNIDO 
AKINBOLAWA  NATIONAL COORDINATOR, 
WAQP  UNIDO 
 O.J. SIKUADE   AG. DIRECTOR 
DEPARTMENT OF WEIGHTS 
& MEASURES,  
FEDERAL MINISTRY OF 
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY 
M.S. SIDI  CHIEF LEGAL METROLOGY 
OFFICER AND STAFF   
 NIKE OWOYELE  HEAD LABORATORY 
SERVICES 
STANDARDS 




J. ACHUKWU  DIRECTOR AND STAFF 
STANDARDS 




S. A. DENLOYE  DIRECTOR LABORATORY 
SERVICES AND STAFF 
NATIONAL AGENCY FOR 
FOOD AND DRUG 
ADMINISTRATION CONTROL 
OFFICE (NAFDAC) 
M. I. OJO 
DEPUTY DIRECTOR  
(BY PHONE) 
NIGERIAN ASSOCIATION OF 
CHAMBERS OF COMMERCE, 
INDUSTRY, MINES AND 
AGRICULTURE (NACCIMA) 
SEMIU AYINLA 
GENERAL MANAGER  
(AND STAFF) 
OBASANJO FARMS  
NIGERIA LTD 
YUSUF ISIAKA 





JAGDISH  AG. MANAGING DIRECTOR  DANGOTE NOODLES LTD 
NGO MCDAPPA 




DANGOTE NOODLES LTD 
SANNI MIKAIL 
ISO COORDINATOR, 
DANGOTE GROUP  
(BY PHONE) 
DANGOTE NOODLES LTD 
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PERSONNES RENCONTRÉES AU SÉNÉGAL 




MINISTÉRE DU COMMERCE, 
DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DE 
L'ARTISANAT 
MAMADOU SYIL KEBE  
INGÉNIEUR - 
CHEF DE DIVISION 
MINISTÉRE DU COMMERCE, 
DE L'INDUSTRIE ET DE 
L'ARTISANAT 








PRESIDENT DU CPN 
 (COPIL) 
UNION NATIONALE DES 






NATIONAL DU PQAO AU 
SENEGAL 
ONUDI 







(JUSQU’EN OCTOBRE 2012) 
BUREAU DE MISE A NIVEAU 
SOKHNA DIOP CISSE  EXPERT SUIVI  BUREAU DE MISE A NIVEAU 
FATOU DYANA BA  EXPERT INDUSTRIE  BUREAU DE MISE A NIVEAU 
OUMY TALL  SENEGALAISE DES EAUX 
CHEF DE SECTION 
SURVEILLANCE PHYSICO-
ETLININGS DES EAUX 
ASTON N'DIAYE  EVALUATEUR TECHNIQUE  LCI 
NDEYE FATOU NDIAYE  EVALUATEUR TECHNIQUE  ITA 






ABDUL AZIZ NDAW  DIRECTEUR GÉNÉRAL  QES CONSULTING 
INTERNATIONAL 
BARBACAR NDIR  EVALUATEUR QUALITÉ  AFS CONSULTING 
IBRAHIMA GAYE  EVALUATEUR QUALITÉ  CONSULTANT 
INDEPENDENT 
DIENG MGOSSE NDIAYE  SUNEOL  CLABO 
ALASSANE BA  DIRECTEUR DE LA QUALITÉ  PALM BTP 
ALIOU DIOUF  RESP. QUALITÉ  OLEOSEN 
BABA GADJI  CHARGE DE MISSION  CERES LOCUSTOX 
DOGO SECK  ADMINISTRATEUR GÉNERAL  CERES LOCUSTOX 
BÉCAYE FALL  CHEF SERVICE BIOLOGIE 
AUDITEUR TECHNIQUE SOAC 
HOSPITAL PRINCIPAL  
DE DAKAR  
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PERSONNES RENCONTRÉES AU SÉNÉGAL 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
COLETTE CROMIS  
MANSAY 
RESPONSABLE QUALITÉ DU  
LSAHE 
INSTITUT PASTEUR DE  
DAKAR-LSAHE 
BÉNÉDICTE SISSOKO  CONSULTANTE  AFRIQUE MANAGEMENT 
COUNCIL 
SARKE FATOU BÉYE 
ADJOINTE RESPONSIBLE 




BARBACAR GHING  RESP. ADJOINT DU SERVICE 
QUALITÉ 
INSTITUT PASTEUR DE 
DAKAR 
PAPA ALASSANE DIAW 
BIOLOGISTE ASSISTANT 
BIO24 –  
EVALUATION TECHNIQUE 
LABORATOIRE BIO24 
TIDIANE SIBY  DIRECTEUR  LABORATOIRE BIO24 
MEISSZ FILL  INSPECTEUR  DIC/ DITP 
ALHOUSSEYNOU 
MOCTAR HANNE 
CHEF DE BUREAU 
QUARANTAINE DU PLANNING 




QUALITY MANAGEMENT AND 




BAGORÉ BATHILY  DIRECTEUR  LA LAITERIE DU BERGER 
BÉNEDICTE TORT-
BOURGEOIS SISSOKO 




AMC - AFRIQUE 
MANAGEMENT CONSEIL 
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PERSONS MET IN SIERRA LEONE 
NAME  TITLE  ORGANIZATION 
STEPHEN KARGBO  UNIDO  HEAD OF OPERATIONS 
JOHN KAISAM  UNIDO  NATIONAL COORDINATOR 
OF WAQP 
BASSIE G BANGURA  CHAIRMAN  NATIONAL STEERING 
COMMITTEE 
JAMES DUMBUYA  SECRETARY  NATIONAL STEERING 
COMMITTEE 
MOHAMED K BAKARR   NSC MEMBER  MINISTRY OF LANDS AND 
COUNTRY PLANNING 
JAMES DUMBUYA  EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR  SIERRA LEONE STANDARDS 
BUREAU 
AMADOU JOGOR BAH  DEPUTY EXECUTIVE 
DIRECTOR 
SIERRA LEONE STANDARDS 
BUREAU 
PHILIPPE KANU  HACCP EXPERT   
 
PERSONNES RENCONTRÉES AU TOGO 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
SAMBO  POINT FOCAL ONUDI  MINISTRE DE L'INDUSTRIE 
LOKO  CHARGÉ DE PROGRAMME  MINISTRE DE L'INDUSTRIE 
JAMES LASSÉVI 
AGBOGJAN  CTN  PQ2 
WILFREED AFOUTOU  ASSISTANT CTN  PQ2 
KOKOU BIAVA ATTITSO   PRÉSIDENT CPN  DIRECTEUR DE L'INDUSTRIE 
MINISTERE DE L'INDUSTRIE 
BROOHM  PARTICIPANT AU CPN  CCI TOGO 
CHANTAL GOTO  DIRECTRICE  ITRA 
BANLA  DIRECTRICE  INH 
BARRY  VÉTÉRINAIRE INSPECTEUR   DIRECTION DE L'ÉLEVAGE  
YANTRA  VÉTÉRINAIRE INSPECTEUR   DIRECTION DE L'ÉLEVAGE  
ABOTCHI  CHEF DE CABINET   DIRECTION DE L'ÉLEVAGE  
SODJI AHIN  DIRECTEUR   BRMN 
GBEASSOR MESSAVI   PRÉSIDENT CPN 
DIRECTION MATIONALE  
DE LA RECHERCHE 
SCIENTIFIQUE 
THÉOPHILE PANOU  VICE PRÉSIDENT CPN  IMPRIMERIE 
XAVIER ALLADO  ADMINISTRATEUR GÉNÉRAL  EPSILON 
PROSPER SÉWA 
AMÉTÉPÉ  SECRETAIRE GÉNÉRAL  NIOTO  
AZIAGBE KOFI MICHEL  DIRECTION PRODUCTION / 
RESPONSABLE QUALITÉ   SGMT 
GEAU GÉRARD   ASSISTANT DIRECTION RH  SGMT 
GBEMOU KODJO  COMPTABLE  SGMT  
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PERSONNES RENCONTRÉES AU TOGO 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
BACCALIAN   DG  SGMT 
AGRIHA OURO  CHEF COMPTABLE  BB MIAH VITALE 
GAFAH  RESPONSABLE QUALITÉ  BBVITALE 
BALI  DIRECTRICE  ONAF 
 
PERSONNES RENCONTREES LORS DE L’ASSEMBLEE GENERALE DE L’AAFEX 
NOM  TITRE  ORGANISATION 
MARIE KONATE  PDG  PKL 
RENAUD GOIRAND  PDG  COCOPACK 
MOSSOGBÉ TOURE  PDG  SITA 
AISSATA DEM  DG  DANAYA CÉRÉALES 
MARIKO   GÉRANTE  UCODAL 
YAYA MALLE  GÉRANT  LE VERGER 
TALL  PRÉSIDENTE   AAFEX 
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Annex 7: Key reference documents
12 
 
PROGRAMME DE RESTRUCTURATION ET DE MISE A NIVEAU  
UEMOA/COMMISSION DDRE. ETUDES SUR LA COMPETITIVITE DES FILIERES 
AGRICOLES DANS L’ESPACE UEMOA, IRAM. (MARS 2006). 
 
UEMAO/ONUDI. APPUI A LA CONCEPTION ET LA MISE EN PLACE DE 
MECANISMES DE FINANCEMENT DE LA RESTRUCTURATION ET DE LA MISE A 
NIVEAU DES PME DE L’UEMOA, QUR LE PLAN REGIONAL, PUIS NATIONAL 
RAPPORT FINAL. (VERSION PROVISOIRE – JANVIER 2011). 
 
UEMOA/ONUDI. FONDS D’APPUI A LA POLITIQUE DE RESTRUCTURATION ET DE 
MISE A NIVEAU DE L’UEMOA. MANUEL OPÉRATIONNEL. (VERSION PROVISOIRE – 
MARS 2011). 
 
UEMOA/ONUDI. PROGRAMME SOUS-REGIONAL PILOTE DE RESTRUCTURATION 
ET DE MISE A NIVEAU DE L’INDUSTRIE DES PAYS DE L’UEMOA, DOCUMENT DE 
PROJET (CONVENTION D’ASSISTANCE). (2006). 
 
UEMOA/ONUDI. PROGRAMME DE RESTRUCTURATION ET DE MISE A NIVEAU DE 
L’INDUSTRIE DES PAYS DE L’UEMOA, PHASE DE DEPLOIEMENT, EBAUCHE DU 
DOCUMENT DE PROJET. (VERSION 2012). 
 
UEMOA/ONUDI. RAPPORT DES MISSIONS CIRCULAIRES. (2008, 2009) 
 
UNIDO/UEMOA. RAPPORTS D’EXECUTION TECHNIQUE ET FINANCIER (NRS 1-9), 
IN PARTICULAR THE LAST REPORT (NR. 9). (MARCH 2012). 
 
UNIDO. ANALYSE STRATEGIQUE DES FILIERES AGROINDUSTRIELLES 
PRIORITAIRES ET DU SECTEUR DE L’EMBALLAGE DANS LES ETATS MEMBRES 
DE L’UEMOA. (JUIN 2009). 
 
UNIDO. AUTO EVALUATION PROGRAMME SOUS-REGIONAL PILOTE DE 
RESTRUCTURATION ET DE MISE A NIVEAU DE L’INDUSTRIE DES PAYS DE 
L’UEMOA, A. CAPELLO. (JANVIER 2011). 
 
UNIDO. FINAL REPORTS OF SUBCONTRACTORS (2) ENGAGED IN 
IMPLEMENTATION OF UPGRADING PLANS (INVESTISSEMENTS IMMATÉRIELS). 
(2012) UNIDO. THE UNIDO INITIATIVE ON INDUSTRIAL UPGRADING AND 
ENTERPRISE COMPETITIVENESS, DRAFT PROPOSAL NOTE ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF A UNIDO UPGRADING KIT.  
 
UNIDO. NOTES ON MISSIONS BY UEMOA AND ECOWAS REPRESENTATIVES TO 
UNIDO HQ. (FEBRUARY 2010). 
 
UNIDO. LIST OF ETAPES DU PROCESSUS DE MISE A NIVEAU. 
                                                 
12 The evaluation team consulted a wide range of documents concerning the two programmes; as it is not 
possible to give an exhaustive list of all documents used by the team, the current list highlights the main 
ones.  
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WEST AFRICA QUALITY PROGRAMME  
CONVENTION NO. 9 ACP ROC 15, APPUI A LA COMPETITIVITE ET A 
L’HARMONISATION DES MESURES OTC ET SPS. DOCUMENT DE PROJET. (JUIN 
2007). 
 
ECOWAS. WEST AFRICA QUALITY POLICY. (2013). 
 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, REPORTS OF WAQP ROM MISSIONS (MONITORING). 
(2010-2012). 
 
UEMOA.NORMALISATION ET DE PROMOTION DE LA QUALITE AU SEIN DE 
L’UEMOA, RAPPORT D’EXECUTION FINAL. (DECEMBRE 2006). 
 
UNIDO. RAPPORTS D’EXECUTION TECHNIQUE. (JANVIER 2007- OCTOBER 2012). 
 
UNIDO. REPORTS OF PERIODIC REVIEW MEETINGS. 
 
UNIDO. REPORTS OF TECHNICAL MEETINGS OF REGIONAL THEMATIC 
WORKING GROUPS. 
 
UNIDO. INTERNALNOTES, SUCH AS RECOMMENDATIONS ON ACTIVITIES 
PREPARED BY THE CTA, TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR TECHNICAL 
SPECIFICATIONS FOR PURCHASE OF EQUIPMENT.  
 
UNIDO. TECHNICAL REPORTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL 
CONSULTANTS ENGAGED IN SUPPORT (REGIONAL/COUNTRY-LEVEL) RELATED 
TO SPECIFIC SUB-THEMES:   
 
o  TESTING LABORATORIES 
o  STANDARDIZATION 
o  QUALITY ASSURANCE 
o  CERTIFICATION 
o  BUSINESS PLANS FOR LABORATORIES 
o  REGIONAL QUALITY INFRASTRUCTURE (SOAC, SOAMET, 
NORMCERQ) 
o  STRENGTHENING OF TECHNICAL CENTRES AT THE LEVEL OF 
UEMOA 
o  LEGAL STATUS OF CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT BODIES  
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OTHER DOCUMENTS RELATED TO QUALITY AND UPGRADING 
 
QUALITY AND EXPORT  
COMMISSION EUROPEENNE/  DIRECTION GENERALE DE LA SANTE ET DES 
CONSOMMATEURS DIRECTION F OFFICE ALIMENTAIRE ET VETERINAIRE:  
 
AAFEX / ASSOCIATION AFRIQUE AGROEXPORT. 
 
AAFEX. CATALOGUE DES MEMBRES (2012). 
 
AAFEX. PROCES VERBAL  DE L’ASSEMBLEE GENERALE. (5 DECEMBRE 2011). 
 
AAFEX ET PROGRAMME QUALITE ; APPUI A LA MISE EN ŒUVRE DU SYSTEME 
DE MANAGEMENT DE LA SECURITE DES DENREES ALIMENTAIRES SELON LA 
NORME ISO 22000 : 2005 - EERAF07A17-11 – RAPPORT DE MISSION SENEGAL. 
 
BETTER TRAINING FOR SAFER FOOD ANNUAL REPORT 2009. 
 
DG (SANCO) /2010/8545-RM FINAL. RAPPORT D’UNE MISSION EFFECTUEE AU 
SENEGAL DU27 AVRIL  AU 06 MAI 2010 AFIN D’EVALUER LES SYSTEMES DE 
CONTROLE EN PLACE REGISSANT  LA PRODUCTION DES  PRODUITS DE LA 
PECHE DESTINES A L’EXPORTATION VERS L’UNION EUROPEENNES. 
 
DG (SANCO)  /2009/8351-MR FINAL. FINAL REPORT OF A MISSION CARRIED OUT 
IN SIERRA LEONE IN ORDER TO EVALUATE THE CONTROL SYSTEMS IN PLACE 
GOVERNING THE PRODUCTION OF FISHERY PRODUCTS INTENDED TO EXPORT 
TO EUROPEAN UNION. 
 
DG (SANCO) /2009/8331-MR FINAL. RAPPORT D’UNE MISSION EFFECTUEE AU 
TOGO DU 8 AU 11 JUIN 2009 CONCERNANT LES PRODUITS DE LA PECHE.  
 
DG (SANCO) /2007/8331-RM FINAL. RAPPORT D’UNE MISSION EFFECTUEE AU 
TOGO DU 23 AU 27 AVRIL  2007 AFIN D’EVALUER LES CONTROLE DE SANTE 
PUBLIC ET LES CONDITIONS DE PRODUCTION DE  PRODUITS DE LA PECHE 
DESTINES A L’EXPORTATION VERS L’UNION EUROPEENNES.  
 
DG (SANCO)/8001/2006- RM FINAL. RAPPORT D’UNE MISSION EFFECTUEE EN 
COTE D’IVOIRE DU 25 AOUT  AU 1ER SEPTEMBRE 2006 AFIN D’EVALUER LES 
CONTROLES DE SANTE PUBLIC ET LES CONDITIONS DE PRODUCTION ET 
D’EXPORT DES PRODUITS DE LA PECHE. 
 
GRET/ AFD. ETUDE SUR LA COHERENCE DES POLITIQUES COMMERCIALES EN 
AFRIQUE DE L’OUEST, RAPPORT FINAL (2010). 
 
PIP MAGAZINE.  N°15 NEW EU MARKET REQUIREMENTS. (SEPTEMBER 2011).  
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PIP MAGAZINE. N° 14 FINAL EVALUATION OF THE PIP. (NOVEMBER 2008). 
 
PIP ANALYSE. ENQUETES SUR LES EXPORTATEURS DE FRUITS ET LEGUMES 
EN AFRIQUE SUB SAHARIENNE, LES EXIGENCES DES ACHETEURS ET LEURS 
IMPACTS SUR LES CHAINES D’APPROVISIONNEMENT. (MAI 2009). 
 
PROGRAMME INITIATIVES PESTICIDES (PIP) / COLEACP. 
 
WEST AFRICA TRADE HUB / WE AID. THE DIRECTORY OF WEST AFRICAN 
EXPORTERS. (AUGUST 2012). 
 
SME FINANCE  
BOAD /AFD.ETUDE SUR LES INSTRUMENTS DE GARANTIE ET LES MARCHES DE 
GARANTIES BANCAIRES DANS LA ZONE DE L’UEMOA, REALISEE PAR HORUS ET 
OSEO. (JANVIER 2011). 
 
BOAD. GUIDE PRATIQUE DES OPERATEURS PRIVES (JUIN 2009). 
 
LA BOAD ET LA PROMOTION DES PME. 
 
INVESTISSEURS ET PARTENAIRES POUR LE DEVELOPPEMENT, I&P, « VERS 
UNE NOUVELLE ECONOMIE AFRICAINE » (NOVEMBRE 2012). 
 
LA FINANCE EN AFRIQUE, AU-DELA  DE LA CRISE -  THORSTEN BECK, SAMUEL 
MUNZELE MAIMBO, ISSA FAYE, THOURAYA TRIKI – BAD, WORL BANK & BMZ 
(2011). 
 
ONUDI / ITPO PARIS. ETUDE PORTANT SUR LA CREATION D’UNE SOCIETE DE 
CAPITAL INVESTISSEMENT AU MALI, ERIC MARTI. (JANVIER  2010). 
 
GENERAL DOCUMENTS 
ECOWAS EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT AND UEMOA. REGIONAL INTEGRATION FOR 
GROWTH AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN WEST-AFRICA: STRATEGIES AND PLAN 
OF ACTION.(DECEMBER 2006). 
 
UNIDO. PAST COUNTRY PROGRAMME EVALUATIONS IN THE COUNTRIES 
COVERED BY THE TWO PROGRAMMES REVIEWED. 
 
UNIDO. SMTQ THEMATIC EVALUATION (2010). 
 
UNIDO.THEMATIC EVALUATION OF UNIDO PROJECTS RELATED TO “INDUSTRIAL 
UPGRADING”, C. STARITZ, PRELIMINARY DRAFT (DECEMBER 2011). 
 
WTO. COUNTRY-SPECIFIC TRADE POLICY REVIEWS (PER COUNTRY). 
 